《議報》第163期
仇恨：為你我而鳴的喪鐘
易堯（湖北）
2004年9月1日到4日期間，俄羅斯北奧塞梯爆發了一場特大的校園人質危機，被綁架的平民1200多人。據俄羅斯官方消息，共有355人喪生，還有 400多人傷勢嚴重。在這些受難者當中，多數是兒童。他們被炸得身首異處，或面目全非、無法辨認。這一令人髮指的恐怖活動震驚了世界，據目擊證人說，這些暴徒宣稱他們這麼做是要報復俄軍對車臣兒童的殺戮。但這並不能合理化他們對俄國兒童犯下的罪惡行徑。眾所周知，以暴易暴的結果就是共同毀滅，無論哪一方獲勝，都是末日來臨。所以，為限制暴力的擴張，保證人類能在這地球上正常存活下去，代表人性文明的部分人類制定了許多相關的國際公約，以最大限度地降低暴力對人類文明的摧殘。
其中，日內瓦戰俘條約就明確規定：戰俘在任何時間均須受人道的待遇和保護。只要放下了武器，戰俘就具有人權。婦女和兒童更是被嚴厲禁止傷害的物件，這是協約國達成的基本共識。然而，近年來，針對平民的恐怖的襲擊卻越來越多，在戰後的伊拉克，人質事件和斬首暴行頻繁發生，那向全世界公開播放砍頭的畫面讓每一個良知未泯的人都為之顫慄和憤怒。而這殺戮兒童的恐怖，則大大超越了人類文明所能承受的極限，成為了一種比獸性更野蠻、更殘忍的行徑，受到了來自文明社會的全面抗議和譴責，並再次敲響了人類文明的警鐘。警鐘若不能預警的話，隨時都有可能變成一記喪鐘。
2004年2月至3月間，《新浪網》對中國青年在戰時如何對待婦孺和戰俘進行調查問卷，問：如果你是一名士兵，在上級允許的情況下，你會向婦孺和戰俘開槍嗎？基本上做肯定回答的就占了82.6％。
更讓人膽戰心驚的是，在參與調查的人當中，暴力語言如影隨形，隨處可見。
來自遼寧錦州的參與者表示：“敢於和中華民族作對的種族就該殺光”。來自中國科學院系統的參與者表示：“為達到正當目的，可以不擇手段；尤其是對日本人，越南人，印尼人，見人就殺！！！”。來自安徽毫州的參與者說：“如果是日本人的話，我連孕婦也殺，何況婦孺和戰俘？殺殺殺！！！”……。（參見中國資訊中心《調查發現82.6%的中國青年贊同槍殺婦孺和戰俘--對新浪網網路調查的研究報告》）
自由亞洲電臺的《中國透視》節目中，吳弘達先生與陳奎德先生專門對此進行了分析，陳先生首先想到的就是六四屠城，他說：“1989年6月4日淩晨的時候，中共的坦克和士兵向手無寸鐵的學生和平民開槍，……中共當局為了維護自己的特權，竟然用野戰軍來對付平民。……但是，大家更為驚訝的是這些士兵，他們都是老老實實的農家子弟出身，為什麼會對清清楚楚毫無武裝、毫無武器的同胞--學生和市民能夠下得了手，能夠開得了槍！…”
吳弘達先生分析道：“因為中國每一個政權的根底建立在仇恨上。……我想原因，一方面是一個是文化基礎，一個延續到今天的不尊重生命的傳統，另外更主要的是資訊封鎖、思想封鎖等等，這些都有關係。”但他不解的是：“還有一個重要因素，就是今天的中國統治者，他們究竟在搞什麼？”
中國統治者在搞什麼？他們在無休止地製造暴力和仇恨。9月4日，許多還保存著人類良知的中國人喊出了“我是俄羅斯人”的口號，以示對恐怖的聲討和對災難的同情。作為一個中國人，我以前也有著莫名的仇恨情結，“911”的電視畫面曾讓我興奮不已。但這次，我無論如何也沒有了置身事外的幸災樂禍和心安理得。因為我知道，照這樣的趨勢，我也將成為受害者當中的一群。不僅是我，還包括眾多中國人，心頭都糾纏著一個崇尚暴力的死結。我們總是相信烏龜跟兔子賽跑烏龜能得第一，我們總是希望敵人一天天爛下去而我們一天天好起來。誰是我們的敵人？教科書告訴我們，反對我們的、比我們更能耐的、過得比我們好的都是敵人。雷鋒是好人好事的榜樣，毛澤東率先題詞“向雷鋒同志學習”。雷鋒精神有兩點，一是對同志要像春風一樣溫暖，“毫不利己，專門利人”；二是堅決捍衛毛主席，“對敵人要像秋風掃落葉一樣殘酷無情”。號召之後，整個中國卻是壞事做絕，好人難當，世風日下，道德淪喪。倒是後者深入人心，他人就是地獄，他人就是豺狼。爾虞我詐，置人死地而後快。同夥尚且如此，惶論敵人。
很明顯，當今中國絕大多數青年表現出來的“暴力情結”與國際公認的基本法則是背道而馳的。漠視人權和生命是專制政權的重要特徵，並以此薰陶和煽動著它的子民。專制政權壟斷報紙、廣播、書籍等新聞出版業，以政治學習、業務討論、思想彙報、大會發言、小組討論、談心得、寫體會等花樣翻新、威逼利誘的方式，不斷渲染著“紅旗是用鮮血染成的”這一事實，揮舞著“鐮刀和錘子”，從而開動全部國家機器把每一個人的出生、上學、就業、結婚、生子乃至生病死去都牢牢控制在手上，通過黨棒教育推行、貫徹一套自欺欺人的話語系統，自啟蒙階段就開始影響、改造、操縱人們的思維和語言，並左右著人們的聽覺和視覺。一方面它積極宣揚階級鬥爭、忠君意識和民族主義進行洗腦；另一方面，它嚴密採取焚書、禁報、電波過濾和網路封鎖等手段，隔絕和破壞一切可以識破其陰謀的資訊而徹底地對文化進行全面閹割，迫使人們唯命是從、助紂為虐。從薩達姆的殘暴到本拉登的瘋狂，每一次恐怖活動的得逞，專制政權的主宰者及其狂奴都會言不由衷地表現出參與狂歡的熱情和衝動。由此也就不難理解，為什麼俄羅斯那些孩童屍骨未寒，中央電視臺的電視螢幕上就滾出了死亡人數的有獎競猜；而15年前的血洗天安門就更是順理成章。
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原載《議報》第163期 http://www.chinaeweekly.com
此文系本刊首發，歡迎其他各類刊物轉登轉發，但是請注明出處和本報網址
Saturday, January 12, 2008
深入龍巢的相關討論
轉貼自http://www.socialforce.tw/phpBB/portal.php多位發文者的討論，因為只看文章內容，所以常沒記下討論者的名字，請自行去該站查閱
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Cliff Roger, and et al. (2007) Entering the Dragon's Lair:Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States. Santa Monica, C.A.: RAND.
該份報告是蘭德公司與美國空軍合作的(已經合作非常久，產出許多報告)，晚上利用點時間稍微瀏覽。全部分成六章節：
1. 導論、
2. 當代中國軍事戰略、
3. 中國軍事戰略原理對美軍戰場進入的潛在意函、
4. 中國反介入(antiaccess)手段的可能影響、
5. 美軍對中國該手段的反擊、
以及6. 結論。
一般而言，對軍事的意涵在4、5兩章，提到中國可利用彈道飛彈、攻擊機、巡弋飛彈、隱形行動與網路阻絕等工具，針對前進部署於中國週邊1500公里的軍事基地，進行第一波的攻擊，對象包括對軍用機場、海軍基地等補給、維修等設施，通訊系統，甚至是航空母艦。
這個實踐的理論支撐為超限戰與以小搏大的概念；令人感到興趣的是，許多研究已經提到上述的理論、手段，為何空軍與蘭德公司要選在這個時刻公佈？
其實，阻絕戰術(個人偏愛這樣的用法)是中國針對台灣的一種手段；各位設想中國是要在西太平洋取得主導權，這樣的阻絕戰術有多大效果？應該遠不如偷襲珍珠港吧。
身為後進的中國，最可能與美國爭霸的方式是採取與美國類似的發展方式：航母戰鬥群、兩棲作戰部隊，而非僅是阻絕戰術的運用。
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中國可能在台海發生事端時，脅迫日本封鎖駐日美軍基地
中国、米軍阻止の戦略着々 台湾海峡有事 「基地」封じ込めへ日本に圧力も
4月4日8時1分配信 産経新聞
[Disclaimer：產經新聞保有本文一切版權。為尊重著作權，本譯文業已經適當刪節，僅為向讀者簡介原文要義使用，並加註譯者個人評論意見，不一定能完整忠實表達原文意旨。欲閱讀完整原文請至產經新聞網站點閱，或購買該社刊載本文之出版品。]
【華盛頓 山本秀也】 在中國海空軍實力急速增強之下，美方專家已經開始憂心在台海發生事端之時，「美軍會陷入無法介入的困境」。部方專家指出中國軍方近來逐漸取得以巡弋飛彈和潛艦阻止（美軍）空母戰鬥群接近的攻擊能力，加上身為核武俱樂部成員的強大軍事力背景，屆時將可能有能力脅迫日本政府「封鎖駐日美軍基地」不為美軍所用，使美日同盟陷於無法順利運作的危險。
美國戰略智庫蘭德公司中國軍事專家羅傑‧克里夫(Roger Cliff)領軍的研究團隊在其提出的報告「深入龍巢」(原文在：Entering Dragon’s Lair，大眾可免費點閱)中，分析了中國如何阻止美軍接近台灣週邊的戰略。
羅傑‧克里夫指出：「台灣問題是未來美中發生軍事衝突最有可能的原因」，並強力警告：「雖然現下美方在軍事上保有壓倒性的優勢，然而中國可以藉由各種手段適時將美軍阻止在該地域外無法接近，而達成迫使台灣降伏的目的。」
報告中假設中國動手對台灣採取武力侵犯的條件:是美國已身陷全球兩個地區的軍事衝突中，而難以分身應付台海局勢。
該報告並預期，在序戰階段中國對美軍可能採取的攻擊手段包括：
（１）透過網路攻擊、EMP或對衛星的直接打擊，破壞美軍的指管通情(C4ISR)系統；
（２）對美軍的後勤運通補保系統進行攻擊；
（３）對西太平洋地區海港、機場等據點進行破壞。
在此之前，中國應該會透過政治手段意圖封鎖美軍在西太平洋最大的據點，也就是駐日基地。報告中引用中國國防大學研究文件指出，中方認為在美軍介入台海衝突時，或許有可能脅迫日本採取不支持的立場，同時報告也引述了解放軍軍官的發言：「如果日本允許美軍使用駐日基地，則（我軍）也不惜對日本進行攻擊」
實戰開始的階段中，該報告推定中國應該會以巡弋飛彈和潛艦部隊對美軍空母進行海空雙方面的攻擊，並認為中國也有可能以部署數量逐漸增加的彈道飛彈攻擊美軍。
該報告並沒有假設美中全面開戰的情境，而是認為中國戰略的着眼點在於寧願透過誇示自己阻止美軍接近台海戰區的能力，迫使美軍考量在西太平洋地區展開作戰部署的高成本與高負擔，因而最終阻止美軍介入，實現以武力統一台灣的企圖。
【譯註：我也簡短地看了一下蘭德公司的這篇報告。文中雖然列舉了不少中國可能用以阻止美軍接近台海戰區的戰術，但我認為他們只是把想得到的東西都列出來，並沒有說這些手段一定有用，也沒有把中國形容得像金鐘罩鐵布衫一樣。懂軍事的各位應該都知道中國這些手段的效果恐怕都比不上山本五十六大將在珍珠港的一擊。如果當年擁有半邊太平洋，又打美軍打瘸了的日本都撐不了半年，在中途島後就一路挨打，我看不出中國今天的下場會比當年的日本好到哪裡去。日本政府是否會真的會受到中國脅迫就乖乖就範，我想，台海之戰也將會是日本自己生死存亡的關頭，日本政府屆時應該不會那麼笨吧？或許Roger Cliff也是在趁機利用本文敲打一下日本政府才是。】
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應該這樣說吧，中美雙方現在都在部局也就是在壓注，從這篇文章給我的感覺，應是在警告美國政府若想要確實的將太平洋納入自己的手中，就要再壓下更多傳統軍力的籌碼，甚至籌碼的算法可能要考量到日方在情勢緊張下背叛的可能性。國際政治充滿了不確定性，若是日方真的倒戈成為中立，美方在太平洋的實力將瞬間減半，戰爭爆發的可能性將大幅度的增加。
其實美國軍方早已針對這點開始做準備，從空軍部屬最先進的F-22中隊來看，本土外部署的中隊幾乎全在太平洋，關島這個本身主權屬於美國可以不理會它國限制的基地也逐漸的在擴增並常駐兵力。
但文中有幾點我覺得很奇怪，從中國來說若要阻止美軍的接近台海，其海軍包括潛艦在內在還沒取得航母前，都得離開本土空軍的保護傘，而中方戰機的航程除了J-11外，其它的都飛不遠，而美軍艦載機作戰半徑一千浬，在中間還有個台灣掛在那邊，要如何阻止是個很奇妙的問題。就網路攻擊來說，的確是一大問題，但就對對美軍的後勤與海港上的攻擊，這更是個奇妙的問題，除非今天中國擁有一艘可以發射100發巡弋飛彈的潛艇，才能對遠在兩千浬外陸上基地以非核戰癱瘓的能力，但今天中國沒有，死老美卻有三還是四艘 -_-
就我看來，運用彈道飛彈攻擊美軍基地是個很恐怖的想法，因為就現代的科技而言，就算美國這個偷窺狂擁有無與倫比的偷窺能力，也無法分辨彈頭上是核還是非核，當然啦若是胡錦濤先打個電話給美國總統說那不是核彈，美國總統相信的話又另當別論，否則的話問題可不止於中美兩國-_-
這篇文章最不通的地方在於，美軍若在無損失的狀況下，很有可能因成本問題而退縮，但若美軍在軍事上有所損失，美國會在損失後一開始就退縮？這是讓我無從想像其政治上的後果。
我崇拜山本五十六，那是因為在兩國軍力相近但國力相對較弱時，能夠趁美國在軍事上施壓的同時果斷的投入所有兵力來取得戰略上的先機，這個戰術上的成功至少這個策略撐上一年左右。但反觀現在的中美，中國的兵力了不起打的到沖繩，打的到關島，但對夏威夷來說，還是只能用核武策略來嚇阻。這點中國一點也比不上當年的日方。
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中國有可能透過限制軍力進入的方式，在台海衝突上打敗美國
CHINA COULD POTENTIALLY DEFEAT U.S. IN CONFLICT OVER TAIWAN
BY LIMITING MILITARY ACCESS, RAND STUDY FINDS
蘭德公司(RAND Corporation)
Thursday
March 29, 2007
http://www.rand.org/news/press.07/03.29.html
【譯註】其實不算外電翻譯，因為經過筆者截頭去尾砍中間後，內容所剩不多... Embarassed :P
根據智庫蘭德 (RAND) 公司所發表的《進入龍巢：中國反進入戰略及其對美國的意涵》（Entering the Dragon's Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States）報告，中國將可藉由反進入(antiaccess)的戰略－亦即阻止美國部署軍力至戰鬥區域、限制美軍可行動的區域、或迫使美軍在較遠的地方行動－，使其在未來對台的軍事衝突中可打敗美國。
研究中指出中國可能採取的反進入戰略包括：
＊迫使美國友邦（例如日本）限制或不允許美國使用在其領土上的基地。
＊打擊或干擾資訊或電腦系統，以延遲美方軍力部署，或讓美國無法取得敵人位置的相關資訊。
＊中斷美方後勤系統以防止及時的補給及延緩緊急的增援。
＊攻擊空軍基地或港口，以防止或瓦解軍力或補給匯集。
＊攻擊如航母等海軍資產，以限制美方由海面發射軍機的能力。
帶領研究的作者Roger Cliff說：「這些戰略的淨效果就是中國確實可擊敗美國－此處並非指摧毀美國軍力，而是中國達到其軍事和政治上的目標，同時防止美國達到部份或全部的目標。」
Arrow 報告全文(Full Document)
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG524/
Arrow 研究綱要(Research Brief) http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB213/
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Cliff Roger, and et al. (2007) Entering the Dragon's Lair:Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States. Santa Monica, C.A.: RAND.
該份報告是蘭德公司與美國空軍合作的(已經合作非常久，產出許多報告)，晚上利用點時間稍微瀏覽。全部分成六章節：
1. 導論、
2. 當代中國軍事戰略、
3. 中國軍事戰略原理對美軍戰場進入的潛在意函、
4. 中國反介入(antiaccess)手段的可能影響、
5. 美軍對中國該手段的反擊、
以及6. 結論。
一般而言，對軍事的意涵在4、5兩章，提到中國可利用彈道飛彈、攻擊機、巡弋飛彈、隱形行動與網路阻絕等工具，針對前進部署於中國週邊1500公里的軍事基地，進行第一波的攻擊，對象包括對軍用機場、海軍基地等補給、維修等設施，通訊系統，甚至是航空母艦。
這個實踐的理論支撐為超限戰與以小搏大的概念；令人感到興趣的是，許多研究已經提到上述的理論、手段，為何空軍與蘭德公司要選在這個時刻公佈？
其實，阻絕戰術(個人偏愛這樣的用法)是中國針對台灣的一種手段；各位設想中國是要在西太平洋取得主導權，這樣的阻絕戰術有多大效果？應該遠不如偷襲珍珠港吧。
身為後進的中國，最可能與美國爭霸的方式是採取與美國類似的發展方式：航母戰鬥群、兩棲作戰部隊，而非僅是阻絕戰術的運用。
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中國可能在台海發生事端時，脅迫日本封鎖駐日美軍基地
中国、米軍阻止の戦略着々 台湾海峡有事 「基地」封じ込めへ日本に圧力も
4月4日8時1分配信 産経新聞
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【華盛頓 山本秀也】 在中國海空軍實力急速增強之下，美方專家已經開始憂心在台海發生事端之時，「美軍會陷入無法介入的困境」。部方專家指出中國軍方近來逐漸取得以巡弋飛彈和潛艦阻止（美軍）空母戰鬥群接近的攻擊能力，加上身為核武俱樂部成員的強大軍事力背景，屆時將可能有能力脅迫日本政府「封鎖駐日美軍基地」不為美軍所用，使美日同盟陷於無法順利運作的危險。
美國戰略智庫蘭德公司中國軍事專家羅傑‧克里夫(Roger Cliff)領軍的研究團隊在其提出的報告「深入龍巢」(原文在：Entering Dragon’s Lair，大眾可免費點閱)中，分析了中國如何阻止美軍接近台灣週邊的戰略。
羅傑‧克里夫指出：「台灣問題是未來美中發生軍事衝突最有可能的原因」，並強力警告：「雖然現下美方在軍事上保有壓倒性的優勢，然而中國可以藉由各種手段適時將美軍阻止在該地域外無法接近，而達成迫使台灣降伏的目的。」
報告中假設中國動手對台灣採取武力侵犯的條件:是美國已身陷全球兩個地區的軍事衝突中，而難以分身應付台海局勢。
該報告並預期，在序戰階段中國對美軍可能採取的攻擊手段包括：
（１）透過網路攻擊、EMP或對衛星的直接打擊，破壞美軍的指管通情(C4ISR)系統；
（２）對美軍的後勤運通補保系統進行攻擊；
（３）對西太平洋地區海港、機場等據點進行破壞。
在此之前，中國應該會透過政治手段意圖封鎖美軍在西太平洋最大的據點，也就是駐日基地。報告中引用中國國防大學研究文件指出，中方認為在美軍介入台海衝突時，或許有可能脅迫日本採取不支持的立場，同時報告也引述了解放軍軍官的發言：「如果日本允許美軍使用駐日基地，則（我軍）也不惜對日本進行攻擊」
實戰開始的階段中，該報告推定中國應該會以巡弋飛彈和潛艦部隊對美軍空母進行海空雙方面的攻擊，並認為中國也有可能以部署數量逐漸增加的彈道飛彈攻擊美軍。
該報告並沒有假設美中全面開戰的情境，而是認為中國戰略的着眼點在於寧願透過誇示自己阻止美軍接近台海戰區的能力，迫使美軍考量在西太平洋地區展開作戰部署的高成本與高負擔，因而最終阻止美軍介入，實現以武力統一台灣的企圖。
【譯註：我也簡短地看了一下蘭德公司的這篇報告。文中雖然列舉了不少中國可能用以阻止美軍接近台海戰區的戰術，但我認為他們只是把想得到的東西都列出來，並沒有說這些手段一定有用，也沒有把中國形容得像金鐘罩鐵布衫一樣。懂軍事的各位應該都知道中國這些手段的效果恐怕都比不上山本五十六大將在珍珠港的一擊。如果當年擁有半邊太平洋，又打美軍打瘸了的日本都撐不了半年，在中途島後就一路挨打，我看不出中國今天的下場會比當年的日本好到哪裡去。日本政府是否會真的會受到中國脅迫就乖乖就範，我想，台海之戰也將會是日本自己生死存亡的關頭，日本政府屆時應該不會那麼笨吧？或許Roger Cliff也是在趁機利用本文敲打一下日本政府才是。】
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應該這樣說吧，中美雙方現在都在部局也就是在壓注，從這篇文章給我的感覺，應是在警告美國政府若想要確實的將太平洋納入自己的手中，就要再壓下更多傳統軍力的籌碼，甚至籌碼的算法可能要考量到日方在情勢緊張下背叛的可能性。國際政治充滿了不確定性，若是日方真的倒戈成為中立，美方在太平洋的實力將瞬間減半，戰爭爆發的可能性將大幅度的增加。
其實美國軍方早已針對這點開始做準備，從空軍部屬最先進的F-22中隊來看，本土外部署的中隊幾乎全在太平洋，關島這個本身主權屬於美國可以不理會它國限制的基地也逐漸的在擴增並常駐兵力。
但文中有幾點我覺得很奇怪，從中國來說若要阻止美軍的接近台海，其海軍包括潛艦在內在還沒取得航母前，都得離開本土空軍的保護傘，而中方戰機的航程除了J-11外，其它的都飛不遠，而美軍艦載機作戰半徑一千浬，在中間還有個台灣掛在那邊，要如何阻止是個很奇妙的問題。就網路攻擊來說，的確是一大問題，但就對對美軍的後勤與海港上的攻擊，這更是個奇妙的問題，除非今天中國擁有一艘可以發射100發巡弋飛彈的潛艇，才能對遠在兩千浬外陸上基地以非核戰癱瘓的能力，但今天中國沒有，死老美卻有三還是四艘 -_-
就我看來，運用彈道飛彈攻擊美軍基地是個很恐怖的想法，因為就現代的科技而言，就算美國這個偷窺狂擁有無與倫比的偷窺能力，也無法分辨彈頭上是核還是非核，當然啦若是胡錦濤先打個電話給美國總統說那不是核彈，美國總統相信的話又另當別論，否則的話問題可不止於中美兩國-_-
這篇文章最不通的地方在於，美軍若在無損失的狀況下，很有可能因成本問題而退縮，但若美軍在軍事上有所損失，美國會在損失後一開始就退縮？這是讓我無從想像其政治上的後果。
我崇拜山本五十六，那是因為在兩國軍力相近但國力相對較弱時，能夠趁美國在軍事上施壓的同時果斷的投入所有兵力來取得戰略上的先機，這個戰術上的成功至少這個策略撐上一年左右。但反觀現在的中美，中國的兵力了不起打的到沖繩，打的到關島，但對夏威夷來說，還是只能用核武策略來嚇阻。這點中國一點也比不上當年的日方。
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中國有可能透過限制軍力進入的方式，在台海衝突上打敗美國
CHINA COULD POTENTIALLY DEFEAT U.S. IN CONFLICT OVER TAIWAN
BY LIMITING MILITARY ACCESS, RAND STUDY FINDS
蘭德公司(RAND Corporation)
Thursday
March 29, 2007
http://www.rand.org/news/press.07/03.29.html
【譯註】其實不算外電翻譯，因為經過筆者截頭去尾砍中間後，內容所剩不多... Embarassed :P
根據智庫蘭德 (RAND) 公司所發表的《進入龍巢：中國反進入戰略及其對美國的意涵》（Entering the Dragon's Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States）報告，中國將可藉由反進入(antiaccess)的戰略－亦即阻止美國部署軍力至戰鬥區域、限制美軍可行動的區域、或迫使美軍在較遠的地方行動－，使其在未來對台的軍事衝突中可打敗美國。
研究中指出中國可能採取的反進入戰略包括：
＊迫使美國友邦（例如日本）限制或不允許美國使用在其領土上的基地。
＊打擊或干擾資訊或電腦系統，以延遲美方軍力部署，或讓美國無法取得敵人位置的相關資訊。
＊中斷美方後勤系統以防止及時的補給及延緩緊急的增援。
＊攻擊空軍基地或港口，以防止或瓦解軍力或補給匯集。
＊攻擊如航母等海軍資產，以限制美方由海面發射軍機的能力。
帶領研究的作者Roger Cliff說：「這些戰略的淨效果就是中國確實可擊敗美國－此處並非指摧毀美國軍力，而是中國達到其軍事和政治上的目標，同時防止美國達到部份或全部的目標。」
Arrow 報告全文(Full Document)
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG524/
Arrow 研究綱要(Research Brief) http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB213/
GRAND STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH OTHER STATES IN THE NEW, NEW WORLD ORDER
GRAND STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH OTHER STATES
IN THE NEW, NEW WORLD ORDER
James F. Miskel
Naval War College Review, Winter 2005, Vol. 58, No. 1
he art of statecraft has often involved efforts to improve the security of one state by taking advantage of the power and influence of other states. This is, for example, why a state typically seeks to forge military alliances with others. It is also why some states provide economic and military support to client or dependent states and why some advocate the formation of multistate trading blocs. The theory behind the trading-bloc strategy is that cooperation on security matters is more likely when there are strong economic and other mutually beneficial connections among the members of the bloc. Among the tools that have been and are being used to influence other states are trade preferences, loans, loan guarantees, concessionary pricing for military sales, export-import financing, technical assistance, foreign aid, and international disaster relief. While humanitarian altruism is a major factor in foreign aid and disaster relief, statesmen often see the reduction of suffering as a method of improving the stability of a recipient state or as an inducement for a recipient state to cooperate more fully on security matters.
Many ideas for making American foreign policy more effective have been offered in recent years. Some of them involve ways of prioritizing all forms of official, state-to-state assistance on those states whose stability or cooperation will most benefit the national interests of the United States. Obviously, there are many states that are already stable and already do generally cooperate with the United States. Canada, Japan, and the states of Western Europe (disagreements over the second war with Iraq notwithstanding) fall into this category. Certainly the economically advanced and politically stable states of the collective “West” have a common interest in suppressing the signal threat—global terrorism—of the new, new world order that sprang from the rubble of the World Trade Center and Pentagon on 11 September 2001. Thus the real focus of foreign policy reform proposals is on the large number of states that are neither as economically advanced nor as stable as Japan, Canada, and Western Europe.
Three general approaches have been proposed for identifying the states outside the “winner’s circle” of economically advanced and stable states whose cooperation and stability contribute most to the national interests of the United States. Each of these approaches—as should be expected, because of the emphasis of all on state-to-state relations—is realist in its assumption that the state is the most important actor in world affairs and thus that working through and with other states is an effective way for the United States to further its national interests. The general approaches would respectively devote the lion’s share of state-to-state assistance to one of the following groups of states:
Lever, or pivotal, states through which the United States can promote stability in a region and thus tamp down the threat of terrorism
Buffer states that can be strengthened to become more effective insulators against terrorist attacks upon the United States and its interests
Failed or failing states, the restoration of which to functionality would eliminate platforms from which terrorists might plan, prepare, or launch attacks upon the United States or its overseas interests.
Each of these options is based on distinctly different assumptions about the role that other states can play on the world stage and about the type of contributions that they can make in the global war on terror. This article examines these assumptions and finds that they are in some important respects inconsistent with security threats that will face the United States in the early twenty-first century.
PIVOTAL STATES
In the late 1990s, after the Cold War but before the global war on terrorism—that is to say, during the original new world order and before the new, new world order—the notion of pivotal states enjoyed considerable support, because it recognized something that should have been, even if it was not, intuitively obvious. That something was that it made sense for the United States to organize its foreign policy priorities so as to ensure that states that deserved a lot of attention got a lot of attention, and conversely that states that deserved less attention got less. The approach, proposed by Professor Paul Kennedy and other authors, may appear somewhat dated now, but it is based upon an enduring principle—that state-to-state assistance would be most effective if it were targeted at states that would then exert favorable (to American interests) influence regionwide. The general rule for determining whether a state deserved a good deal of attention boiled down to the following: if a state’s successes and failures had major ripple effects on neighboring states, that state was ipso facto a pivotal state.1
The pivotal-states strategy calls to mind the saying, “When Brazil [or any dominant state] sneezes, Argentina [or any smaller neighboring state] catches cold.” Brazil was, indeed, designated by Paul Kennedy and his coauthors as a pivotal state by virtue of the size of its population and economy relative to neighboring states, and Argentina’s economy did indeed actually “catch cold” when Brazil devalued its currency in 1999. Obviously the pivotal-states strategy aims at the positive effects that a pivotal state can have on its neighbors.
According to the strategy, the United States should target its foreign aid, economic preferences, concessionary military sales, and technical assistance on the “Brazils” of the world and at the same time reduce its aid and assistance to other states, including their nonpivotal neighbors—for example, Argentina. Extending the health analogy, the strategy called for the United States to give vitamins to Brazil in order to promote rosy cheeks in both Brazil and Argentina. To do otherwise, Kennedy and his coauthors argued, would spread state-to-state assistance so thinly among a large number of recipient states that no single one would get enough aid to make a real difference.
The image projected by the pivotal-states strategy is proactive. The strategy seeks to influence regionally dominant states precisely because those states are regionally dominant. They are pivots because they extend muscular tentacles of economic, cultural, political, and ideological influence into their respective hinterlands. Perhaps because of this focus on relatively powerful states, this strategy implies a high level of respect for the sovereignty and national interests of the recipient states.
Like all of the strategies discussed here, the pivotal-states strategy is easier to describe than to execute. It assumes that decisions about import quotas, tariffs, and foreign aid will actually be made (or perhaps only wishes they would be made) on the basis of foreign policy considerations alone. The reality is, of course, often quite different. Such decisions are political judgments and will always be heavily colored by estimates about their likely effects on domestic constituencies. Higher quotas and lower tariffs are inevitably evaluated and voted up or down on the basis of their impact on the U.S. economy and, more particularly, on domestic American industries—often with only scant regard for their potential effects on a pivotal state in a distant region of the world. President George W. Bush’s March 2002 decision on steel import tariffs is a good case in point. Although it has since been rescinded, the tariffs were very clearly designed to support the domestic steel industry regardless of its effects on foreign trading partners. Similarly, decisions about where to invest foreign aid or even sell military hardware at concessionary prices are always influenced by political pressures from constituency groups, be they individuals who want to extend the helping hand of foreign aid to whoever needs it regardless of the overall foreign policy, or industry representatives and labor lobbyists who want to maximize sales whether the opportunities are in high or low-priority markets.
It is less than clear that the conditions in failed states actually offer better opportunities for terrorists than do conditions in certain functional states.
Moreover, circumstances change, often in ways that disrupt the best-laid plans of strategists. For example, Afghanistan was never considered a pivotal or even moderately important state until after the Taliban refused to turn over the 11 September terrorists. Nevertheless, the country is getting a considerable share of American nation-building and peacekeeping resources. This seems to indicate that it would be impossible for the United States to adhere to any spending priority list over time.
On the other hand, a truly rigorous concentration of foreign aid, trade preferences, and intensive technical assistance, etc., on a very small number of pivotal states can have profoundly positive effects on a region. This was the case in postwar Germany and Japan, and it appears to be the strategy the United States is following with respect to Iraq. The objectives of the very heavy investment in postwar reconstruction in Iraq clearly include the stabilization of the Middle East region as a whole and the promotion of political and economic reform in neighboring states—including, of course, states with unrepresentative regimes that have been sponsoring terrorism or at least not acting effectively to suppress it.
Focusing on only one or two pivotal states (for example, Iraq and Afghanistan) amounts to a pivotal-regions strategy (or in this instance, region), a substantially different approach in that it does not identify pivotal states in every major region or focus aid on them as levers for the promotion of American national interests around the world. For the time being, considering the Greater Middle East as the pivotal region may make good strategic sense. The Middle East is, in fact, a crucially important region at this point, because it is the ideological and financial wellspring of Islamic extremism, and because its oil resources play such an important role in the world economy. Nonetheless, the reconstruction project in Iraq will one day be completed, internationalized, or abandoned, and when that day comes questions about whether state-to-state aid should be concentrated on pivotal, buffer, or failed states will reemerge.
BUFFER STATES
Buffer-states strategies also envision that the United States would provide greater amounts of economic, political, and military support to some states than to others, but in this strategy the priority traditionally has been states that can solidify the local status quo, rather than states with resources that can be leveraged into greater influence over events in distant regions.
For example, the Soviet Union established the Warsaw Pact in order to provide a “cordon sanitaire” between the motherland and the West. Stalin’s cocooning strategy clearly viewed the Eastern European satellites as insulators between the core of the Soviet empire and the sources of economic, cultural, and ideological contagion in the West. He saw the satellites also as shock absorbers that could contribute to the preservation of his hard-won empire by serving as first lines of defense in the event of a military attack by NATO. Ironically, before World War II some Western European leaders had viewed the very same Eastern European states as buffers against Bolshevism. Until the dawn of the nuclear age and now the global war on terrorism, the oceans were thought to constitute all the buffers that the United States needed, although there have occasionally been arguments for prioritizing aid to Mexico so that it could better protect the United States against infiltration and mass migration from Central America.
The image projected by buffer-states strategies is reactive. Buffer-states strategies aim at local, not widely dispersed, states. Their contributions are defensive, and their ability to project economic, cultural, political, and ideological influence over other states is immaterial.
Lately there has been interest in a strategy that appears to combine aspects of both the buffer and pivotal-states strategies. This “seam states” strategy was formulated and effectively articulated by a Naval War College colleague, Dr. Thomas P. M. Barnett.2 As envisioned by Barnett, the seam-states approach forms part of a larger strategy involving improvements in homeland security and proactive interventions in nonseam states. Barnett’s seams resemble the fault lines between civilizations or cultures that were envisioned by Professor Samuel Huntington in the early 1990s;3 however, Barnett’s lines in the sand are fewer in number, more fluid, and more heavily based on secular phenomena than were Huntington’s cultural fault lines.
The seams represent the dividing line between two figurative tectonic plates. One plate contains the states that are connected with, or are attempting with at least some success to connect with, the “West” through globalization. This plate accounts for approximately two-thirds of the world’s population, and it represents, in Barnett’s schema, an economic and political winners’ circle of relatively stable and prosperous states. The other plate represents the remaining one-third of the world’s population who reside in states that are disconnected, or are deliberately disconnecting themselves, from the evolving norms, practices, and institutions of globalization. Barnett argues that in the new, new world order this is where the main security threats originate. The threats may be from a state (North Korea), a terrorist group sponsored by a state (Hizbollah), or terrorists acting completely independently of a state (al-Qa‘ida), but in each instance the threat is assumed to emanate from an entity based on the second tectonic plate.
According to this strategy, states along the seams between the tectonic plates are potentially important because they can serve collectively as a barrier inhibiting the ability of terrorist networks on the second plate to attack states on the first plate—but not every state on the seam is equally important.
Twelve of the most important seam states are designated by Barnett for priority attention. The twelve would get more economic, political, and military assistance from the United States; other advanced countries and other seam states would get less. Of the twelve most important seam states, Professor Kennedy and others earlier identified seven as pivotal states.
States (seven) on both the pivotal and seam-states lists: Algeria, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, South Africa, Turkey
States (five) on seam-states list only: Greece, Malaysia, Morocco, the Philippines, Thailand
States (two) on the pivotal states list only: Egypt, India.
Although the focus of this essay is on the overall strategies, rather than nuts-and-bolts decisions about which states warrant higher priority, the list of key seam states does invite comment. Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines share maritime borders primarily with each other and land borders with only four states: the first-plate states of Singapore and Brunei, the second-plate—but nonthreatening—state of Papua New Guinea, and Thailand, which is designated as another key seam state. In effect, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines do not actually abut any significant segment of the seam between the first tectonic plate and the second. This suggests that these three states are designated for priority attention for some reason other than their status as seam states, which in turn may raise questions about the assumptions upon which the strategy was built. It seems clear that the region as a whole is what is strategically important—the vast expanse of ocean, a huge number of islands, and heavily trafficked sea-lanes that Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines individually govern—not the ability of the three states to serve as buffers between the first and second tectonic plates.
Despite the high degree of overlap between the seam-states and pivotal-states lists, the seam-states strategy is, in fact, more closely aligned philosophically with the buffer-states approach. The seam and buffer-states strategies concentrate state-to-state assistance on a selected number of states that have primarily defensive functions and may or may not be able to project economic, cultural, political, or ideological influence at the regional level. In this strategy, influence is projected beyond the seam by the state that provides the assistance in the first place—the United States.
In concluding that the key seam states could function as effective barriers against terrorist networks, the strategy makes two important assumptions. One is that the seam states actually provide some sort of physical barrier between the first and second plates; the second is that terrorist networks would actually have to transit the barrier in order to attack the United States or one of its neighbors on the first tectonic plate. Both of these assumptions are questionable, given the nature of modern transportation networks and the relatively small volume of men and materiel that terrorist organizations would actually have to move from one location to another in order to attack a state in the winners’ circle. As long as commercial airlines fly to places like Kabul and Khartoum and ships dock at ports in South Asia and West Africa, terrorist organizations will be able to fly over or sail around whatever barriers the seam states provide.
The strategy also assumes that the key seam states are now or soon will be (after having received state-to-state assistance) physically capable of controlling their borders and exerting on-the-ground control over remote internal regions. This indeed would seem to be the sine qua non of the strategy, for if a state cannot control its own territory, it can hardly serve as an effective barrier against intrusion or movement between the second and first plates.
At least four (Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Brazil) of the twelve key seam states long ago demonstrated the inability to assert control over remote internal areas or effectively police their land and sea borders. Terrorists having already established bases of operation in three of them—Pakistan, the Philippines, and Indonesia—it is clear that none has presented a major barrier to terrorist networks in the past. Enough incidents of terrorism continue to occur in each of these countries (a March 2003 bombing in the Philippines’ second biggest airport, the August 2003 hotel bombing in Jakarta and the October 2002 bombing of a Bali resort in Indonesia, and the intermittent terrorism in Kashmir conducted or supported by Pakistani groups) to raise doubts that any of the three will become effective barriers any time soon. Although there are as yet no signs that the fourth, Brazil, is home to anti-American terrorist base camps, there are serious questions about the extent of Brazil’s effective control over its remote interior sections, in particular near the western borders with Colombia and Peru and the southern frontier with Paraguay and Argentina.
The pivotal-states strategy calls to mind the saying, “When Brazil sneezes, Argentina catches cold.”
The seam-states strategy envisions a robust program of state-to-state assistance (military sales, military advisers and trainers, foreign aid, technical assistance on law enforcement and government reforms, and favorable trade agreements) to help key seam states improve and extend their governing capacities so as to prevent second-plate terrorists from attacking first-plate targets.
A program of this magnitude is daunting, to say the least, and unlikely to be resourced adequately. Moreover, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Brazil, and perhaps other key seam states ultimately lack sufficient incentives to exert themselves seriously in underpopulated rural zones; all face more direct challenges in their overcrowded cities. Demographic trends suggest that the urban challenges will get worse, not better. Pakistan, Indonesia, Brazil, the Philippines, and also Malaysia have vast land or maritime borders that are virtually impossible to control without unaffordable increases in their security budgets. For example, the coastlines of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines total about sixty thousand miles—five times the length of the coastline of the United States. It is hard to envision Indonesia, Malaysia, or the Philippines ever being able to control effectively more than a tiny percentage—that is, ever being truly effective at the role that the seam strategy envisions for them.
FAILING STATES
Failing-states strategies are of a completely different order than pivotal, buffer, or seam-states strategies. Theoretically, pivotal and buffer-states strategies target other states as being relatively capable of either projecting influence regionally or acting as barriers against intrusion by third parties. Failing states are capable of neither, and it is their very incapacity that causes some strategists to believe that they warrant high priority in state-to-state assistance.
Failed states have been variously defined. Some definitions include states that have simply ceased to exist and have been succeeded by others. For example, under some definitions the Austro-Hungarian Empire would be a failed state, because the geography and population centers once administered as one entity by the Hapsburgs are now administered by successor states. By this yardstick, the term “failing state” could have applied to the Soviet Union during the late Gorbachev and early Yeltsin eras. For the purposes of strategies for dealing with current and future security issues, such inclusive definitions are useless; a state’s failure is often positive in terms of U.S. national interests, as for example when a state that sponsors terrorism fails or, as in Iraq, is made to fail. A state’s failure can also leave behind successor states that are politically stable, administratively competent, or connected with the norms of the economically advanced states on the first tectonic plate. Some of the Soviet Union’s successor states (Russia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia) fall into this category, as do a number of Hapsburg successor states (Austria, the Czech Republic, and Hungary).
A more pertinent definition focuses on sovereign states that exist on paper as members of the United Nations and thus are candidates for state-to-state assistance but that have ceased to provide basic government services to their citizenry, often because of internal strife—as in Somalia in the early 1990s and Liberia in 2003. Initially of concern because of the humanitarian consequences of civil wars, forced starvation, and human rights abuses, failed states have come to be seen by some as launching pads for terrorists and major criminal organizations as well as wellsprings of destabilizing refugee movements and breeding grounds for virulent diseases.4
Quite a few scholars and government officials have burned a good deal of tread off their tires trying to devise taxonomies for failing states. This veritable cottage industry attempts to identify warning signs that might enable the international community to intervene early enough to prevent other states from failing. The theory behind these efforts is that concentrated state-to-state assistance for states in danger of failing will prevent failure and thereby:
Eliminate opportunities for terrorist and criminal organizations to establish bases of operations
Remove the incentive for refugees to flee into other countries
Enable law enforcement, humanitarian, and public health agencies to expand their operations and thereby gradually improve living conditions and prevent the spread of crime and disease.
It is clear that the internal chaos and anarchy of failing states do indeed create fertile breeding grounds for crime, human rights abuses, disease, and starvation. But notwithstanding the assumptions of this strategy, it is much less clear that the conditions in failed states actually offer better opportunities for terrorists than do conditions in certain functional states.
For example, states that actively sponsor terrorism with money, police protection, or weapons and that share intelligence reports about impending antiterrorist operations tend not to be failing. Such “services” may simply not be reliably available in a failing state. States that are genuinely failing are not typically well connected with Western intelligence sources and are thus usually not in a position to obtain or leak advance warning to terrorists. Further, they often exert little control over the internal security forces that might be expected to provide protection to terrorist base camps. Moreover, failing states may be viewed by terrorists as being unable to provide more than token resistance to antiterrorist incursions by neighboring states or special operations units from Western states. Failing states may even be seen by terrorist organizations as incapable of distinguishing between antiterrorist incursions and indigenous violence—and thus as unable or unwilling to offer even stout legal defenses of their sovereignty.
This is not to say that terrorists do not operate or establish base camps in failing states. They do. However, the issue for strategists seeking to prioritize the investments in state-to-state assistance is not whether there are terrorist organizations in failing states. For strategists the issue is whether the terrorist organizations and operations in failing states are more dangerous to the United States than terrorist organizations and operations in functioning states.
Fund-raising by terrorist organizations is one aspect of this issue. It has been noted that terrorist organizations finance their operations through criminal activity in failing states. For example, there have been reports that al-Qa‘ida has been trafficking in diamonds smuggled from the failing states of Liberia and Sierra Leone.5 The profits that al-Qa‘ida earns from reselling diamonds apparently help finance the group’s operations and enable it to maintain its communications network and purchase weapons. Obviously, anything that enables groups like al-Qa‘ida to finance their operations ought to be of substantial concern to strategists, but it should be remembered that the problem is hardly unique to failing states. While smuggling is considerably easier in a failed state that cannot control its borders, goods are also smuggled out of functioning states (e.g., diamonds from Tanzania, drugs from Colombia, small arms from Russia), and the profits from these enterprises can also finance terrorist groups. In fact, criminal enterprises inside functioning states can also generate funds for terrorists. Even in the United States, terrorist operatives or their sympathizers have engaged in illegal activity (such as smuggling cigarettes from low-tax states like North Carolina for resale in high-tax states like New York, embezzling from charities, extorting money from legitimate businessmen and families) in order to raise funds for terrorism.
States along the seams between the tectonic plates are potentially important because they can serve collectively as a barrier—but not every state on the seam is equally important.
Another factor to consider is that the most serious recent terrorist attacks on first-plate states have been based either in the first-plate state itself or in a state that was not considered to have failed. The bombings in Indonesia were reportedly undertaken by an Indonesian terrorist group, and the 11 September attacks on the United States sprang from a complex of headquarters, training camps, and weapons caches in Afghanistan. On 10 September 2001 most observers felt that Afghanistan under the Taliban suffered from too much government, not too little. The Taliban might have failed to improve the living conditions in Afghanistan, but it did control enough of the country to make al-Qa‘ida view the Taliban government as a sound strategic partner—one that would be able to assert state sovereignty and provide protection to al-Qa‘ida operations. None of the individuals indicted for the March 2004 terrorist bombing in Spain was from a failing state—in fact, most were from one of the designated seam states, Morocco.
Events in Afghanistan and Indonesia strongly suggest that in terms of the war on terrorism, the threat posed by groups in failing states is no more serious than the threat posed by groups operating in lightly governed (or ungovernable) zones inside functioning states. As noted above in connection with the seam-states strategy, the phenomenon of remote and only nominally administered rural or coastal zones inside functioning states is already a serious problem in some parts of the world. As urbanization continues to deplete rural populations and force national governments to concentrate on governing cities, the phenomenon may become more widespread.
THE LURE OF ELEGANT CATEGORIZATIONS
This article has sought to compare and contrast the assumptions and conceptual approaches embedded in three broad strategies for maximizing the benefits the United States receives from state-to-state assistance programs. None of the three represents an adequate strategy for dealing with the security threats of the present day and age.
Each of the three depends heavily upon the ability of strategists to perform two functions well: first, to decide which states are more important than others in terms of their contributions to the “bottom line”; and second, to adhere to the designated priorities over extended periods of time, not just a single fiscal year. The difficulty of actually performing both tasks well should not be underestimated. Judgments about where the United States should invest its time and money are inherently and inescapably political, and in practice they are likely to reflect domestic considerations as much as strategic calculations. Political pressures from domestic interest groups and unanticipated developments overseas will not only shape the original priority list of recipient states but cause our investment patterns to diverge from whichever strategy is officially adopted. In the unlikely event that an elegant game plan were actually adopted, it would not be long before we began to violate it.
Moreover, each of the general strategies reflects assumptions about the role of other states that may be inappropriate for the security threats posed in the new, new world order. Indeed, it may well be that the very idea of categorizing states according to the role that the United States would assign them (extending a stabilizing influence over a region, serving as a barrier against external threats, reestablishing stability over the territory of a failing state) is misguided, because of the quicksilver nature of the terrorist threats emanating from “beyond the seam.” As we have seen, at least some terrorist groups seem able to disperse and reorganize (perhaps under different names), relocate at great distance (al-Qa‘ida’s relocation from Sudan to Afghanistan is the best example), and quickly form partnerships of convenience with groups in other countries, including first-plate states like Great Britain and France. The pivotal states, buffer/seam-states and failed-states strategies plod in comparison. By the time state-to-state assistance has had its hoped-for effects on a pivotal, key seam or failing state, the terrorist organizations will have moved on to other locations from which they could base operations, devise new routes for attack on the “West,” or forge new alliances with dissident groups inside first-plate or seam states.
The pivotal, buffer, and seam-states strategies each more or less assumes that all states that are categorized as high priority will play roughly the same role. For example, a seam-states strategy assumes that once having received state-to-state assistance, all of the key seam states will at least attempt to serve as effective barriers to third-party threats. If this assumption were not made, there would be no logical reason to pursue the strategy in the first place. It is also assumed that a state could be a pivot or a nonpivot, but not both—a seam state or a nonseam state, but not both.
The problem is that at least some of the states that would be designated as pivotal and key seam states have characteristics of failing or beyond-the-seam states. That is to say, several of the pivot or key seam states contain zones where they have simply failed to exert effective control. These ungoverned or very lightly governed zones (such as the fastness of Pakistan’s mountainous border with Afghanistan, where Osama Bin Laden has reportedly been managing to avoid capture and orchestrate terrorist actions in first-plate states), out-of-the-way islands in Indonesia, dense patches of jungle in the Philippine archipelago, and the isolated interior of Brazil are already home to terrorist organizations and could provide bases of terrorist operations in the future. Many of these pivot or seam states have pressing social problems in overpopulated cities and are not highly motivated even to attempt to play the role scripted for them in the pivot and seam-states strategies—to assert control over remote and dangerous regions. In some of these states, governance is a delicate balancing act among ethnic minorities or religious factions. Their rulers may well see their own interests as being best served by lip service to the role of pivot or buffer.
Given these considerations, the lure of grand strategies based on elegant categorizations of states should be resisted. A more effective approach would be to do more of something we do not do enough of today—allocate security-related assistance to other states on the basis of that state’s potential contribution to specific high-priority projects or functions in the war on terrorism. Examples are the collection and sharing of intelligence information about terrorist organizations, law enforcement action against indigenous terrorist groups with affiliations to al-Qa‘ida, suppression of illegal fund-raising activities by terrorist organizations, and effective regulation and monitoring of financial transfers that support terrorist organizations.
NOTES
1. Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill, and Paul Kennedy, “Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 1 (January/February 1996).
2. Thomas P. M. Barnett, “The Pentagon’s New Map: It Explains Why We’re Going to War and Why We’ll Keep Going to War,” Esquire, March 2003.
3. Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993).
4. State Failure Task Force, Internal Wars and Failures of Governance, 1955–2000. The task force was initially commissioned by the U.S. government during the 1990s and has since continued its work under the auspices of the Center for International Development and Conflict Management, at the University of Maryland. The data are available at the center’s website, www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/. Recent articles on failed states as platforms for terrorism include Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States in a World of Terror,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4 (July/August 2002); and Jeffrey Record, “Collapsed Countries, Casualty Dread, and the New American Way of War,” Parameters 32, no. 2 (Summer 2002), pp. 4–23.
5. Douglas Farah, “Report Says Africa Harbors Al Qaeda: Terror Assets Hidden in Gem Buying Spree,” Washington Post, 29 December 2002, p. A01.
IN THE NEW, NEW WORLD ORDER
James F. Miskel
Naval War College Review, Winter 2005, Vol. 58, No. 1
he art of statecraft has often involved efforts to improve the security of one state by taking advantage of the power and influence of other states. This is, for example, why a state typically seeks to forge military alliances with others. It is also why some states provide economic and military support to client or dependent states and why some advocate the formation of multistate trading blocs. The theory behind the trading-bloc strategy is that cooperation on security matters is more likely when there are strong economic and other mutually beneficial connections among the members of the bloc. Among the tools that have been and are being used to influence other states are trade preferences, loans, loan guarantees, concessionary pricing for military sales, export-import financing, technical assistance, foreign aid, and international disaster relief. While humanitarian altruism is a major factor in foreign aid and disaster relief, statesmen often see the reduction of suffering as a method of improving the stability of a recipient state or as an inducement for a recipient state to cooperate more fully on security matters.
Many ideas for making American foreign policy more effective have been offered in recent years. Some of them involve ways of prioritizing all forms of official, state-to-state assistance on those states whose stability or cooperation will most benefit the national interests of the United States. Obviously, there are many states that are already stable and already do generally cooperate with the United States. Canada, Japan, and the states of Western Europe (disagreements over the second war with Iraq notwithstanding) fall into this category. Certainly the economically advanced and politically stable states of the collective “West” have a common interest in suppressing the signal threat—global terrorism—of the new, new world order that sprang from the rubble of the World Trade Center and Pentagon on 11 September 2001. Thus the real focus of foreign policy reform proposals is on the large number of states that are neither as economically advanced nor as stable as Japan, Canada, and Western Europe.
Three general approaches have been proposed for identifying the states outside the “winner’s circle” of economically advanced and stable states whose cooperation and stability contribute most to the national interests of the United States. Each of these approaches—as should be expected, because of the emphasis of all on state-to-state relations—is realist in its assumption that the state is the most important actor in world affairs and thus that working through and with other states is an effective way for the United States to further its national interests. The general approaches would respectively devote the lion’s share of state-to-state assistance to one of the following groups of states:
Lever, or pivotal, states through which the United States can promote stability in a region and thus tamp down the threat of terrorism
Buffer states that can be strengthened to become more effective insulators against terrorist attacks upon the United States and its interests
Failed or failing states, the restoration of which to functionality would eliminate platforms from which terrorists might plan, prepare, or launch attacks upon the United States or its overseas interests.
Each of these options is based on distinctly different assumptions about the role that other states can play on the world stage and about the type of contributions that they can make in the global war on terror. This article examines these assumptions and finds that they are in some important respects inconsistent with security threats that will face the United States in the early twenty-first century.
PIVOTAL STATES
In the late 1990s, after the Cold War but before the global war on terrorism—that is to say, during the original new world order and before the new, new world order—the notion of pivotal states enjoyed considerable support, because it recognized something that should have been, even if it was not, intuitively obvious. That something was that it made sense for the United States to organize its foreign policy priorities so as to ensure that states that deserved a lot of attention got a lot of attention, and conversely that states that deserved less attention got less. The approach, proposed by Professor Paul Kennedy and other authors, may appear somewhat dated now, but it is based upon an enduring principle—that state-to-state assistance would be most effective if it were targeted at states that would then exert favorable (to American interests) influence regionwide. The general rule for determining whether a state deserved a good deal of attention boiled down to the following: if a state’s successes and failures had major ripple effects on neighboring states, that state was ipso facto a pivotal state.1
The pivotal-states strategy calls to mind the saying, “When Brazil [or any dominant state] sneezes, Argentina [or any smaller neighboring state] catches cold.” Brazil was, indeed, designated by Paul Kennedy and his coauthors as a pivotal state by virtue of the size of its population and economy relative to neighboring states, and Argentina’s economy did indeed actually “catch cold” when Brazil devalued its currency in 1999. Obviously the pivotal-states strategy aims at the positive effects that a pivotal state can have on its neighbors.
According to the strategy, the United States should target its foreign aid, economic preferences, concessionary military sales, and technical assistance on the “Brazils” of the world and at the same time reduce its aid and assistance to other states, including their nonpivotal neighbors—for example, Argentina. Extending the health analogy, the strategy called for the United States to give vitamins to Brazil in order to promote rosy cheeks in both Brazil and Argentina. To do otherwise, Kennedy and his coauthors argued, would spread state-to-state assistance so thinly among a large number of recipient states that no single one would get enough aid to make a real difference.
The image projected by the pivotal-states strategy is proactive. The strategy seeks to influence regionally dominant states precisely because those states are regionally dominant. They are pivots because they extend muscular tentacles of economic, cultural, political, and ideological influence into their respective hinterlands. Perhaps because of this focus on relatively powerful states, this strategy implies a high level of respect for the sovereignty and national interests of the recipient states.
Like all of the strategies discussed here, the pivotal-states strategy is easier to describe than to execute. It assumes that decisions about import quotas, tariffs, and foreign aid will actually be made (or perhaps only wishes they would be made) on the basis of foreign policy considerations alone. The reality is, of course, often quite different. Such decisions are political judgments and will always be heavily colored by estimates about their likely effects on domestic constituencies. Higher quotas and lower tariffs are inevitably evaluated and voted up or down on the basis of their impact on the U.S. economy and, more particularly, on domestic American industries—often with only scant regard for their potential effects on a pivotal state in a distant region of the world. President George W. Bush’s March 2002 decision on steel import tariffs is a good case in point. Although it has since been rescinded, the tariffs were very clearly designed to support the domestic steel industry regardless of its effects on foreign trading partners. Similarly, decisions about where to invest foreign aid or even sell military hardware at concessionary prices are always influenced by political pressures from constituency groups, be they individuals who want to extend the helping hand of foreign aid to whoever needs it regardless of the overall foreign policy, or industry representatives and labor lobbyists who want to maximize sales whether the opportunities are in high or low-priority markets.
It is less than clear that the conditions in failed states actually offer better opportunities for terrorists than do conditions in certain functional states.
Moreover, circumstances change, often in ways that disrupt the best-laid plans of strategists. For example, Afghanistan was never considered a pivotal or even moderately important state until after the Taliban refused to turn over the 11 September terrorists. Nevertheless, the country is getting a considerable share of American nation-building and peacekeeping resources. This seems to indicate that it would be impossible for the United States to adhere to any spending priority list over time.
On the other hand, a truly rigorous concentration of foreign aid, trade preferences, and intensive technical assistance, etc., on a very small number of pivotal states can have profoundly positive effects on a region. This was the case in postwar Germany and Japan, and it appears to be the strategy the United States is following with respect to Iraq. The objectives of the very heavy investment in postwar reconstruction in Iraq clearly include the stabilization of the Middle East region as a whole and the promotion of political and economic reform in neighboring states—including, of course, states with unrepresentative regimes that have been sponsoring terrorism or at least not acting effectively to suppress it.
Focusing on only one or two pivotal states (for example, Iraq and Afghanistan) amounts to a pivotal-regions strategy (or in this instance, region), a substantially different approach in that it does not identify pivotal states in every major region or focus aid on them as levers for the promotion of American national interests around the world. For the time being, considering the Greater Middle East as the pivotal region may make good strategic sense. The Middle East is, in fact, a crucially important region at this point, because it is the ideological and financial wellspring of Islamic extremism, and because its oil resources play such an important role in the world economy. Nonetheless, the reconstruction project in Iraq will one day be completed, internationalized, or abandoned, and when that day comes questions about whether state-to-state aid should be concentrated on pivotal, buffer, or failed states will reemerge.
BUFFER STATES
Buffer-states strategies also envision that the United States would provide greater amounts of economic, political, and military support to some states than to others, but in this strategy the priority traditionally has been states that can solidify the local status quo, rather than states with resources that can be leveraged into greater influence over events in distant regions.
For example, the Soviet Union established the Warsaw Pact in order to provide a “cordon sanitaire” between the motherland and the West. Stalin’s cocooning strategy clearly viewed the Eastern European satellites as insulators between the core of the Soviet empire and the sources of economic, cultural, and ideological contagion in the West. He saw the satellites also as shock absorbers that could contribute to the preservation of his hard-won empire by serving as first lines of defense in the event of a military attack by NATO. Ironically, before World War II some Western European leaders had viewed the very same Eastern European states as buffers against Bolshevism. Until the dawn of the nuclear age and now the global war on terrorism, the oceans were thought to constitute all the buffers that the United States needed, although there have occasionally been arguments for prioritizing aid to Mexico so that it could better protect the United States against infiltration and mass migration from Central America.
The image projected by buffer-states strategies is reactive. Buffer-states strategies aim at local, not widely dispersed, states. Their contributions are defensive, and their ability to project economic, cultural, political, and ideological influence over other states is immaterial.
Lately there has been interest in a strategy that appears to combine aspects of both the buffer and pivotal-states strategies. This “seam states” strategy was formulated and effectively articulated by a Naval War College colleague, Dr. Thomas P. M. Barnett.2 As envisioned by Barnett, the seam-states approach forms part of a larger strategy involving improvements in homeland security and proactive interventions in nonseam states. Barnett’s seams resemble the fault lines between civilizations or cultures that were envisioned by Professor Samuel Huntington in the early 1990s;3 however, Barnett’s lines in the sand are fewer in number, more fluid, and more heavily based on secular phenomena than were Huntington’s cultural fault lines.
The seams represent the dividing line between two figurative tectonic plates. One plate contains the states that are connected with, or are attempting with at least some success to connect with, the “West” through globalization. This plate accounts for approximately two-thirds of the world’s population, and it represents, in Barnett’s schema, an economic and political winners’ circle of relatively stable and prosperous states. The other plate represents the remaining one-third of the world’s population who reside in states that are disconnected, or are deliberately disconnecting themselves, from the evolving norms, practices, and institutions of globalization. Barnett argues that in the new, new world order this is where the main security threats originate. The threats may be from a state (North Korea), a terrorist group sponsored by a state (Hizbollah), or terrorists acting completely independently of a state (al-Qa‘ida), but in each instance the threat is assumed to emanate from an entity based on the second tectonic plate.
According to this strategy, states along the seams between the tectonic plates are potentially important because they can serve collectively as a barrier inhibiting the ability of terrorist networks on the second plate to attack states on the first plate—but not every state on the seam is equally important.
Twelve of the most important seam states are designated by Barnett for priority attention. The twelve would get more economic, political, and military assistance from the United States; other advanced countries and other seam states would get less. Of the twelve most important seam states, Professor Kennedy and others earlier identified seven as pivotal states.
States (seven) on both the pivotal and seam-states lists: Algeria, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, South Africa, Turkey
States (five) on seam-states list only: Greece, Malaysia, Morocco, the Philippines, Thailand
States (two) on the pivotal states list only: Egypt, India.
Although the focus of this essay is on the overall strategies, rather than nuts-and-bolts decisions about which states warrant higher priority, the list of key seam states does invite comment. Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines share maritime borders primarily with each other and land borders with only four states: the first-plate states of Singapore and Brunei, the second-plate—but nonthreatening—state of Papua New Guinea, and Thailand, which is designated as another key seam state. In effect, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines do not actually abut any significant segment of the seam between the first tectonic plate and the second. This suggests that these three states are designated for priority attention for some reason other than their status as seam states, which in turn may raise questions about the assumptions upon which the strategy was built. It seems clear that the region as a whole is what is strategically important—the vast expanse of ocean, a huge number of islands, and heavily trafficked sea-lanes that Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines individually govern—not the ability of the three states to serve as buffers between the first and second tectonic plates.
Despite the high degree of overlap between the seam-states and pivotal-states lists, the seam-states strategy is, in fact, more closely aligned philosophically with the buffer-states approach. The seam and buffer-states strategies concentrate state-to-state assistance on a selected number of states that have primarily defensive functions and may or may not be able to project economic, cultural, political, or ideological influence at the regional level. In this strategy, influence is projected beyond the seam by the state that provides the assistance in the first place—the United States.
In concluding that the key seam states could function as effective barriers against terrorist networks, the strategy makes two important assumptions. One is that the seam states actually provide some sort of physical barrier between the first and second plates; the second is that terrorist networks would actually have to transit the barrier in order to attack the United States or one of its neighbors on the first tectonic plate. Both of these assumptions are questionable, given the nature of modern transportation networks and the relatively small volume of men and materiel that terrorist organizations would actually have to move from one location to another in order to attack a state in the winners’ circle. As long as commercial airlines fly to places like Kabul and Khartoum and ships dock at ports in South Asia and West Africa, terrorist organizations will be able to fly over or sail around whatever barriers the seam states provide.
The strategy also assumes that the key seam states are now or soon will be (after having received state-to-state assistance) physically capable of controlling their borders and exerting on-the-ground control over remote internal regions. This indeed would seem to be the sine qua non of the strategy, for if a state cannot control its own territory, it can hardly serve as an effective barrier against intrusion or movement between the second and first plates.
At least four (Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Brazil) of the twelve key seam states long ago demonstrated the inability to assert control over remote internal areas or effectively police their land and sea borders. Terrorists having already established bases of operation in three of them—Pakistan, the Philippines, and Indonesia—it is clear that none has presented a major barrier to terrorist networks in the past. Enough incidents of terrorism continue to occur in each of these countries (a March 2003 bombing in the Philippines’ second biggest airport, the August 2003 hotel bombing in Jakarta and the October 2002 bombing of a Bali resort in Indonesia, and the intermittent terrorism in Kashmir conducted or supported by Pakistani groups) to raise doubts that any of the three will become effective barriers any time soon. Although there are as yet no signs that the fourth, Brazil, is home to anti-American terrorist base camps, there are serious questions about the extent of Brazil’s effective control over its remote interior sections, in particular near the western borders with Colombia and Peru and the southern frontier with Paraguay and Argentina.
The pivotal-states strategy calls to mind the saying, “When Brazil sneezes, Argentina catches cold.”
The seam-states strategy envisions a robust program of state-to-state assistance (military sales, military advisers and trainers, foreign aid, technical assistance on law enforcement and government reforms, and favorable trade agreements) to help key seam states improve and extend their governing capacities so as to prevent second-plate terrorists from attacking first-plate targets.
A program of this magnitude is daunting, to say the least, and unlikely to be resourced adequately. Moreover, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Brazil, and perhaps other key seam states ultimately lack sufficient incentives to exert themselves seriously in underpopulated rural zones; all face more direct challenges in their overcrowded cities. Demographic trends suggest that the urban challenges will get worse, not better. Pakistan, Indonesia, Brazil, the Philippines, and also Malaysia have vast land or maritime borders that are virtually impossible to control without unaffordable increases in their security budgets. For example, the coastlines of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines total about sixty thousand miles—five times the length of the coastline of the United States. It is hard to envision Indonesia, Malaysia, or the Philippines ever being able to control effectively more than a tiny percentage—that is, ever being truly effective at the role that the seam strategy envisions for them.
FAILING STATES
Failing-states strategies are of a completely different order than pivotal, buffer, or seam-states strategies. Theoretically, pivotal and buffer-states strategies target other states as being relatively capable of either projecting influence regionally or acting as barriers against intrusion by third parties. Failing states are capable of neither, and it is their very incapacity that causes some strategists to believe that they warrant high priority in state-to-state assistance.
Failed states have been variously defined. Some definitions include states that have simply ceased to exist and have been succeeded by others. For example, under some definitions the Austro-Hungarian Empire would be a failed state, because the geography and population centers once administered as one entity by the Hapsburgs are now administered by successor states. By this yardstick, the term “failing state” could have applied to the Soviet Union during the late Gorbachev and early Yeltsin eras. For the purposes of strategies for dealing with current and future security issues, such inclusive definitions are useless; a state’s failure is often positive in terms of U.S. national interests, as for example when a state that sponsors terrorism fails or, as in Iraq, is made to fail. A state’s failure can also leave behind successor states that are politically stable, administratively competent, or connected with the norms of the economically advanced states on the first tectonic plate. Some of the Soviet Union’s successor states (Russia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia) fall into this category, as do a number of Hapsburg successor states (Austria, the Czech Republic, and Hungary).
A more pertinent definition focuses on sovereign states that exist on paper as members of the United Nations and thus are candidates for state-to-state assistance but that have ceased to provide basic government services to their citizenry, often because of internal strife—as in Somalia in the early 1990s and Liberia in 2003. Initially of concern because of the humanitarian consequences of civil wars, forced starvation, and human rights abuses, failed states have come to be seen by some as launching pads for terrorists and major criminal organizations as well as wellsprings of destabilizing refugee movements and breeding grounds for virulent diseases.4
Quite a few scholars and government officials have burned a good deal of tread off their tires trying to devise taxonomies for failing states. This veritable cottage industry attempts to identify warning signs that might enable the international community to intervene early enough to prevent other states from failing. The theory behind these efforts is that concentrated state-to-state assistance for states in danger of failing will prevent failure and thereby:
Eliminate opportunities for terrorist and criminal organizations to establish bases of operations
Remove the incentive for refugees to flee into other countries
Enable law enforcement, humanitarian, and public health agencies to expand their operations and thereby gradually improve living conditions and prevent the spread of crime and disease.
It is clear that the internal chaos and anarchy of failing states do indeed create fertile breeding grounds for crime, human rights abuses, disease, and starvation. But notwithstanding the assumptions of this strategy, it is much less clear that the conditions in failed states actually offer better opportunities for terrorists than do conditions in certain functional states.
For example, states that actively sponsor terrorism with money, police protection, or weapons and that share intelligence reports about impending antiterrorist operations tend not to be failing. Such “services” may simply not be reliably available in a failing state. States that are genuinely failing are not typically well connected with Western intelligence sources and are thus usually not in a position to obtain or leak advance warning to terrorists. Further, they often exert little control over the internal security forces that might be expected to provide protection to terrorist base camps. Moreover, failing states may be viewed by terrorists as being unable to provide more than token resistance to antiterrorist incursions by neighboring states or special operations units from Western states. Failing states may even be seen by terrorist organizations as incapable of distinguishing between antiterrorist incursions and indigenous violence—and thus as unable or unwilling to offer even stout legal defenses of their sovereignty.
This is not to say that terrorists do not operate or establish base camps in failing states. They do. However, the issue for strategists seeking to prioritize the investments in state-to-state assistance is not whether there are terrorist organizations in failing states. For strategists the issue is whether the terrorist organizations and operations in failing states are more dangerous to the United States than terrorist organizations and operations in functioning states.
Fund-raising by terrorist organizations is one aspect of this issue. It has been noted that terrorist organizations finance their operations through criminal activity in failing states. For example, there have been reports that al-Qa‘ida has been trafficking in diamonds smuggled from the failing states of Liberia and Sierra Leone.5 The profits that al-Qa‘ida earns from reselling diamonds apparently help finance the group’s operations and enable it to maintain its communications network and purchase weapons. Obviously, anything that enables groups like al-Qa‘ida to finance their operations ought to be of substantial concern to strategists, but it should be remembered that the problem is hardly unique to failing states. While smuggling is considerably easier in a failed state that cannot control its borders, goods are also smuggled out of functioning states (e.g., diamonds from Tanzania, drugs from Colombia, small arms from Russia), and the profits from these enterprises can also finance terrorist groups. In fact, criminal enterprises inside functioning states can also generate funds for terrorists. Even in the United States, terrorist operatives or their sympathizers have engaged in illegal activity (such as smuggling cigarettes from low-tax states like North Carolina for resale in high-tax states like New York, embezzling from charities, extorting money from legitimate businessmen and families) in order to raise funds for terrorism.
States along the seams between the tectonic plates are potentially important because they can serve collectively as a barrier—but not every state on the seam is equally important.
Another factor to consider is that the most serious recent terrorist attacks on first-plate states have been based either in the first-plate state itself or in a state that was not considered to have failed. The bombings in Indonesia were reportedly undertaken by an Indonesian terrorist group, and the 11 September attacks on the United States sprang from a complex of headquarters, training camps, and weapons caches in Afghanistan. On 10 September 2001 most observers felt that Afghanistan under the Taliban suffered from too much government, not too little. The Taliban might have failed to improve the living conditions in Afghanistan, but it did control enough of the country to make al-Qa‘ida view the Taliban government as a sound strategic partner—one that would be able to assert state sovereignty and provide protection to al-Qa‘ida operations. None of the individuals indicted for the March 2004 terrorist bombing in Spain was from a failing state—in fact, most were from one of the designated seam states, Morocco.
Events in Afghanistan and Indonesia strongly suggest that in terms of the war on terrorism, the threat posed by groups in failing states is no more serious than the threat posed by groups operating in lightly governed (or ungovernable) zones inside functioning states. As noted above in connection with the seam-states strategy, the phenomenon of remote and only nominally administered rural or coastal zones inside functioning states is already a serious problem in some parts of the world. As urbanization continues to deplete rural populations and force national governments to concentrate on governing cities, the phenomenon may become more widespread.
THE LURE OF ELEGANT CATEGORIZATIONS
This article has sought to compare and contrast the assumptions and conceptual approaches embedded in three broad strategies for maximizing the benefits the United States receives from state-to-state assistance programs. None of the three represents an adequate strategy for dealing with the security threats of the present day and age.
Each of the three depends heavily upon the ability of strategists to perform two functions well: first, to decide which states are more important than others in terms of their contributions to the “bottom line”; and second, to adhere to the designated priorities over extended periods of time, not just a single fiscal year. The difficulty of actually performing both tasks well should not be underestimated. Judgments about where the United States should invest its time and money are inherently and inescapably political, and in practice they are likely to reflect domestic considerations as much as strategic calculations. Political pressures from domestic interest groups and unanticipated developments overseas will not only shape the original priority list of recipient states but cause our investment patterns to diverge from whichever strategy is officially adopted. In the unlikely event that an elegant game plan were actually adopted, it would not be long before we began to violate it.
Moreover, each of the general strategies reflects assumptions about the role of other states that may be inappropriate for the security threats posed in the new, new world order. Indeed, it may well be that the very idea of categorizing states according to the role that the United States would assign them (extending a stabilizing influence over a region, serving as a barrier against external threats, reestablishing stability over the territory of a failing state) is misguided, because of the quicksilver nature of the terrorist threats emanating from “beyond the seam.” As we have seen, at least some terrorist groups seem able to disperse and reorganize (perhaps under different names), relocate at great distance (al-Qa‘ida’s relocation from Sudan to Afghanistan is the best example), and quickly form partnerships of convenience with groups in other countries, including first-plate states like Great Britain and France. The pivotal states, buffer/seam-states and failed-states strategies plod in comparison. By the time state-to-state assistance has had its hoped-for effects on a pivotal, key seam or failing state, the terrorist organizations will have moved on to other locations from which they could base operations, devise new routes for attack on the “West,” or forge new alliances with dissident groups inside first-plate or seam states.
The pivotal, buffer, and seam-states strategies each more or less assumes that all states that are categorized as high priority will play roughly the same role. For example, a seam-states strategy assumes that once having received state-to-state assistance, all of the key seam states will at least attempt to serve as effective barriers to third-party threats. If this assumption were not made, there would be no logical reason to pursue the strategy in the first place. It is also assumed that a state could be a pivot or a nonpivot, but not both—a seam state or a nonseam state, but not both.
The problem is that at least some of the states that would be designated as pivotal and key seam states have characteristics of failing or beyond-the-seam states. That is to say, several of the pivot or key seam states contain zones where they have simply failed to exert effective control. These ungoverned or very lightly governed zones (such as the fastness of Pakistan’s mountainous border with Afghanistan, where Osama Bin Laden has reportedly been managing to avoid capture and orchestrate terrorist actions in first-plate states), out-of-the-way islands in Indonesia, dense patches of jungle in the Philippine archipelago, and the isolated interior of Brazil are already home to terrorist organizations and could provide bases of terrorist operations in the future. Many of these pivot or seam states have pressing social problems in overpopulated cities and are not highly motivated even to attempt to play the role scripted for them in the pivot and seam-states strategies—to assert control over remote and dangerous regions. In some of these states, governance is a delicate balancing act among ethnic minorities or religious factions. Their rulers may well see their own interests as being best served by lip service to the role of pivot or buffer.
Given these considerations, the lure of grand strategies based on elegant categorizations of states should be resisted. A more effective approach would be to do more of something we do not do enough of today—allocate security-related assistance to other states on the basis of that state’s potential contribution to specific high-priority projects or functions in the war on terrorism. Examples are the collection and sharing of intelligence information about terrorist organizations, law enforcement action against indigenous terrorist groups with affiliations to al-Qa‘ida, suppression of illegal fund-raising activities by terrorist organizations, and effective regulation and monitoring of financial transfers that support terrorist organizations.
NOTES
1. Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill, and Paul Kennedy, “Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 1 (January/February 1996).
2. Thomas P. M. Barnett, “The Pentagon’s New Map: It Explains Why We’re Going to War and Why We’ll Keep Going to War,” Esquire, March 2003.
3. Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993).
4. State Failure Task Force, Internal Wars and Failures of Governance, 1955–2000. The task force was initially commissioned by the U.S. government during the 1990s and has since continued its work under the auspices of the Center for International Development and Conflict Management, at the University of Maryland. The data are available at the center’s website, www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/. Recent articles on failed states as platforms for terrorism include Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States in a World of Terror,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4 (July/August 2002); and Jeffrey Record, “Collapsed Countries, Casualty Dread, and the New American Way of War,” Parameters 32, no. 2 (Summer 2002), pp. 4–23.
5. Douglas Farah, “Report Says Africa Harbors Al Qaeda: Terror Assets Hidden in Gem Buying Spree,” Washington Post, 29 December 2002, p. A01.
柳惠千：我在法蘭西飛行的日子
http://www.mnd.gov.tw/publication/subject.aspx?TopicID=1727
我在法蘭西飛行的日子
引 言
「（本報記者ooo／台北報導）我國軍事外交再傳重大突破！軍方權威管道透露，我國已與法國空軍簽訂協議，將互派現役戰鬥機飛行員長駐各國飛行部隊。這項深具意義的軍事合作協議，將是自中美協防條約解除，美國現役飛行員撤出台灣之後，再一次與友我國家互派飛行員進駐交流，在政治、軍事、外交意義上格外重大………..」。千禧年十月底身為中華民國空軍戰鬥機飛行員的我，就在這起敏感的軍事新聞環伺之下，肩負著國內各級長官的深切期許，雖然低調卻仍舊如履薄冰似的前來法國參與「中、法空軍戰術飛行交換訓練案」，正式進駐法國空軍幻象2000-5型機作戰中隊，執行長達二年的戰術交流飛行任務。轉眼之間抵法至今已達一年有餘，除了初到異國時生活上的陌生、孤寂和語言上的挫折、困擾之外，駐法工作與飛行的主要任務卻是十分精彩且深具挑戰性。由於歷史、政治、經濟、軍事和外交上種種的特殊國情發展需要，使得法國空軍無論在組織結構與國防目標上，都具有放眼國際的宏觀與主導歐陸發展的氣魄。筆者在這段交換訓練任務期間，隨同第一線作戰中隊參與法軍在國內各式飛行演習訓練任務，除長期領受法空軍飛行部隊戰備飛行員的「養成教育」之外，值得讚嘆與反思的法式鮮活思維更有道之不盡的欽羨。故筆者希望用另一種比較輕鬆與寫實的態度，針對在法飛行過程中特別值得詳述其究的項目，融合筆者主觀的心路歷程與客觀的訓練環境，表達出身為戰鬥機飛行員的辛酸與榮耀。
一、科西加島實彈射擊訓練：
SOLENZARA－一個蠻「義大利」的名字－法國空軍126戰鬥機聯隊－座落於法國南面地中海上的科西加島，距法國本島約有150海浬孤立島嶼。清晨 06：30，陽光剛剛由海面上昇起，在十月份秋後的早晨，倒映在海天一色的洋面上，金光閃爍顯得特別刺眼。每小時25浬的季節性海風，已經將 SOLENZARA基地跑道旁的風標袋吹得飽滿挺立，停機坪上十餘架幻象2000-5型戰機整整齊齊的排列在初陽的餘光下，架架面向地中海，驕傲的神情彷彿像是一群剛由沈睡中甦醒的猛獅。島上寧靜的清晨顯得十分詳和，跑道旁濃密的橄欖樹林中，鳥兒們不甘寂寞似的爭相走告初陽昇起的美景，吱吱喳喳的鳥語劃破了大地的寧靜。這一切僅僅是風暴來臨前的短暫寧靜嗎﹖或許吧！一個小時後的基地內，像極了戰鼓敲醒了大地，停機坪上突然湧入的工作人潮，繁忙中卻又嚴謹的執行著狀似神聖的儀式—他們是戰機各系統的專業人員，正忙著為蓄勢待發的戰鷹做好一切「衝天」的準備。熟練無瑕的程序、精準劃一的動作，再加上彼此目光接觸時一聲聲愉快而精神飽滿的「Bonjour….」問候，今天﹔一如往日，是SOLENZARA空軍基地迎接挑戰的寫照，也是我心目中法式天真、自信、熱情的開始……
每年乙次長達二至三週前進SOLENZARA基地的實彈射擊訓練，是目前法軍作戰中隊年度內的重點訓練項目，同時也是作戰中隊在時限內完成機動移防與戰備部屬訓練的大好機會。針對實際戰場經驗所模設計的各式射擊場景，除了可以提供新進人員實彈射擊的能力評鑑之外，另對於資深領隊人員也具有教學相長、精益求精的策勵作用。今年的射擊訓練與往年有些不同，由於法軍幻象2000-5F型機才剛剛完成換裝而正式成軍服役，大部份中隊現役飛行員都必須依照不同的資格能力，完成「空對空射擊能力評鑑」程序，故在行前的飛行員言談之間顯得格外重視和謹慎。
二、移防首日：
戰備移防可不同於轉降外場那般簡單，先前的移防計劃、準備與提示早就已經在法軍飽富經驗的戰備行政體系中逐一按時完成，中隊飛行員的工作顯得專注而獨特。除了把所有妥善飛機順利圓滿的飛抵遠在300浬之外的科西加島—SOLENZARA基地之外，任務執行過程中還必須要精心規劃相關課目組合訓練，以期達到模擬實戰轉場的訓練目的。所以在移防當日的飛行科目中，包含了CAP（防禦性空中戰鬥巡邏）與SWEEP（攻擊性掃蕩干擾）視距外攻／防戰術訓練、戰術空中加油、長途飛行、海上低空導航及外場落地一氣呵成，任務領隊的提示過程足足花了將近二個小時，法軍戰術領隊的職責真是不好扛。
當日筆者分配到的任務是擔任SWEEP掃蕩二號機。從原駐地DIJON基地起飛之後，即採戰術流動隊形定向訓練空域，如此可獲得最大機載雷達搜索範圍及最佳目視相互支援效果，另可確保在飛航管制人員的監控之下，順利通過各式國際民航班機航班綿密的歐陸領空（有時滿天縱橫交錯的航空器高空凝結尾，看起來真是挺嚇人的）。當好不容易趕赴150浬外的訓練空域時，從其他基地起飛並擔任CAP任務的四架模擬敵機早已盤旋等候我們多時，透過共同採用的安全波道彼此 CHECK-IN互通無誤之後，耳機內隨即傳來領隊「FIGHT`S ON（模擬戰鬥開始進行）」的指令，此令既出非同小可，因為隨時都有被敵方獵殺的可能。
這批組合對抗任務的空中場景是由數量上較具優勢（四架），但是雷達武器性能居於劣勢（僅具FOX-I能力的SUPER-530D飛彈）的幻象2000 C型機擔任「點防禦」任務。筆者所屬的幻象2000-5F型機因為具備雷達主動導引及射後不理之MICA飛彈武裝優勢，故退而採取數量上居於裂勢的二機小隊，及模擬在敵境內遭受嚴重電子干擾而喪失我方空戰管制的不利條件下，執行自主式攻擊騷擾任務。歷時約十五分鐘的視距外戰鬥過程中，雖然始終沒有機會在空中看到任何一架戰機的蹤影，但藉由幻象機RDY雷達螢幕上鎖定的多架敵機，以及整合式反制干擾接收系統ICMS不斷出現的威脅信號，另透過無線電與長機之間片刻不停歇的SA戰況資訊描述，再加上平均在三～四萬呎高空頻繁的立體迴避戰術動作，戰況緊張激烈的程度，只有側身於座艙之中才能有所意會。在現代化高科技武器戰鬥發展下，到底是誰說飛行員的負荷會愈來愈輕鬆的﹖﹖﹖有時侯真恨不得自已擁有三頭六臂再加上用不完的手指頭，否則如何能夠應付未來附加給飛行員愈來愈多的高科技負擔。言猶在耳：此刻卻傳來敵方戰機因到達BINGO油量（最低戰鬥停止油量）而宣告「K.I.O」（戰鬥任務停止）的急切呼叫，我想大概是對方資淺僚機因戰況緊張而猛開後燃器所至。戰鬥提早結束也讓我們有充份時間徐然前往與空中加油機定點會合。至於戰果裁定將於落地後經由SERPAM及OTARIS任務歸詢系統，完整客觀的呈現給所有任務人員參考檢討。
「戰術空中加油」任務一如儀器飛行般講求精確柔和。如此「繡花式」的專注、平心、靜氣工夫與前一刻緊張激烈的戰鬥動作真是大異其趣。筆者有幸藉由這次交換飛行訓練機會，提前接受目前本軍尚未執行的空中加油課目，除倍感榮幸之外亦是全力以赴不敢有辱使命。話說當時二機前往與法軍C-135FR空中加油機集合後，先由長機在加油機左翼輸油軟管完成「CONTACT接合」操作後，再由時任僚機的筆者調整至右翼進行接合，歷時約五分鐘的「繡花式」操作，終於在加油機觀測員的指示下開始脫離，當座機受油桿正式脫離加油機的那一刻，真有如重獲新生似的自由舒暢，全身肌內不必再因專注而緊繃，換來的卻是重新加滿油料的飽足感。重新與長機集合後，彼此相互檢查機上存油，額外增加的2200公斤（近5000磅）用油，足夠我們順利執行接下來更多彩多姿的海上低空導航任務。
「海上低空導航飛行」對於駐防在DIJON基地的法軍飛行員來說是十分雀躍的，由於平日飛行訓練空域大多在法國東北面的歐陸中心，鮮少有機會「出海」活動，這回藉由移防外島科西加的訓練機會，可以強化其飛行員跨洲或跨洋戰術導航的飛行能力。當筆者經由法國南面大城「馬塞」附近的海岸線離開陸地並朝向地中海上的科西加島直航時，開始逐步向下調整高度。由原先飛航空層四萬呎巡航高度，經飛航管制員特許之下一頭攢下雲層，持續不斷向下調整高度至二仟呎、一仟呎、五佰呎，接著就一直保持五佰尺的低空，並以500浬/時的高速奔馳在浩瀚的地中海面上。長機機身在正午炎陽下投影在海面上，彷彿是二架戰機比肩奔騰，500呎的絕對高度在大氣壓力的調整下只見2～300呎的指示高度，低空大速雄壯出擊的豪情令人動容。時間一分一秒的往前走，洋面上飛快而過的各式休閒船艇只在我的眼角餘光中瞬間一瞥，此刻的我早已是汗流如注，眉宇間流下的汗珠順勢攢入眼角而感到刺痛，深怕它稍有差池而不願眨眼，當然更不會妄想在此刻打開頭盔護鏡擦去擾人的汗珠。
終於在遠方海平面上發現了島狀的科西加，進入管制空域前伴隨著長機緩慢爬升高度，重新與進場管制站取得連絡，保持3000呎高度沿著海島東面進入SOLENZARA基地進場航線，此情此景突然令我想起昔日在國內花蓮及台東兩基地任務返航倦鳥歸巢的美好景象，思鄉的愁緒不容在我心中駐足太久，陌生的機場更需要我額外的專注與謹慎，完成了一個自已尚稱滿意的輕巧觸地之後，結束了長達二個半小時的戰術轉場飛行任務，在烈日當頭的座艙中緩慢的滑行至停機坪，此刻的我終於可以大膽的擦去積在唇角的汗珠。關車前機工作示意加大油門、開啟減速板，兩旁消防用強力水注混合著防腐、防銹特殊溶劑，沖洗著滾熱的機身也沖刷掉海面擬結的鹽質，雖然身處高溫烘焙的座艙內，我的心中卻感到無比清涼。
三、射擊訓練環境
二週密集的飛行任務均在獨立且寬廣的實彈射擊管制區域內進行。SOLENZARA基地的主要任務在於提供所有參訓部隊生活及工作所需之硬體支援及飛航管制，基地本身僅有一搜救分隊常年駐防，並無配屬其他戰鬥飛行部隊，故能全心支援各飛行部隊的短期駐訓。實彈射擊訓練中最重要的靶機角色，乃由法製幻象F- 1型機擔綱演出，法軍並無固定靶機中隊，靶機來自於各基地駐防之幻象F-1型機輪流移防接替。靶標亦為法製「TAC-100」型拖曳電子靶。靶標本身為一無線電波音響感測接收及發送器，用以偵測通過靶標週邊之機砲數量，再以無線電發報機直接將偵測結果傳送地面接收站（即時資料），由值勤人員將射擊結果於開槍後立即告知飛行員，俾利於下一次射擊航線修正參考。靶標後方連接一具網狀輕質紅色靶布以利飛行員清楚目視。有效的射擊是以通過感測器半徑3公尺範圍內機砲數量做為計算標準，如果有幸將二發以上30公厘機砲成功的送上該感應區，飛行員將立即在耳機中獲得「BLEU」（藍色）的英雄式歡呼，否則﹔聽到的則是令人氣餒的「ROUGE」（紅色—亦稱之為麵包）。
任務派遣及航線執行方式是由靶機與第一小隊（每一射擊小隊為二架）同時起飛，並由該小隊執行放靶後目視檢查，確証靶標拖曳正常後才可進行實彈射擊任務。隨後每批小隊間隔十分鐘起飛，靶機則視射擊課目而定可提供約5至6架射擊機（最多三個射擊小隊）執行15至20次之射擊航線操作，射擊完成後即行脫離。
彈葯配賦情況則依飛行員資格能力劃分為三類，具有二機領隊（或以上）資格的老鳥，每年配賦770發機砲，甫完成戰備之菜鳥僚機與正在進行換裝中的雜鳥則享有特惠方案，每年配賦高達920發機砲可供享用。航線種類亦分為「基本射擊航線」、「資格鑑定航線」及「戰術射擊航線」等三類。由於戰術射擊航線的場景內容結合了實際戰場可能遭遇的各種高度、速度、G力瞬間變化，故每批射擊練習航線與開槍情況均變化無窮，大幅的增加了操控上的挑戰性與學習效益。飛行員可由每批任務歸詢時，詳細觀看空中慢速定格播放的空用錄影帶，彼此觀摩及交換每一次開槍時的狀況及心得，藉此將珍貴的「錯誤經驗」無私的傳遞出來，更在無形中凝聚了飛行員之間無法言傳的「革命情感」，對於筆者習慣了法軍飛行員天真、浪漫與死要面子的特性之後，這回由實彈射擊訓練過程中，終於在他們身上找到了一種全世界戰鬥飛行員都該具備的「基本情操」。
四、射擊能力鑑定過程
在島上的第二週射擊訓練是重頭戲。大部份飛行員必需在二至三批照準或實彈射擊飛行的暖身活動後，正式接受「空對空射擊能力鑑定」的挑戰且順利的達成法軍訂定的評鑑標準，否則該名飛行員不具備實戰任務射擊能力認可，影響所及不僅在於個人飛行能力的肯定，更直接關係到中隊成員平均戰力增損，故所有飛行人員無不卯盡全力，以期爭取該項評鑑順利完成，尤其新進換裝或資淺人員（當然也包含我這位外國人在內），無不戰戰兢兢的設法儘早達到評鑑合格的標準。
猶記鑑定飛行當日筆者擔任飛行領隊，帶領著法軍尚未完成戰備的僚機一起提示時，相互鼓勵、打氣的高昂情緒至今仍然無法忘懷。當時還是青澀僚機的他比我更緊張，前一天射擊評鑑未達合格標準的壓力，清清楚楚的掛在他自信不足的臉上，如今又面臨長機是個「外國人」的不適，哇拉拉…..我想他昨晚大概久久輾轉難眠吧！不過﹔不知道是誰說的--「壓力令人學習快速成長」。在飛行前的任務提示中，設法重建他自信的同時，反而忘卻了自已亦背負鑑定合格的壓力。
靶機起飛十分鐘後，我們迅速的在跑道上完成試車程序，保持後燃器加速一路爬升到二萬五千呎，此時雷達顯示幕上順利的獲得靶機回波，經由敵我識別器密碼辯証無誤之後，立即採取對頭攔截方式加速至450浬/時。提醒僚機FENCE-IN（武器選取安全檢查）的同時，自已也再度確認所有實彈射擊程序及電門位置，偶而由座艙後視鏡中瞥見僚機蓄勢待發的姿勢，更令我確信今天是我們圓滿完成任務的光榮時刻。
鑑定航線中靶機對頭通過之後立即採 60坡度下降轉彎，射擊小隊必需在靶機完成轉彎一圈（360度）的過程中，順利的達成至少二次有效命中射擊，否則無法達到鑑定合格的標準。當靶機從右下方二點鐘位置通過的那一剎那，筆者立即重新開啟後燃器、微略帶起機頭、瞬間持續帶桿增加至6～7G負荷，以便在最小的轉彎半徑下保持最佳的操控能量，同時亦爭取足夠的時間完成穩定的追瞄射擊。此刻時間、空間、距離、能量在腦中不斷的翻騰，眼裏盡是逐漸由遠而近的紅色靶標，握著油門、駕駛桿的雙手卻是無比的鎮靜謹慎……
距離1500公尺----抬頭顯示幕上不斷閃爍的符號催促著我該是打開武器安全保險的時刻。距離1200公尺----快速的交互檢查接近率固定徘徊在50浬左右。距離900公尺----謹慎徐緩的將射擊參考符號移向下方「待宰」的靶標，同時再度確認沒有誤鎖靶機的疑慮。距離 600公尺----射擊參考線已經結結實實的「貼」在靶標上，掛在板機上的食指有些不自主的顫抖，專注的瞬間彷彿像是凍結的時空。距離450公尺--- -！！按下機砲扳機、鬆開扳機、向上帶桿、加油門、脫離射擊位置、關閉機砲保險、檢查發動機…..一連串下意識快速的反射動作，是每一位飛行員在地面模擬過上百次、上千次的成果。重新調整射擊航線的同時，耳機中傳來令人振奮的射擊結果播報「Leader, Resultat Bleu（命中目標）」。這個久已渴望聽到的結果，在隨後僚機執行射擊的過程中，亦如願的重複著播報。圓滿達成任務之後迅速帶領僚機脫離射擊空域「凱旋而歸」，返航途中驚訝的發現，科西加島一向光禿單調的石灰岩峭壁，突然變得美景如畫，壓仰著難奈的興奮之情直到落地為止，當關停發動機緩慢步下座機的同時，才發現自已早已揮汗如雨，迎面而來的僚機隊員突然的給了我一把無所適從的熱情擁抱，一切盡在不言中……
五、返防前夕
對飛行員而言，面對全力以赴、迎向挑戰的飛行時光總是過得特別快，轉眼之間﹔二個星期的實彈射擊訓練即將結束，明天就是全中隊任務完畢啟程返防的日子。下午最後乙批實彈任務結束後，中隊所有空、地勤人員暫時放下手邊的工作，一起集合在修護棚廠內參與慶功酒會，席間邀請SOLENZARA基地所有在任務期間提供支援的單位及人員同歡，香檳和啤酒的「氣泡」配上法式乳酪臘腸的「美咮」充塞滿棚，所有的辛勞與汗水伴隨著莫名的成就感在此刻昇華到最高點。法軍飛行中隊長就在此刻突然敲響酒杯示意致詞，全場瞬時默然的傾耳聆聽…「首先非常感謝………這二個星期的實彈射擊訓練期間，本中隊總共完成了450架次飛行，成功發射八枚紅外線魔法飛彈、二佰八十枚反制干擾火焰彈、二萬一千四佰發30公厘空用機砲…………最值得高興的是全中隊所有飛行員均順利完成本年度幻象2000-5F型機服役以來，第一次全面性的「空對空實彈射擊」能力評鑑。尤其是今年度首次有來自中華民國空軍的台灣（ROCAF-Taiwan）飛行員與我們一起……（筆者法文能力有限無法全部翻譯，實在感到抱歉）…………」。言畢全場歡聲雷動，頓時斛杯交錯好不熱鬧，透過夕陽餘暉反射在香檳氣泡的迷幻景色中，我依稀看見那位圓滿完成射擊鑑定的法軍僚機，正高舉著啤酒杯自信的向我大喊「A La votre」。
作者簡介
空軍中校 柳惠千
空軍官校七十七年班、空院94年班、美國馬里蘭大學管理碩士、政大外交系戰研所研究生，現任職空軍四九九聯隊第四十一作戰隊作戰長
我在法蘭西飛行的日子
訓練心得
由於歷史、政治、經濟、軍事和外交上種種的特殊國情發展需要，使得法國空軍無論在組織結構與國防目標上，都具有放眼國際的宏觀與主導歐陸發展的氣魄。筆者藉「中、法空軍戰術飛行交換訓練案」，正式進駐法國空軍幻象2000-5型機作戰中隊，執行長達二年的戰術交流飛行任務。隨同第一線作戰中隊參與法軍在國內各式飛行演習訓練任務，除長期領受法空軍飛行部隊戰備飛行員的「養成教育」之外，值得讚嘆與反思的法式鮮活思維，更有道之不盡的欽羨。
我在法蘭西飛行的日子
引 言
「（本報記者ooo／台北報導）我國軍事外交再傳重大突破！軍方權威管道透露，我國已與法國空軍簽訂協議，將互派現役戰鬥機飛行員長駐各國飛行部隊。這項深具意義的軍事合作協議，將是自中美協防條約解除，美國現役飛行員撤出台灣之後，再一次與友我國家互派飛行員進駐交流，在政治、軍事、外交意義上格外重大………..」。千禧年十月底身為中華民國空軍戰鬥機飛行員的我，就在這起敏感的軍事新聞環伺之下，肩負著國內各級長官的深切期許，雖然低調卻仍舊如履薄冰似的前來法國參與「中、法空軍戰術飛行交換訓練案」，正式進駐法國空軍幻象2000-5型機作戰中隊，執行長達二年的戰術交流飛行任務。轉眼之間抵法至今已達一年有餘，除了初到異國時生活上的陌生、孤寂和語言上的挫折、困擾之外，駐法工作與飛行的主要任務卻是十分精彩且深具挑戰性。由於歷史、政治、經濟、軍事和外交上種種的特殊國情發展需要，使得法國空軍無論在組織結構與國防目標上，都具有放眼國際的宏觀與主導歐陸發展的氣魄。筆者在這段交換訓練任務期間，隨同第一線作戰中隊參與法軍在國內各式飛行演習訓練任務，除長期領受法空軍飛行部隊戰備飛行員的「養成教育」之外，值得讚嘆與反思的法式鮮活思維更有道之不盡的欽羨。故筆者希望用另一種比較輕鬆與寫實的態度，針對在法飛行過程中特別值得詳述其究的項目，融合筆者主觀的心路歷程與客觀的訓練環境，表達出身為戰鬥機飛行員的辛酸與榮耀。
一、科西加島實彈射擊訓練：
SOLENZARA－一個蠻「義大利」的名字－法國空軍126戰鬥機聯隊－座落於法國南面地中海上的科西加島，距法國本島約有150海浬孤立島嶼。清晨 06：30，陽光剛剛由海面上昇起，在十月份秋後的早晨，倒映在海天一色的洋面上，金光閃爍顯得特別刺眼。每小時25浬的季節性海風，已經將 SOLENZARA基地跑道旁的風標袋吹得飽滿挺立，停機坪上十餘架幻象2000-5型戰機整整齊齊的排列在初陽的餘光下，架架面向地中海，驕傲的神情彷彿像是一群剛由沈睡中甦醒的猛獅。島上寧靜的清晨顯得十分詳和，跑道旁濃密的橄欖樹林中，鳥兒們不甘寂寞似的爭相走告初陽昇起的美景，吱吱喳喳的鳥語劃破了大地的寧靜。這一切僅僅是風暴來臨前的短暫寧靜嗎﹖或許吧！一個小時後的基地內，像極了戰鼓敲醒了大地，停機坪上突然湧入的工作人潮，繁忙中卻又嚴謹的執行著狀似神聖的儀式—他們是戰機各系統的專業人員，正忙著為蓄勢待發的戰鷹做好一切「衝天」的準備。熟練無瑕的程序、精準劃一的動作，再加上彼此目光接觸時一聲聲愉快而精神飽滿的「Bonjour….」問候，今天﹔一如往日，是SOLENZARA空軍基地迎接挑戰的寫照，也是我心目中法式天真、自信、熱情的開始……
每年乙次長達二至三週前進SOLENZARA基地的實彈射擊訓練，是目前法軍作戰中隊年度內的重點訓練項目，同時也是作戰中隊在時限內完成機動移防與戰備部屬訓練的大好機會。針對實際戰場經驗所模設計的各式射擊場景，除了可以提供新進人員實彈射擊的能力評鑑之外，另對於資深領隊人員也具有教學相長、精益求精的策勵作用。今年的射擊訓練與往年有些不同，由於法軍幻象2000-5F型機才剛剛完成換裝而正式成軍服役，大部份中隊現役飛行員都必須依照不同的資格能力，完成「空對空射擊能力評鑑」程序，故在行前的飛行員言談之間顯得格外重視和謹慎。
二、移防首日：
戰備移防可不同於轉降外場那般簡單，先前的移防計劃、準備與提示早就已經在法軍飽富經驗的戰備行政體系中逐一按時完成，中隊飛行員的工作顯得專注而獨特。除了把所有妥善飛機順利圓滿的飛抵遠在300浬之外的科西加島—SOLENZARA基地之外，任務執行過程中還必須要精心規劃相關課目組合訓練，以期達到模擬實戰轉場的訓練目的。所以在移防當日的飛行科目中，包含了CAP（防禦性空中戰鬥巡邏）與SWEEP（攻擊性掃蕩干擾）視距外攻／防戰術訓練、戰術空中加油、長途飛行、海上低空導航及外場落地一氣呵成，任務領隊的提示過程足足花了將近二個小時，法軍戰術領隊的職責真是不好扛。
當日筆者分配到的任務是擔任SWEEP掃蕩二號機。從原駐地DIJON基地起飛之後，即採戰術流動隊形定向訓練空域，如此可獲得最大機載雷達搜索範圍及最佳目視相互支援效果，另可確保在飛航管制人員的監控之下，順利通過各式國際民航班機航班綿密的歐陸領空（有時滿天縱橫交錯的航空器高空凝結尾，看起來真是挺嚇人的）。當好不容易趕赴150浬外的訓練空域時，從其他基地起飛並擔任CAP任務的四架模擬敵機早已盤旋等候我們多時，透過共同採用的安全波道彼此 CHECK-IN互通無誤之後，耳機內隨即傳來領隊「FIGHT`S ON（模擬戰鬥開始進行）」的指令，此令既出非同小可，因為隨時都有被敵方獵殺的可能。
這批組合對抗任務的空中場景是由數量上較具優勢（四架），但是雷達武器性能居於劣勢（僅具FOX-I能力的SUPER-530D飛彈）的幻象2000 C型機擔任「點防禦」任務。筆者所屬的幻象2000-5F型機因為具備雷達主動導引及射後不理之MICA飛彈武裝優勢，故退而採取數量上居於裂勢的二機小隊，及模擬在敵境內遭受嚴重電子干擾而喪失我方空戰管制的不利條件下，執行自主式攻擊騷擾任務。歷時約十五分鐘的視距外戰鬥過程中，雖然始終沒有機會在空中看到任何一架戰機的蹤影，但藉由幻象機RDY雷達螢幕上鎖定的多架敵機，以及整合式反制干擾接收系統ICMS不斷出現的威脅信號，另透過無線電與長機之間片刻不停歇的SA戰況資訊描述，再加上平均在三～四萬呎高空頻繁的立體迴避戰術動作，戰況緊張激烈的程度，只有側身於座艙之中才能有所意會。在現代化高科技武器戰鬥發展下，到底是誰說飛行員的負荷會愈來愈輕鬆的﹖﹖﹖有時侯真恨不得自已擁有三頭六臂再加上用不完的手指頭，否則如何能夠應付未來附加給飛行員愈來愈多的高科技負擔。言猶在耳：此刻卻傳來敵方戰機因到達BINGO油量（最低戰鬥停止油量）而宣告「K.I.O」（戰鬥任務停止）的急切呼叫，我想大概是對方資淺僚機因戰況緊張而猛開後燃器所至。戰鬥提早結束也讓我們有充份時間徐然前往與空中加油機定點會合。至於戰果裁定將於落地後經由SERPAM及OTARIS任務歸詢系統，完整客觀的呈現給所有任務人員參考檢討。
「戰術空中加油」任務一如儀器飛行般講求精確柔和。如此「繡花式」的專注、平心、靜氣工夫與前一刻緊張激烈的戰鬥動作真是大異其趣。筆者有幸藉由這次交換飛行訓練機會，提前接受目前本軍尚未執行的空中加油課目，除倍感榮幸之外亦是全力以赴不敢有辱使命。話說當時二機前往與法軍C-135FR空中加油機集合後，先由長機在加油機左翼輸油軟管完成「CONTACT接合」操作後，再由時任僚機的筆者調整至右翼進行接合，歷時約五分鐘的「繡花式」操作，終於在加油機觀測員的指示下開始脫離，當座機受油桿正式脫離加油機的那一刻，真有如重獲新生似的自由舒暢，全身肌內不必再因專注而緊繃，換來的卻是重新加滿油料的飽足感。重新與長機集合後，彼此相互檢查機上存油，額外增加的2200公斤（近5000磅）用油，足夠我們順利執行接下來更多彩多姿的海上低空導航任務。
「海上低空導航飛行」對於駐防在DIJON基地的法軍飛行員來說是十分雀躍的，由於平日飛行訓練空域大多在法國東北面的歐陸中心，鮮少有機會「出海」活動，這回藉由移防外島科西加的訓練機會，可以強化其飛行員跨洲或跨洋戰術導航的飛行能力。當筆者經由法國南面大城「馬塞」附近的海岸線離開陸地並朝向地中海上的科西加島直航時，開始逐步向下調整高度。由原先飛航空層四萬呎巡航高度，經飛航管制員特許之下一頭攢下雲層，持續不斷向下調整高度至二仟呎、一仟呎、五佰呎，接著就一直保持五佰尺的低空，並以500浬/時的高速奔馳在浩瀚的地中海面上。長機機身在正午炎陽下投影在海面上，彷彿是二架戰機比肩奔騰，500呎的絕對高度在大氣壓力的調整下只見2～300呎的指示高度，低空大速雄壯出擊的豪情令人動容。時間一分一秒的往前走，洋面上飛快而過的各式休閒船艇只在我的眼角餘光中瞬間一瞥，此刻的我早已是汗流如注，眉宇間流下的汗珠順勢攢入眼角而感到刺痛，深怕它稍有差池而不願眨眼，當然更不會妄想在此刻打開頭盔護鏡擦去擾人的汗珠。
終於在遠方海平面上發現了島狀的科西加，進入管制空域前伴隨著長機緩慢爬升高度，重新與進場管制站取得連絡，保持3000呎高度沿著海島東面進入SOLENZARA基地進場航線，此情此景突然令我想起昔日在國內花蓮及台東兩基地任務返航倦鳥歸巢的美好景象，思鄉的愁緒不容在我心中駐足太久，陌生的機場更需要我額外的專注與謹慎，完成了一個自已尚稱滿意的輕巧觸地之後，結束了長達二個半小時的戰術轉場飛行任務，在烈日當頭的座艙中緩慢的滑行至停機坪，此刻的我終於可以大膽的擦去積在唇角的汗珠。關車前機工作示意加大油門、開啟減速板，兩旁消防用強力水注混合著防腐、防銹特殊溶劑，沖洗著滾熱的機身也沖刷掉海面擬結的鹽質，雖然身處高溫烘焙的座艙內，我的心中卻感到無比清涼。
三、射擊訓練環境
二週密集的飛行任務均在獨立且寬廣的實彈射擊管制區域內進行。SOLENZARA基地的主要任務在於提供所有參訓部隊生活及工作所需之硬體支援及飛航管制，基地本身僅有一搜救分隊常年駐防，並無配屬其他戰鬥飛行部隊，故能全心支援各飛行部隊的短期駐訓。實彈射擊訓練中最重要的靶機角色，乃由法製幻象F- 1型機擔綱演出，法軍並無固定靶機中隊，靶機來自於各基地駐防之幻象F-1型機輪流移防接替。靶標亦為法製「TAC-100」型拖曳電子靶。靶標本身為一無線電波音響感測接收及發送器，用以偵測通過靶標週邊之機砲數量，再以無線電發報機直接將偵測結果傳送地面接收站（即時資料），由值勤人員將射擊結果於開槍後立即告知飛行員，俾利於下一次射擊航線修正參考。靶標後方連接一具網狀輕質紅色靶布以利飛行員清楚目視。有效的射擊是以通過感測器半徑3公尺範圍內機砲數量做為計算標準，如果有幸將二發以上30公厘機砲成功的送上該感應區，飛行員將立即在耳機中獲得「BLEU」（藍色）的英雄式歡呼，否則﹔聽到的則是令人氣餒的「ROUGE」（紅色—亦稱之為麵包）。
任務派遣及航線執行方式是由靶機與第一小隊（每一射擊小隊為二架）同時起飛，並由該小隊執行放靶後目視檢查，確証靶標拖曳正常後才可進行實彈射擊任務。隨後每批小隊間隔十分鐘起飛，靶機則視射擊課目而定可提供約5至6架射擊機（最多三個射擊小隊）執行15至20次之射擊航線操作，射擊完成後即行脫離。
彈葯配賦情況則依飛行員資格能力劃分為三類，具有二機領隊（或以上）資格的老鳥，每年配賦770發機砲，甫完成戰備之菜鳥僚機與正在進行換裝中的雜鳥則享有特惠方案，每年配賦高達920發機砲可供享用。航線種類亦分為「基本射擊航線」、「資格鑑定航線」及「戰術射擊航線」等三類。由於戰術射擊航線的場景內容結合了實際戰場可能遭遇的各種高度、速度、G力瞬間變化，故每批射擊練習航線與開槍情況均變化無窮，大幅的增加了操控上的挑戰性與學習效益。飛行員可由每批任務歸詢時，詳細觀看空中慢速定格播放的空用錄影帶，彼此觀摩及交換每一次開槍時的狀況及心得，藉此將珍貴的「錯誤經驗」無私的傳遞出來，更在無形中凝聚了飛行員之間無法言傳的「革命情感」，對於筆者習慣了法軍飛行員天真、浪漫與死要面子的特性之後，這回由實彈射擊訓練過程中，終於在他們身上找到了一種全世界戰鬥飛行員都該具備的「基本情操」。
四、射擊能力鑑定過程
在島上的第二週射擊訓練是重頭戲。大部份飛行員必需在二至三批照準或實彈射擊飛行的暖身活動後，正式接受「空對空射擊能力鑑定」的挑戰且順利的達成法軍訂定的評鑑標準，否則該名飛行員不具備實戰任務射擊能力認可，影響所及不僅在於個人飛行能力的肯定，更直接關係到中隊成員平均戰力增損，故所有飛行人員無不卯盡全力，以期爭取該項評鑑順利完成，尤其新進換裝或資淺人員（當然也包含我這位外國人在內），無不戰戰兢兢的設法儘早達到評鑑合格的標準。
猶記鑑定飛行當日筆者擔任飛行領隊，帶領著法軍尚未完成戰備的僚機一起提示時，相互鼓勵、打氣的高昂情緒至今仍然無法忘懷。當時還是青澀僚機的他比我更緊張，前一天射擊評鑑未達合格標準的壓力，清清楚楚的掛在他自信不足的臉上，如今又面臨長機是個「外國人」的不適，哇拉拉…..我想他昨晚大概久久輾轉難眠吧！不過﹔不知道是誰說的--「壓力令人學習快速成長」。在飛行前的任務提示中，設法重建他自信的同時，反而忘卻了自已亦背負鑑定合格的壓力。
靶機起飛十分鐘後，我們迅速的在跑道上完成試車程序，保持後燃器加速一路爬升到二萬五千呎，此時雷達顯示幕上順利的獲得靶機回波，經由敵我識別器密碼辯証無誤之後，立即採取對頭攔截方式加速至450浬/時。提醒僚機FENCE-IN（武器選取安全檢查）的同時，自已也再度確認所有實彈射擊程序及電門位置，偶而由座艙後視鏡中瞥見僚機蓄勢待發的姿勢，更令我確信今天是我們圓滿完成任務的光榮時刻。
鑑定航線中靶機對頭通過之後立即採 60坡度下降轉彎，射擊小隊必需在靶機完成轉彎一圈（360度）的過程中，順利的達成至少二次有效命中射擊，否則無法達到鑑定合格的標準。當靶機從右下方二點鐘位置通過的那一剎那，筆者立即重新開啟後燃器、微略帶起機頭、瞬間持續帶桿增加至6～7G負荷，以便在最小的轉彎半徑下保持最佳的操控能量，同時亦爭取足夠的時間完成穩定的追瞄射擊。此刻時間、空間、距離、能量在腦中不斷的翻騰，眼裏盡是逐漸由遠而近的紅色靶標，握著油門、駕駛桿的雙手卻是無比的鎮靜謹慎……
距離1500公尺----抬頭顯示幕上不斷閃爍的符號催促著我該是打開武器安全保險的時刻。距離1200公尺----快速的交互檢查接近率固定徘徊在50浬左右。距離900公尺----謹慎徐緩的將射擊參考符號移向下方「待宰」的靶標，同時再度確認沒有誤鎖靶機的疑慮。距離 600公尺----射擊參考線已經結結實實的「貼」在靶標上，掛在板機上的食指有些不自主的顫抖，專注的瞬間彷彿像是凍結的時空。距離450公尺--- -！！按下機砲扳機、鬆開扳機、向上帶桿、加油門、脫離射擊位置、關閉機砲保險、檢查發動機…..一連串下意識快速的反射動作，是每一位飛行員在地面模擬過上百次、上千次的成果。重新調整射擊航線的同時，耳機中傳來令人振奮的射擊結果播報「Leader, Resultat Bleu（命中目標）」。這個久已渴望聽到的結果，在隨後僚機執行射擊的過程中，亦如願的重複著播報。圓滿達成任務之後迅速帶領僚機脫離射擊空域「凱旋而歸」，返航途中驚訝的發現，科西加島一向光禿單調的石灰岩峭壁，突然變得美景如畫，壓仰著難奈的興奮之情直到落地為止，當關停發動機緩慢步下座機的同時，才發現自已早已揮汗如雨，迎面而來的僚機隊員突然的給了我一把無所適從的熱情擁抱，一切盡在不言中……
五、返防前夕
對飛行員而言，面對全力以赴、迎向挑戰的飛行時光總是過得特別快，轉眼之間﹔二個星期的實彈射擊訓練即將結束，明天就是全中隊任務完畢啟程返防的日子。下午最後乙批實彈任務結束後，中隊所有空、地勤人員暫時放下手邊的工作，一起集合在修護棚廠內參與慶功酒會，席間邀請SOLENZARA基地所有在任務期間提供支援的單位及人員同歡，香檳和啤酒的「氣泡」配上法式乳酪臘腸的「美咮」充塞滿棚，所有的辛勞與汗水伴隨著莫名的成就感在此刻昇華到最高點。法軍飛行中隊長就在此刻突然敲響酒杯示意致詞，全場瞬時默然的傾耳聆聽…「首先非常感謝………這二個星期的實彈射擊訓練期間，本中隊總共完成了450架次飛行，成功發射八枚紅外線魔法飛彈、二佰八十枚反制干擾火焰彈、二萬一千四佰發30公厘空用機砲…………最值得高興的是全中隊所有飛行員均順利完成本年度幻象2000-5F型機服役以來，第一次全面性的「空對空實彈射擊」能力評鑑。尤其是今年度首次有來自中華民國空軍的台灣（ROCAF-Taiwan）飛行員與我們一起……（筆者法文能力有限無法全部翻譯，實在感到抱歉）…………」。言畢全場歡聲雷動，頓時斛杯交錯好不熱鬧，透過夕陽餘暉反射在香檳氣泡的迷幻景色中，我依稀看見那位圓滿完成射擊鑑定的法軍僚機，正高舉著啤酒杯自信的向我大喊「A La votre」。
作者簡介
空軍中校 柳惠千
空軍官校七十七年班、空院94年班、美國馬里蘭大學管理碩士、政大外交系戰研所研究生，現任職空軍四九九聯隊第四十一作戰隊作戰長
我在法蘭西飛行的日子
訓練心得
由於歷史、政治、經濟、軍事和外交上種種的特殊國情發展需要，使得法國空軍無論在組織結構與國防目標上，都具有放眼國際的宏觀與主導歐陸發展的氣魄。筆者藉「中、法空軍戰術飛行交換訓練案」，正式進駐法國空軍幻象2000-5型機作戰中隊，執行長達二年的戰術交流飛行任務。隨同第一線作戰中隊參與法軍在國內各式飛行演習訓練任務，除長期領受法空軍飛行部隊戰備飛行員的「養成教育」之外，值得讚嘆與反思的法式鮮活思維，更有道之不盡的欽羨。
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