www.dod.mil/pubs/twstrait_02261999.html
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Report to Congress
Pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill
(Download in MS Word 6.0 format.)
The FY99 Appropriations Bill states that "the Secretary of Defense shall provide to Congress a report…detailing the security situation in the Taiwan Strait. Such a report shall include an analysis of military forces facing Taiwan from the People’s Republic of China, evaluating recent additions to the offensive military capabilities of the People’s Republic of China." The Appropriations Bill also further requires assessment of new challenges to to Taiwan’s deterrent forces, "consistent with the commitments made by the United States in the Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law 96-8."
This report, submitted in response to the FY99 Appropriations Bill, addresses Taiwan’s ability to defend against current and emerging PLA capabilities. The report addresses PLA and Taiwan force planning, strategy, and doctrine; projected PLA and Taiwan capabilities in 2005 in the areas of conventional theater ballistic and cruise missiles; information operations (C2W); air and air/missile defense assets; naval systems; special operations and conventional ground forces; and intangibles such as leadership, training, personnel, and morale. The report concludes with a dynamic balance assessment of China’s ability in 2005 to implement a naval blockade; establish air superiority; conduct an amphibious invasion of Taiwan; and gain information dominance.
THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT
I. THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT
Nearly three years after the People’s Republic of China (PRC) conducted provocative military exercises opposite Taiwan on the eve of that island's first popular presidential election, the security situation in the Taiwan Strait remains calm with no threat of imminent hostilities. There has been little change in the military balance; Beijing has limited its military activity in the region to routine training; Taipei has reduced the size and scope of its military exercises and played down other activities which Beijing might misconstrue as provocative and destabilizing. Within the political arena, senior negotiators from the two quasi-official organizations responsible for managing cross-Strait relations --Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS)--met in China in mid-October 1998 and resumed direct contacts--suspended since 1995--aimed at reducing tensions and improving bilateral relations. Although they agreed on future SEF-ARATS dialogue, cooperation, and visits, there was little movement on resolving the more substantive political issues which divide the two sides.
Beijing views Taiwan as a province of China and demands that Taiwan accept the principle of "one China" as a basis for negotiations aimed at eventual reunification. The PRC insists that Taiwan should engage in "political talks" which would set the stage for the island's eventual reunification with the mainland under the "one country, two systems" formula. China also has condemned Taipei's activities aimed at broadening international recognition. For its part, Taipei rejects Beijing's concept of "one China," arguing that China currently is a divided nation and demanding that Beijing deal with Taiwan on an equal basis. Taipei has predicated unification on the condition that China attain levels of economic development and political freedom comparable to those enjoyed on Taiwan; in the interim, Taipei believes that the two sides should focus on "technical" or procedural issues, such as cultural and educational exchanges, law enforcement cooperation, and the resolution of commercial disputes arising from Taiwan's extensive trade and investment interests on the mainland. Taipei also has condemned Beijing's efforts to isolate Taiwan internationally.
Both Beijing and Taipei have stated they seek a peaceful resolution to the reunification issue. Chinese leaders, however, have refused to renounce the option of using force against Taiwan, stating that a formal declaration of independence by Taipei or foreign intervention in Taiwan's internal affairs relative to the reunification issue would provoke China to take up arms against Taiwan. Beijing recently resurrected a third previously stated circumstance, namely, Taipei's acquisition of nuclear weapons.
Taiwan remains concerned over the continuing modernization and professionalization of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the potential threat that it poses to the island's security. Taipei points to the series of military exercises in July 1995 and March 1996 which the PLA conducted opposite Taiwan--exercises that included ballistic missile launches into waters near the island--and the acquisition of advanced weapons systems from Russia, like the Su-27 fighter and the KILO-class submarine, as clear indications of China's focus on defeating Taiwan militarily.
II. DEFENSE STRATEGY AND FORCE PLANNING
Traditionally, China's defense strategy and force planning priorities have been determined by the need to maintain a large armed forces structure capable of responding to a wide range of internal and external missions. This tradition continues to be reflected in China's reliance on a force structure comprised of three elements: the more than 2.5 million member PLA; the one million member People's Armed Police (PAP); and, a reserve-militia component numbering well over 1.5 million personnel. However, in recent years, there has been growing evidence that China's force development strategy is being influenced, in part, by its focus on preparing for military contingencies along its southeastern flank, especially in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.
Over a decade ago, the PLA shifted its strategic focus from preparing to fight a large-scale, "total war" to preparing to fight limited, "local wars." Several developments sharpened the PLA's focus and sense of purpose in preparing for this new kind of warfare. They include the military success of the U.S.-led coalition in the Persian Gulf War; Beijing's perception of an unfolding revolution in military affairs; Chinese suspicions over perceived U.S. efforts to "contain" and militarily "encircle" China; the deployment of two U.S. naval aircraft carrier battle groups near Taiwan during the 1996 missile crisis; and, China's fear that Taiwan was moving toward de jure independence. These developments have reinforced China's desire to size and structure PLA forces capable of fighting and winning "local wars under high-tech(nology) conditions."
Although the PLA is still decades from possessing a comprehensive capability to engage and defeat a modern adversary beyond China's boundaries, Beijing believes that the PLA can develop asymmetric abilities in certain niches--such as advanced cruise missiles and conventional short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). Asymmetric warfare generally is defined as attacks by a weaker or more technologically backward opponent on a stronger foe's vulnerabilities using unexpected or innovative means, while avoiding the adversary's strengths. China's effort to "leapfrog" generations of technology in weapons programs is often times perceived as an effort to develop new and surprising capabilities, but most of the actual programs are derivative of efforts already well underway in more developed countries. Rather than technological breakthroughs, Beijing's military modernization effort could more accurately be described as a focus on asymmetric engagement capabilities. China is seeking to identify innovative tactics and employment parameters for systems and technologies which the PLA has successfully employed or can be reasonably expected to employ in the next two decades.
With respect to Taiwan's defense strategy and force planning priorities, Taipei long ago renounced its intention to "recover" the mainland militarily. Taipei's force development plan focuses on three specific areas: maintaining air superiority over the Taiwan Strait and the waters contiguous to Taiwan; conducting effective counter-blockade operations; and, defeating an amphibious and aerial assault on the island. Taipei hopes that sufficient technological and tactical advantage over the mainland in these areas will buy time for the forces of change in China to render the future political and security landscape more amenable to Taiwan's long-term interests.
Force modernization programs on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are interactive in nature. Just as Taiwan’s military acquisitions are intended to address PLA military modernization programs, PRC force planning takes into account emerging capabilities on Taiwan.
III. A COMPARISON OF MILITARY FORCES TO 2005
An Overview of the PLA. Beijing's military modernization program, underway for the past two decades, is designed to prepare the PLA to conduct regional active defensive warfare in support of Chinese economic interests and sovereignty claims--a doctrinal shift away from a focus on the large-scale, land-based guerrilla warfare of Mao's classic "People's War." Chinese doctrine and tactics, however, still bear the indelible mark of Mao's teachings, particularly as they apply to concentration of power by a technologically inferior force at select times and places on the battlefield to overcome a foe armed with superior weapons.
Rather than shifting priority resources from civil infrastructure and economic reform programs to an across-the-board modernization of the PLA, Beijing is focusing on those programs and assets which will give China the most effective means for exploiting critical vulnerabilities in an adversary's military capabilities. This approach potentially will give Beijing the "credible intimidation" needed to accomplish political and military goals without having to rely on overwhelming force-on-force superiority. China's modernization programs thus seek to realize short-term improvements in anti- surface warfare (ASuW) and precision strike and longer term advances in missile defense, counter- space, and information warfare (IW). Concurrently, the PLA is acquiring weapons that would be useful in countering potential adversaries operating on naval platforms or from bases in the East and South China Seas, particularly stand-off weapons such as anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and long-range land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), as well as SRBMs. Beijing also is working to address problems associated with integrating advanced weapons systems into their inventory; and weaknesses in command, control, communication, computers, and intelligence (C4I); training; and logistics, so as to improve the PLA's overall warfighting capability.
In comparing PLA and Taiwan military strengths, the PLA has clear quantitative advantages. However, only a portion of the PLA’s overall strength could be brought to bear against Taiwan at a given time. Primary forces likely to be involved in an operation directed against Taiwan would include conventional short range ballistic missile units in Jiangxi and Fujian provinces; air and ground force units subordinate to the Nanjing Military Region; and naval assets subordinate to the East Sea Fleet. Depending on operational requirements, however, additional air, naval, ballistic missile, and ground force assets from other parts of China could be involved in operations against Taiwan.
An Overview of the Taiwan Military. For more than a decade, Taiwan's military modernization effort has focused on acquiring modern weapons systems and associated equipment to deter--and, if necessary -- defeat Chinese aggression. Billions of dollars have been spent on domestic programs like the Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) and the Tien Kung air defense system, as well as on foreign purchases like the U.S.-made F-16 fighter and the French-built Lafayette-class frigate. Many of these newer systems are in the process of being assimilated into the active inventory. In addition, in the early 1990s, Taiwan's Ministry of Defense publicly announced plans to trim the size of the island's armed forces by 40,000 personnel by 2003, reducing the overall size of the force to around 400,000. Most of the cuts are occurring in the Army, which will number about 200,000. The Air Force and the Navy reportedly will remain at about 60,000-70,000 personnel for each, while the number of personnel assigned to the military police, the coast guard, logistic units and military schools will number between 50,000 and 60,000.
The primary reason for this reduction is to create a smaller army with more mobility and firepower. Another reason is the military's competitive disadvantage in recruiting and retaining highly-trained and technologically proficient personnel to handle modern weapon systems. A third factor is the desire to reduce the number of general officers, especially in the Army. By 2005, Taiwan will have a fighter force of about 400 aircraft and an armor force of about 1,500 tanks. The navy's fleet will number some 30 major surface warships, as older destroyers are phased out of the inventory and replaced with newer combatants. Additionally, the ratio of advanced weaponry to older systems within each of the service inventories will increase.
Chinese Conventional Missiles. As demonstrated in military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in 1995 and 1996, China views its growing conventionally armed ballistic missile force as a potent military and political weapon to influence Taiwan's populace and their leaders. New LACM designs, when operational, will increase China's capability to strike regional targets accurately with conventional warheads. These kinds of weapons systems will play an increasingly important role in modern combat. By 2005, the PLA likely will have deployed two types of SRBMs and a first generation LACM. An expanded arsenal of accurate, conventional SRBMs and LACMs targeted against critical facilities, such as key airfields and C4I nodes, will complicate Taiwan’s ability to conduct military operations.
Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs). Within the next several years, the size of China’s SRBM force is expected to grow substantially. The PLA currently has one regimental-sized CSS-6 (DF-15/M-9) SRBM unit deployed in southeastern China. The CSS-6 is a solid propellant, road mobile missile which can deliver a 500-kilogram conventional payload to a maximum range of 600 km. The CSS-X-7 SRBM—better known by its export designator, the M-11—also is a solid propellant, road-mobile SRBM with an estimated range of 300 km. This missile, however, has not yet entered the PLA’s inventory; and an improved, longer range version may be under development. Moreover, both the CSS-6 and the CSS-X-7 are expected to incorporate satellite-assisted navigation technology to improve their accuracy. In an armed conflict with Taiwan, China's SRBMs likely would target air defense installations, airfields, naval bases, C4I nodes, and logistics facilities.
Land -Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMS). China also is developing LACMs. These missiles appear to have a relatively high development priority. Chinese research and development of LACMs is being aided by an aggressive effort to acquire foreign cruise missile technology and subsystems, particularly from Russia. The first LACM to enter production probably would be air-launched and could be operational early in the next century.
Antiship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs). Technological improvements to the C-801/SARDINE and the C-802/ SACCADE are providing a gradual upgrade to China's current force of antiquated, first generation, CSS-N-1/SCRUBBRUSH ASCMs. Despite the obsolescence of many of its ships, its lack of operational experience and its inability to resupply ASCMs at sea, the PLA Navy could assemble a sizeable ASuW force against Taiwan and, most likely, saturate the Taiwan Navy with barrages of ASCMs. In addition, B-6D bombers subordinate to the PLA Naval Air Force (PLANAF) are capable of firing the C-601/KRAKEN ASCM. The Navy's new FB-7 bomber likely will carry C-801/C-802 ASCMs. China's ASCM capability is expected to improve further with the planned acquisition of two Russian-built SOVREMENNYY-class destroyers armed with the SS-N-22/SUNBURN ASCM.
Taiwan Missile Defense. Taiwan's most significant vulnerability is its limited capacity to defend against the growing arsenal of Chinese ballistic missiles. These missiles pose a serious threat to non-hardened military targets, C2 nodes, and Taiwan's military infrastructure. As an initial response to this emerging threat, Taiwan has purchased the Modified Air Defense System (MADS), an improved variant of the PATRIOT surface-to-air missile (SAM) system which was used during DESERT STORM. The MADS, which began arriving on Taiwan in 1997, is expected to be deployed around heavily populated Taipei. Exclusive reliance on active missile defenses and associated BM/C3I, however, will not sufficiently offset the overwhelming advantage in offensive missiles which Beijing is projected to possess in 2005.
PLA Air Force. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) currently numbers over 400,000 personnel with approximately 4,500 combat aircraft organized in some 30 air divisions. The PLAAF also maintains about 150 transport aircraft in two air divisions. The PLAAF inventory includes over 2,200 obsolete F-6/FARMER fighters, several hundred F-7/FISHBED and F-8/ FINBACK fighters, and over 40 Su-27/FLANKERs. In addition, it has some 500 A-5/FANTAN ground attack aircraft and about 500 bombers, including the obsolete B-5/BEAGLE. Both its aerial refueling and airborne early warning (AEW) programs are behind schedule, as are several of its indigenous aircraft development programs. By 2005, the PLAAF will possess nearly 2,200 tactical fighter aircraft, 500 ground attack aircraft, and 400 bombers, as older aircraft are retired. The majority of the mainland's air fleet still will be composed of second and third generation aircraft augmented by a limited number of fourth generation platforms. Command and control constraints and constricted airspace would limit the number of aircraft which the PLAAF could deploy at one time in an air battle over the Taiwan Strait.
Fighters. The F-10, China's first domestically-produced fourth-generation fighter, reportedly is still undergoing testing and evaluation. The aircraft most likely will be armed with advanced beyond- visual-range (BVR), active radar (AR), air-to-air missiles (AAMs), and may be air refuelable. Domestic assembly of Su-27 kits has begun, with assistance from Russian technicians. Follow-on phases will involve assembly of an undetermined number of aircraft from a mixture of Russian- and Chinese- produced parts and, later, full domestic production of all but the aircraft's avionics and engine. The Su-27s originally purchased directly from Russia are the only fighter aircraft in the PLAAF inventory with sufficient combat radius to allow extended operations beyond China's borders. China will have made modest strides in its aerial refueling program by 2005. The F-8-II, other third generation aircraft modified to incorporate some fourth generation technology, as well as the F-10 are expected to possess aerial refueling capabilities.
Air-to-Air Missiles (AAMs). The PLAAF currently has in its inventory a number of AAMs which are superior to those in Taiwan's inventory. The Russian-built AA-11/ARCHER infrared (IR) AAM carried on the Su-27 is superior to Taiwan's AIM-9/SIDEWINDER and indigenously-produced Tien Chien-I/ SKY SWORD-I IR AAM. China's AA-10a/ALAMO missiles, on the other hand, are roughly comparable to, or slightly less capable than, Taiwan's AIM-7/SPARROWs. China's F-7 is capable of carrying the PL-2A and PL-5B IR AAMs, as well as the all-aspect PL-8 IR AAMs, while its F-8-IIs are capable of carrying the PL-2A, PL-5B, PL-8, and the BVR semi-active radar (SAR) PL-4 and PL-10 AAMs. All of these missiles are comparable to Taiwan's AAMs. By 2005, Beijing likely will have an AR AAM in its inventory and could adapt it for use on a larger number of platforms than Taipei could match. The PLAAF also is developing BVR AAMs for use aboard its fourth generation fighter aircraft.
Bombers. China's bomber aircraft include the B-6/BADGER and the B-5/BEAGLE. The B-5's slow speed and lack of standoff capability make this platform an extremely vulnerable target. The B-6 also is an aging aircraft. However, it is being produced in several versions. One variant is designed to carry an ASCM while another is being developed to carry an air-launched cruise missile (ALCM). The B-5 is being phased out of the inventory but it is still used in training and would probably be employed along with the B-6 bomber during a military conflict against Taiwan. However, both bombers would have limited success against Taiwan's air defense assets; the newer BADGER models incorporating cruise missile technology likely would have better success.
Transports. One of the PLAAF's combat missions is to provide airlift in support of PLA operations. However, until just recently, the PLAAF was unable to transport ground forces rapidly to distant parts of the country or sustain ground operations for extended periods due to antiquated aircraft and the lack of large-capacity aircraft. The PLAAF transport force now is capable of supporting the PLA at increased levels for a limited time and rapidly deploying to internal trouble spots. However, the PLAAF's current complement of large transport aircraft is limited to about a dozen IL-76MD/CANDIDs and about 50 Y-8/CUBs; the remainder of the transport force consists of smaller aircraft like the AN-24/COKE, AN-26/CURL, and Y-5/COLT. The MD variant of the CANDID is a military model specially configured for airborne operations. Beijing can be expected to purchase additional Russian IL-76 or similarly-sized foreign aircraft. The ongoing expansion of China's civil aircraft fleet will allow the PLAAF to use the country's civil airlines to supplement its transport capability during crises.
Airborne. China's 15th Airborne Army consists of three airborne divisions, each with about 10,000 troops. The 15th is China's primary quick reaction force and has been designated as a strategic rapid reaction unit. However, China's airborne units remain handicapped by insufficient lift. Acquisition of additional aircraft and modern equipment, together with the increased emphasis on utilizing airborne forces during training exercises, will improve--albeit marginally-- the 15th's combat capabilities.
Ground-Based Air Defense. Beijing is expending tremendous effort establishing an Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) at both the strategic and tactical levels. China's air defense technology currently lags behind western standards and its current IADS capability lacks many crucial components. Beijing probably could establish a fully operational national IADS within the next twenty years, but clearly not by 2005. China has a rudimentary tactical IADS capability in the form of its mobile Tactical Air Defense System (TADS).
Taiwan Air Force. The Taiwan Air Force (TAF) has about 70,000 personnel and over 400 combat aircraft. The current inventory includes approximately 180 older F-5E/F fighters and over 100 more modern Indigenous Defense Fighters (IDFs).
Fighters. The IDF has faced numerous developmental and operational problems since its inception in the 1980s. Nevertheless, its technical sophistication, with its fly-by-wire controls and blended wing-body design, is believed to be superior to any aircraft produced and deployed by China to date. Production of all 130 IDFs is scheduled to be completed by early 2000. Most of the IDFs are expected to be armed with the indigenously-produced, BVR Tien Chien-II (Sky Sword-II) AR AAM. Taiwan also has purchased 150 F-16 fighters from the United States: 120 single-seat "A" models and 30 two- seat "B" models. On-island deliveries, which began in April 1997, are continuing and should be completed by year's end. These aircraft are armed with upgraded AIM-7M/SPARROW SAR and AIM-9P4 and AIM9S SIDEWINDER IR AAMs. Deliveries of 60 French-built Mirage 2000-5s also began in April 1997 and were completed by October 1998. With its four MICA active radar (AR) and two MAGIC II infrared (IR) AAMs, the Mirage 2000-5 is Taiwan's most formidable air defense fighter. The TAF's current strategy is to employ the IDF for low altitude interception and ground attack; the F-16 for mid altitude offshore interception and ground attack; and, the Mirage 2000-5 for high altitude offshore interception. Taiwan also is planning an upgrade program for about 100 F-5 fighters. The systemic integration and generational problems that affect Taiwan's overall forces with respect to modernization apparently are having the greatest impact on the TAF, where the technology curve is highest.
Air Defense Early Warning. Taiwan has established an air defense early warning network which, when used in conjunction with its ground-based SAMs and fourth-generation tactical aircraft, appears to pose a credible deterrent against an air attack from the mainland. Taiwan has replaced its old SKY NET air defense network with a new network called STRONG NET to provide a comprehensive picture of the surrounding airspace.
Ground-Based Air Defense. The Improved HAWK (I-HAWK) SAM system remains the mainstay of Taiwan's air defense. It is a medium-range, low- to medium-altitude system, designed to defend fixed and mobile assets from high speed aircraft. The standard I-HAWK site consists of a pulse acquisition radar, a continuous wave acquisition radar, a high power illuminating target tracking radar, a range-only radar, and six three-missile launchers. Taipei also has deployed an indigenously-produced SAM--the Tien Kung or Sky Bow-- designed to replace the recently retired NIKE-HERCULES system. The Tien Kung is a medium-to-long range system, reportedly based on early versions of the U.S. PATRIOT. The Tien Kung-I is a single-stage, solid-propellant missile. It is deployed in two configurations: as a mobile, containerized system employing a quad-box launcher similar in appearance to the M901 PATRIOT missile launcher and as a fixed, silo-launched SAM. A follow-on variant, the Tien Kung-II, is configured as a fixed, two-stage, single-rail or silo-launched system. For target acquisition, tracking, and mid-course missile guidance requirements, the Tien Kung employs a multifunction, phased-array radar with associated fire-control computer system and a continuous wave dish antenna illuminator which are tied into the radar in order to allow multiple target engagement. As noted previously, Taiwan also has purchased the MADS, a variant of the PATRIOT SAM system, primarily to serve in an antiballistic missile role.
Short-range air defense coverage is provided primarily by the CHAPARRAL and the SKYGUARD systems. The CHAPARRAL consists of four modified AIM-9C SIDEWINDER missiles mounted on a tracked vehicle. The SKYGUARD is an integrated air defense system consisting of a modified AIM-7M/SPARROW AAM and a 35 mm AAA gun. Taiwan is expected to procure the STINGER/AVENGER SAM system. It is a pedestal mounted system with two pods--each with four STINGER missiles--mounted on the back of a High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). Taiwan's Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST) has developed and publicly displayed a new tactical air defense which it has dubbed the ANTELOPE. According to promotional brochures, work on the ANTELOPE began in July 1995 as a direct by-product of the Tien Chien-I IR AAM. According to CSIST, the ANTELOPE consists of a target acquisition system, communication components, an operational control system, a carrier, and four 18-km maximum range Tien Chien-I missiles. It can be used to intercept low-flying helicopters, fighter aircraft, attack aircraft, and bombers and can be installed on a midsize truck or HMMWV.
PLA Navy. The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) currently numbers approximately 260,000 personnel, with over 50 destroyers and frigates, about 60 diesel and six Han- and Xia-class submarines, and nearly 50 landing ships. This force is complemented by several hundred auxiliary and smaller patrol vessels, as well as a naval air arm of over 500, mostly obsolescent, fixed-winged aircraft and some 30 helicopters. Over the last decade, the PLAN has streamlined and modernized its forces by eliminating large numbers of older ships and replacing them with fewer, more modern units. The number of submarines has declined by about one-half. The size of the major surface combatant fleet has been relatively stable, with older ships slowly being replaced by newer Chinese-built destroyers and frigates. Nearly all of the PLAN's inventory of U.S.-built, World War II-vintage landing ships have been replaced by similar numbers of domestically-produced vessels. Nevertheless, the PLAN continues to lag behind other regional navies, including that of Taiwan, in most technological areas, especially air defense, surveillance, and C4I.
Submarines. China maintains the overwhelming advantage in submarines over Taiwan and this quantitative advantage will continue through 2005. Moreover, while the number of boats in service in China is expected to decrease, their overall qualitative capabilities will increase. China is producing more modern submarines and is using submarine-related technology from Russia. Although the force is oriented principally toward interdicting surface ships using torpedoes and mines, China shortly will begin arming some of its submarines with a submerged-launch cruise missile. The capability of Chinese submarines to conduct ASW operations is expected to improve through 2005, in light of the acquisition of Russian-built KILO-class submarines and the greater emphasis being placed on ASW training. As a result, China's submarine fleet will constitute a substantial force capable of controlling sea lanes and mining approaches around Taiwan, as well as a growing threat to submarines in the East and South China Seas.
Surface Combatants. China's fleet of major surface combatants includes about 40 frigates and 20 destroyers. All carry ASCMs, ranging from the antiquated, first-generation CSS-N-1/ SCRUBBRUSH to the more advanced C-801/SARDINE and C-802/SACCADE. Two Russian-built SOVREMENNYY- class destroyers, which China is expected to acquire in the next several years, likely will be equipped with the SS-N-22/SUNBURN ASCM. The PLAN's surface fleet will continue to strive to enhance both its readiness and endurance for extended operations within the region and around Taiwan. It likely will conduct more realistic training exercises and deploy more advanced anti-ship and air defense missiles and electronic countermeasures.
Amphibious Forces. The PLAN's amphibious fleet provides sealift sufficient to transport approximately one infantry division. The PLAN also has hundreds of smaller landing craft, barges, and troop transports, all of which could be used together with fishing boats, trawlers, and civilian merchant ships to augment the naval amphibious fleet. Shortcomings in long-range lift, logistics, and air support, however, hinders China's ability to project amphibious forces.
People's Liberation Army Naval Air Force (PLANAF). The missions of the PLANAF include protecting China's coastal airspace, providing air support for naval forces at sea, and, conducting maritime search and rescue operations. The PLANAF has only a limited maritime strike capability with some 150 non-standoff B-6/BADGERs, A-5/FANTANs, and B-5/BEAGLEs. However, these aircraft would be only marginally effective against most modern navies. Some of the approximately 30 B-6Ds provide the PLANAF with a cruise missile ship interdiction strike capability utilizing the C-601/ KRAKEN ASCM. The standoff-capable FB-7 fighter-bomber, equipped with the C-801/ASCM, will not become operational for another two to three years. It likely will augment the B-6 and eventually replace some of the B-5s and A-5s in the PLANAF's inventory.
Taiwan Navy. The Taiwan Navy has about 68,000 personnel and some 40 major surface combatants. In addition there are four submarines, about 100 patrol boats, 30 mine warfare ships, and 25 amphibious vessels. Despite the Navy's ability to refurbish and extend the service life of its vessels and equipment well beyond expectation, a large portion of the fleet consists of obsolescent World War II-era ships. The Navy's primary mission is to defend the island against a Chinese blockade and to protect Taiwan's sea lines of communication (SLOCs). The Navy's modernization program is intended to replace its aging fleet of surface combatants with newer ships like the French-built Lafayette-class frigate and a domestically-produced variant of the U.S. Perry-class frigate. Taiwan is acquiring advanced antisubmarine warfare technology which will likely improve their ability to counter PLA submarines operating off the coast of Taiwan.
Submarines. Taiwan has four submarines: two relatively modern Dutch-built ZVAARDVIS Design boats (Hai Lung-class) acquired in the late 1980s and two obsolete, World War II-era GUPPY II boats provided by the United States in 1973 for ASW training. The two Dutch submarines reportedly are armed with wire-guided torpedoes. The U.S. boats are used primarily as training platforms with a secondary mission to lay mines. Acquisition of additional submarines remains one of Taiwan's most important priorities.
Surface Combatants. Taiwan's naval modernization program--dubbed "Kuang Hua" or "Glorious China"--includes the licensed-production of eight Perry-class (Cheng Kung-class) frigates; the purchase of six Lafayette-class (Kang Ting-class) frigates from France; and, the lease of eight Knox-class frigates from the United States. Both the Perry-class and Lafayette-class frigates are armed with indigenously- produced Hsiung Feng II ASCMs, while the Knox-class frigates are equipped with the U.S.-made Harpoon ASCM. Air defense weapons systems include the Standard air defense missile on board the Perry-class frigates and the Sea Chaparral on board the Lafayettes. The primary mission of these newer frigates is sea control, particularly the capability to protect the sea lanes beyond the range of coastal aircraft. The Navy also has more than a dozen older, World War II-era Gearing-class destroyers and numerous smaller combatants and auxiliaries in its operational inventory. The "Kuang Hua" program also includes the future acquisition of three types of smaller surface combatants: 12 Jin Chiang-class 580-ton guided missile patrol combatants; 10-14 1,500-2,000 ton corvettes; and, 50 fast attack missile boats (150-250 ton) to replace the aging fleet of Hai Ou-class boats currently in the inventory.
Taiwan Naval Air Force. Taiwan's small naval air force consists of 10 Hughes MD 500 short-range ASW helicopters, usually deployed aboard Taiwan's Gearing-class destroyers, and nine Sikorsky S-70C(M) ASW Thunderhawk helicopters, used with Taiwan's Perry- and Lafayette-class frigates. The 30 or so S-2T Tracker ASW/Maritime Patrol aircraft currently belonging to the TAF may be turned over to the Taiwan Navy in the future.
PLA Ground Forces. China's ground forces are comprised of approximately 75 army maneuver divisions. Approximately 20 percent of these divisions are designated "rapid reaction" units: combined arms units capable of deploying by road or rail within China without significant train-up or reserve augmentation. China is continuing the process of reducing the size of its army. The 500,000-man force reduction currently underway will streamline the force and facilitate funding to equip its "core" infantry, airborne, mechanized and aviation units with more advanced weapons. The army is supported by a large reserve-militia force numbering more than 1.5 million personnel and a one million man armed police force. Particularly since the 1991 Persian Gulf conflict, the PLA has devoted considerable resources to the development of special operation forces (SOFs). These units likely have been assigned specific missions and tasks in a variety of Taiwan contingencies, to include locating or destroying C4I assets, transportation nodes, and logistics depots; capturing or destroying airfields; destroying air defense assets; and, conducting reconnaissance operations.
Traditionally, China's ground forces have been highly cohesive, patriotic, physically fit, and well trained in basic skills. In addition, they are generally strong in operational and communications security, as well as in the use of camouflage, concealment, and deception. Major weaknesses are lack of transport and logistic support. Ground force leadership, training in combined operations, and morale are poor. The PLA is still a party army with nepotism and political/family connections continuing to predominate in officer appointment and advancement. The soldiers, for the most part, are semi-literate rural peasants; there is no professional NCO corps, per se. Military service, with its low remuneration and family disruption, is increasingly seen as a poor alternative to work in the private sector. China's leadership is aware of these weaknesses and is trying to address them in its overall modernization program. Thus, increasingly in the future, officers likely will be promoted on merit as opposed to connections, and the ratio of higher educated volunteer servicemen to conscripts likely will increase.
Taiwan Ground Forces. Taipei's approximate 220,000-member Army is organized and trained to defend Taiwan and the offshore islands against an invasion. About 80 percent of the Army's combat strength is on Taiwan proper, under the control of three field armies. The three offshore island commands--Chinmen, Matsu, and Penghu--have a total of more than 50,000 soldiers. In 1997, the Army began an aggressive restructuring campaign to upgrade its combat effectiveness, emphasizing rapid reaction capabilities, airborne invasion interdiction, and special forces operations. The plan apparently calls for trimming the force to 200,000 personnel. The three existing field armies will remain intact; however, the Army will eliminate divisions as operational units in peacetime. Existing infantry and mechanized divisions will be reorganized into specialized combined arms brigades. The Taiwan Army's equipment modernization effort has focused on improving mobility and fire power, primarily through the acquisition of tanks, helicopters, and short-range air defense missiles. Taiwan is acquiring over 450 M-60A3 medium tanks; they will join an already large tank force consisting of some 450 M-48H and 300 M-48A5 medium tanks and over 1,000 much older M-41 and M-24 light tanks. Taiwan also has acquired 42 AH-1W Cobra attack and 26 OH-58D Kiowa scout helicopters.
China - Information Operations.
Information Warfare. China's information warfare (IW) program is in the early stages of research. It currently focuses on understanding IW as a military threat, developing effective countermeasures, and studying offensive employment of IW against foreign economic, logistics, and C4I systems. Driven by the perception that China's information systems are vulnerable, the highest priority has been assigned to defensive IW programs and indigenous information technology development. Some technologies could provide enhanced defensive or offensive capabilities against Taiwan military and civilian information infrastructure systems. Computer anti-virus solutions, network security, and advanced data communications technologies are a few examples. Chinese open source articles claim that the PLA has incorporated IW-related scenarios into several recent operational exercises. Efforts have focused on increasing the PLA's proficiency in defensive measures, especially against computer viruses.
Computer Warfare. In the area of Computer Network Attack, China appears interested in researching methods to insert computer viruses into foreign networks as part of its overall Information Operations (IO) strategy. Beijing reportedly has adequate hardware and software tools and possesses a strong and growing understanding of the technologies involved. China's strategic IO use of advanced information technologies in the short- to mid-term likely will lack depth and sophistication; however, as it develops more expertise in defending its own networks against enemy attack, it is likely to step up attempts to penetrate adversarial information systems.
Electronic Warfare. The thrust of China's electronic warfare (EW) efforts continues to focus on technology development and design capabilities improvement, accomplished mainly through cooperation with Western companies, through reverse engineering efforts, and through the procurement of foreign systems. The inventory of Chinese EW equipment includes a combination of 1950s-1980s technologies, with only a few select military units receiving the most modern components. China is procuring state-of-the-art technology to improve its intercept, direction finding, and jamming capabilities. In addition to providing extended imagery reconnaissance and surveillance and ELINT collection, Beijing's unmanned aerial vehicle programs probably will yield platforms for improved radio and radar jammers. Additionally, existing earth stations can be modified to interfere with satellite communications. Finally, the PLA is developing an electronic countermeasures (ECM) doctrine and has performed structured training in an ECM environment.
Antisatellite (ASAT) Programs. China currently can detect and track most satellites with sufficient accuracy for targeting purposes. Beijing's only current means of destroying or disabling a satellite, however, would be to launch a ballistic missile or space launch vehicle armed with a nuclear weapon. Press articles indicate Chinese interest in a laser ASAT. Beijing apparently has research programs involving the relevant technologies, and already may possess the capability to damage, under specific conditions, optical sensors on satellites that are very vulnerable to damage by lasers.
Sensors for Detection and Targeting. China currently is acquiring and developing new systems which will give it a variety of targeting capabilities it currently lacks. Detection and targeting will improve over time, as space-based sensors are launched; long distance reconnaissance drones are produced; and, AEW aircraft are put in service. Beijing reportedly is developing several reconnaissance satellites which could provide initial targeting data to long-range reconnaissance aircraft. The acquisition of an AEW platform capable of conducting data relays has held a high priority in the PLAAF's efforts to modernize. Beijing is expected to acquire several PHALCON AEW systems mounted on IL-76 airframes. The Chinese Navy also reportedly is acquiring Skymaster AEW radars. While Chinese officials claim these radars will be used for search and rescue operations, they could be used in AEW and surface surveillance roles. China conceivably could have fully operational AEW platforms by 2005. By 2000, Beijing will have access to commercial remote sensing overhead imagery in the 2.5 meter resolution range. Access to new overhead imagery platforms in the near term will enhance China's ability to map, surveil, and target. The Chinese already have had access to commercial satellite imagery from the French SPOT satellites, Indian IRS-1c satellite, Canadian RADARSAT, and various Russian satellites. This widely available commercial satellite imagery can be used to develop digital terrain maps for targeting, missile guidance, and mission planning.
Telecommunication Infrastructure. China's telecommunications infrastructure, composed of both civil and military communications networks, currently is being modernized. China's C4I infrastructures, supporting all levels of military and civilian leadership, are receiving specific attention. The PLA communications network supports all branches of the armed forces and uses the same types of communications mediums as the civil network. Multiple transmission systems create a military communication system that is survivable, secure, flexible, mobile and less vulnerable to exploitation, destruction or electronic attack. Thus, while China's command and control networks could be degraded, it is unlikely that they could be denied. Overall, network performance is assessed as adequate. The military's lack of communications satellites could force the PLA to rely on foreign satellite services to meet military needs in wartime or a crisis. In the event of crisis, it is believed the military would preempt the domestic satellite systems for combat operations. Within the operational forces, mobile communications equipment probably will be fielded in greater numbers to maneuver units and increasingly will incorporate features such as encryption and frequency hopping. As a result, the PLA leadership eventually will be able to control its forces in a much more secure and timely manner over a wider and more dynamic range of missions than is currently possible.
Deception. The PLA's modernization program includes improving military denial and deception doctrine and capabilities for use against potential adversaries at the strategic, operational, and tactical level. Recent Chinese military writings affirm that "high technology warfare" requires developing denial and deception techniques for countering U.S. precision weapons, advanced reconnaissance sensors, and command and control warfare doctrine. A 1993 Chinese National Defense University treatise, High Technology and Military Camouflage, suggests that the PLA recognizes the value of conducting deception operations, especially in a crisis involving Taiwan, to create ambiguity about Chinese intentions and force the Taiwan political and military leadership to misallocate resources. According to this study, "deception is intended to induce the enemy to reach erroneous conclusions about the activities, deployment, and combat objectives of our forces. Camouflage and deception can disperse the enemy's troops, waste their firepower, and disrupt their high technology weapons."
Psychological Operations. The PLA historically has made extensive use of psychological operations (PSYOP) in all its military campaigns and has integrated PSYOP into its national military strategy. China is believed to have a robust capability to conduct PSYOP against Taiwan. Moreover, prominent articles on PSYOP in the Liberation Army Daily over the last few years indicate that the PLA is committed to improving its PSYOP capability. In earlier military campaigns--such as China's prolonged confrontation with Taiwan military forces on the offshore islands in the 1950s and 1960s and China's brief border war with Vietnam in 1979--the PLA demonstrated that it has a range of techniques for disseminating PSYOP messages to opposing military forces and civilian populations. During these conflicts, PLA PSYOP units employed loudspeakers, leaflets, posters, and radio broadcasts to spread propaganda messages. China also has demonstrated in past conflicts that it is not averse to using "black" propaganda and disinformation campaigns based on specious assertions and fabricated evidence. Perhaps the best example of this was the "germ warfare" propaganda campaign that was aggressively pursued by Chinese propagandists during the Korean War. This massive PSYOP campaign attempted to convince an international audience that U.S. forces, in collusion with Japan, were spreading biological toxins in Korea and China.
Taiwan - Information Operations.
Information Warfare. As one of the world's largest producers of computer components, Taiwan has all of the basic capabilities needed to carry out offensive and defensive IW related activities, particularly computer network attacks and the introduction of malicious code. While information on formally integrating IW into warfighting doctrine is not available, there are indications that formal doctrine development to guide future employment of these capabilities may be in progress. As new computer systems and technology are developed and as Taiwan increases its role in the manufacture of these systems, its capability to exploit its position for IW activities can be expected to increase substantially.
Computer Warfare. Taiwan has demonstrated a significant knowledge of viruses. A virus known as "Bloody" or "6/4" protesting the Tiananmen Square crackdown was first discovered in Taiwan in 1990. In 1992, personnel from The Hague--with support from INTERPOL--investigated the dissemination of the "Michelangelo" virus by a Taiwan firm. In 1996, Taiwan virus writers developed and distributed a computer virus protesting Japanese claims to the Diaoyutai Islands. The following year, opponents of the Taiwan government developed a widely circulated Word-macro virus known as "Con-Air" which protested social problems on the island. Taiwan also is well known for the efforts by researchers and corporations to combat computer viruses. Trend Micro--formerly known as Trend Micro Devices--is an industry leader in anti-virus software and, to a lesser extent, other network security products. Trend Micro was the first company to develop a response to the "Michelangelo" virus; it currently dominates the anti-virus software market in Japan. Trend Micro also has led in the area of virus recognition technology. Taiwan's Academia Sinica also has made impacts in the area of anti-virus software development.
Sensors for Detection and Targeting. During the 1980s, Taiwan's reconnaissance capability and 1970s vintage photographic technology was adequate for the limited capabilities and low threat posture of the PLAAF. Taiwan's airborne reconnaissance capability, however, began to decline precipitously in the 1990s. Last year, the TAF retired the last of its RF-104G tactical reconnaissance aircraft and replaced them with reconnaissance-configured RF-5E aircraft. Taipei continues to seek a new imaging system capable of exploiting targets at greater distances from the coast, but without exposing its reconnaissance flights to China's increasingly more sophisticated air defenses. Taiwan conducts technical and human intelligence operations against China and purchases French SPOT and U.S. LANDSAT commercial imagery for exploitation.
Telecommunications Infrastructure. Taiwan's telecommunications infrastructure is composed of a civilian communications system and a separate military communications system. The civilian system consists of a nationwide network of fixed telephone lines (coaxial and fiber optic), microwave, wireless (satellite, cellular, paging), and TV and radio broadcast. The military system reportedly also consists of a nationwide network of fixed telephone lines (coaxial and fiber optic) and microwave, as well as satellite, troposcatter and HF/VHF radio. Taiwan is rapidly developing its telecommunications infrastructure with the goal of becoming an Asia-Pacific telecommunications hub. The Taiwan military could benefit from any improvements to the commercial architecture. In the past, satellite communications have played a relatively minor role in domestic communications; they were used primarily to link Taiwan to its offshore islands. INTELSAT provides this domestic function as well as international connections for Taiwan. Satellite communications using very small aperture terminals (VSAT) were placed into commercial service in 1989. Satellites may begin to play a more prominent role both domestically and internationally with the advent of a number of new satellite systems. Taiwan also is working on building its own satellites under the ROCSAT program. ROCSAT-1, which will include an experimental communications package, is scheduled to be launched in January 1999.
Psychological Operations. Taiwan reportedly possesses a well-developed PSYOP capability, under the auspices of the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD). During previous periods of tense confrontation across the Taiwan Strait, the GPWD has demonstrated its ability to employ a wide variety of PSYOP techniques, including broadcasting propaganda messages; using balloons, kites, artillery shells, and various flotation devices to deliver propaganda messages; and, offering financial inducements to potential defectors. China's leadership reportedly is considered an especially hard target for Taiwan's PSYOP forces. Given the continuous attention the Chinese military leadership has given to the indoctrination of its forces, PLA troops also are not likely to be susceptible to Taiwan PSYOP.
China - Other Factors.
Military Leadership. The PLA does not approach leadership in the same way as Western military forces, placing greater emphasis on technical skills than on leadership development. The PLA's leadership culture is also risk averse, favoring the status quo over change. Historical experiences and decades of Communist propaganda have made the majority of Chinese military leaders suspicious of the outside world and its attitudes toward China's increasing power and influence. Relatively few senior officers have travelled abroad, although the military has undertaken a significant military diplomatic effort since the early 1990s that is overcoming this deficiency. The result of this physical and intellectual isolation has been the development of a strongly nationalistic outlook among the officer corps that could color negatively the leadership's approach to international developments seen impacting China's sovereignty or security.
China's military leadership is united on its desire to acquire or improve selected military capabilities in the near term. In the longer term, military leaders want to overhaul significantly the entire armed forces to create a smaller, technically more advanced instrument to fight in the immediate vicinity of China's borders. There also is a corresponding emphasis on military professionalism in China. While the political commissar system still exists and political officers share joint command with their operational brethren, the military now emphasizes operational training over political indoctrination. This trend will create a less politicized officer corps, especially among junior and mid-grade officers. It also will move the military leadership toward forming a more corporate military identity.
Senior Chinese officers are studying modern technological advances and how these can best be incorporated into the current and projected military doctrine and structure. These officers are still generally more familiar and comfortable with an operational level of conflict that relies primarily on ground forces to achieve objectives. Below the most senior level, an increasing number of officers in command positions are conversant in, and somewhat experienced with, modern technological and operational concepts like joint operations. Nevertheless, the military has recently renewed its emphasis on upgrading scientific and technical education in order to overcome perceived deficiencies in the officer corps in this respect.
Training. In recent years, China has shown a growing willingness to experiment with new aspects of training. Training has become more realistic and challenging, with an increased participation by opposition force units and greater emphasis on combined arms. Although intraservice training at the tactical level is improving, joint exercises are still tightly controlled and indicative of the difficulty the PLA likely would have in executing operational-level battle plans. While this past year's summer floods disrupted training for a large percentage of the PLA, certain exercises were not cancelled, particularly those emphasizing Beijing's commitment to improve joint training.
Professional Military Education. Professional military education for both officers and NCOs in the PLA is a high priority for Beijing. Institutional structures designed to instill a high degree of professionalism throughout the force were conspicuously absent in China until 1978, when the PLA began to address educational shortfalls. Since that time, Beijing has established a number of educational institutions throughout the military, although the emphasis remains on the officer corps.
The key organization shaping the professional development of the senior PLA officer corps is the National Defense University (NDU). It instructs senior officers in areas such as strategic studies, operational art, organizational command and management, combined arms and joint service operations, foreign military studies, and logistics. The NDU also provides information and advice on military modernization and broad strategic issues to national-level organizations; it also performs research on various strategic and operational military issues. The second tier in the PLA's officer education system consists of military colleges and academies which prepare field grade officers for regimental-level command and address the fundamentals of joint and combined arms operations. The curriculum concentrates on company, battalion, and regimental tactics. In addition, the schools teach basic joint operations. A small number of schools also trains students in specialty staff duties, such as engineering and communications. The lowest tier of officer education is provided by military colleges and academies for junior officers and mid-rank officers; they provide multiple avenues for undergraduate and general military education. The curriculum consists of three and four year undergraduate programs and a two year vocational program. The majority of the cadets are upper middle school graduates.
The PLA's NCO Corps is in its infancy, having been established only in the late 1980s. Chinese NCOs--former conscripts who are allowed to remain on active duty following their initial enlistment --are classified as either "master sergeants" or "technical sergeants." Newly selected NCOs attend a six month training program at the MR academies. Training is limited to tactics for the master sergeants and technical subjects for the technical sergeants. Beijing has not yet established formal education programs for NCOs beyond their initial training.
Joint/Integrated Operations. The PLA conducts interservice exercises at the tactical level, but the services are not fully integrated into a cohesive combat force. Disparate elements train simultaneously and in proximity, but do not appear to be controlled at the operational level by a joint commander and staff. Ground and air components exercise together with regularity and are improving their interoperability. Integration of ground and naval forces, however, is rarely exercised, particularly at the operational level, where synchronization and command and control are of greatest importance in the conduct of complex operations. The navy is beginning to conduct more combined operations between ships and naval aircraft. The PLA also is looking into the possibility of instituting a "joint command" structure at the operational or theater level, similar to that of the U.S. military. Accordingly, a commander would exercise operational control over all military forces assigned to and deployed in a particular area. These "joint commands" likely would be given specifically assigned missions in response to particular threats or security requirements.
Morale. Morale within the PLA, particularly among enlisted personnel, is assessed as generally low. Problems of desertion, declining relations between officers and troops, reluctance to train with obsolete equipment, high consumption spending by officers, anti-corruption audits which restrict outside earnings, and food shortages have been reported in the Chinese press. Low pay in comparison to other segments of Chinese society is a key factor. The PLA's involvement in business--at least until just recently when it was directed to divest itself of its commercial interests--also distracted many of its more competent officers from their military duties. Some Chinese military leaders believe that many of the morale problems can be solved by increased pay and allowances, further professionalization of the force, and improved quality of life.
Logistics and Sustainability. The PLA's logistics structure and doctrine still reflect, for the most part, the decades-long focus on fighting a large-scale ground conflict, wherein a MR commander would conduct autonomous combat operations over an extended period. The logistics infrastructure developed to support such regional operations is highly decentralized, based on interior lines of communication, and optimized to depend on local depots and stockpiles for resupply. MR commanders apparently were given broad leeway to develop region-specific logistics management procedures. These practices have inhibited the implementation of PLA-wide standards, since the separate management systems made interregional operations virtually impossible. In recent years, the PLA has devoted attention to improving its logistics support to military operations in a Taiwan scenario--operations which would include a higher tempo of operations and use of high technology weapons and equipment. It reportedly has automated many inventory control processes, streamlined procurement, and improved mechanisms for getting supplies to deployed troops. While these developments appear to offer a modest capability to support some types of military operations in the region, the PLA has made only incremental improvements in its ability to support a large-scale, long-term, high optempo engagement.
Taiwan - Other Factors
Military Leadership. Overall, Taiwan's military leadership is competent and capable. Taiwan officers of all services and ranks exhibit a relatively high degree of professionalism. They generally are well educated, operationally proficient, and technically sophisticated--especially when contrasted with their PLA counterparts--and pro-U.S. in their outlook. Balanced against these attributes, the officer corps functions within a culture that values caution over innovation and initiative. Junior officers are familiar with technological improvements but recent modernization efforts will challenge their management skills and may require adjustments to unit training and operational tempos. The Taiwan military will face an ongoing challenge in retaining qualified junior officers as employment opportunities in the civilian sector remain enticing. The increased importance of technology in modern warfare has led to an increased emphasis in Taiwan on modernizing the technology-intensive services, namely the Air Force and Navy. While Army officers continue to dominate the senior leadership positions within the defense hierarchy--the Army comprises more than 50 percent of the armed forces-- the emphasis on the Air Force and Navy may lead to a corresponding rise in the influence of air and naval officers over matters such as defense procurement priorities and employment doctrine. Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui strongly supports the promotion of native Taiwanese officers to senior military positions. Currently, the Chief of General Staff and commanders of the air force and marines are ethnic Taiwanese. This trend will continue and probably will have a positive effect on the morale and cohesion of the lower ranks of the armed forces, who themselves are overwhelmingly native Taiwanese.
Training. Taiwan's large-scale training normally takes place quarterly with the major training centers hosting limited maneuver and live-fire exercises. HAN KUANG 14, conducted in mid-May 1998, was one of Taipei's more typical joint exercises to date. Primarily a C4I exercise, the training was of very short duration and the scenario allowed for only limited exercise play. Taipei scheduled another "joint exercise" on 12 October 1998, but then cancelled it as a "goodwill gesture" toward Beijing in the run-up to the resumption of high level cross-Strait talks on 14 October. A dress rehearsal on 7 October also was cancelled, although a "preliminary dress rehearsal" was held on 2 October. It consisted of a series of live-fire demonstrations showcasing some of Taiwan's most modern military equipment.
Professional Military Education. Professional military education of Taiwan's officer corps is conducted along two developmental lines: the universal track for regular career officers and the professional track for officers in specialized fields like political affairs, medicine, and engineering. The universal track is the general military education for officers provided at the three service academies. Graduates receive a bachelor's degree after completing 130 university-level credit hours. The Naval Academy concentrates on science and engineering, while the Air Force Academy curriculum focuses on aerospace-related courses and includes supervised flight training beginning in the second year. Newly commissioned Army officers go on to branch schools, i.e., infantry, army, and artillery. Education in the professional track is conducted at such specialized schools like the Fu Hsing Kang College, the Defense Medical College, the Defense Management College, and the Chung Cheng Institute of Technology. Mid-career and senior career professional military education is conducted at the Armed Forces University (AFU). Tracing its roots back to 1906, AFU is the highest level institution in the Taiwan military education system. It is responsible for training strategic-level command and staff officers, as well as specialists in defense administration and military intelligence. It also conducts research into the development of war strategies and political warfare. AFU includes four colleges: the War College for senior field grade and general officers and the Command and Staff Colleges of the Army, Navy, and Air Force for junior field grade officers.
Morale. Morale, especially among the enlisted ranks, is generally assessed as poor, amidst efforts to retain competent, educated service members in the face of stiff private sector competition. The military competes poorly with the civilian economy in attracting Taiwan's youth, especially those who are technically-oriented. Continued personnel shortages stemming from low retention rates-- especially among NCOs--will remain a serious problem affecting morale. The military also is hampered by systemic problems of poor, antiquated management and a traditional military culture with very rigid command structures which discourages lower-level risk-taking, decisionmaking, and innovation. The Taiwan Army especially is facing morale problems stemming from the ongoing restructuring and downsizing. While the operational outlook and overall morale of TAF pilots is significantly better than that of PLAAF pilots-- largely due to better training opportunities and exposure to and hands on experience with more modern Western equipment--there exists a disparity between the military and civil aviators in pay and benefits, which inevitably affects morale.
Logistics and Sustainability. Taiwan's logistics capability will support some defensive operations on Taiwan, but its probability of success is highly dependent on the tempo of operations. The military reportedly is trying to make the logistics system more efficient to better support combined or joint force operations. In the interim, logistics support will remain cumbersome--but effective--for localized engagements. Taiwan's defenses rely heavily on air and naval forces, both requiring an extensive maintenance and repair infrastructure to support weapons systems and equipment. The critical requirements are major equipment end items like engines and transmissions, ammunition, fuel and especially obsolete spare parts which no longer are being manufactured.
IV. THE DYNAMIC BALANCE
Currently, China's more than 2.5-million-man PLA dwarfs Taiwan's defense force of about 400,000. In most cases, equipment totals also are lopsided. Only a portion of this overall strength, however, could be brought to bear against Taiwan at one time. China has nearly 4,500 combat aircraft, as compared with some 400 on Taiwan. The Chinese Navy has about 65 attack submarines--five of which are nuclear powered--as compared with four diesel attack submarines for Taiwan. China has over 60 major surface combatants while Taiwan has no more than 40. China has nuclear weapons and a ballistic missile force that can deliver nuclear or conventionally-armed warheads against Taiwan. In terms of the quality of their military equipment, however, Taipei possesses an edge over Beijing, as new weapons systems--particularly fighter aircraft and naval frigates--are entering the inventory.
Should China decide to use military force against Taiwan, there are several options or courses of action available to Beijing, including--but not limited to--an interdiction of Taiwan's SLOCs and a blockade of Taiwan's ports, a large-scale missile attack, and an all-out invasion.
Blockade. The primary intent behind a blockade of the island would be to cripple Taiwan economically and isolate it internationally. China's leaders apparently believe that this option would be less likely to provoke outside intervention than others. Beijing probably would choose successively more stringent quarantine-blockade actions, beginning with declaring maritime exercise closure areas and stopping Taiwan-flagged merchant vessels operating in the Taiwan Strait. Operations likely would include mine laying and deploying submarines and surface ships to enforce the blockade. Barring third party intervention, the PLAN's quantitative advantage over Taiwan's Navy in surface and sub-surface assets would probably prove overwhelming over time. Taiwan's military forces probably would not be able keep the island's key ports and SLOCs open in the face of concerted Chinese military action. Taiwan's small surface fleet and four submarines are numerically insufficient to counter China's major surface combatant force and its ASW assets likely would have difficulty defeating a blockade supported by China's large submarine force. The PLANAF's B-6D bombers armed with C-601 ASCMs would place Taipei's merchant ships and combatants at serious risk.
Missile Strikes. Within the next several years, the size of China’s SRBM force is expected to grow substantially. An expanded arsenal of conventional SRBMs and LACMs targeted against critical facilities, such as key airfields and C4I nodes, will complicate Taiwan’s ability to conduct military operations. By 2005, China will have deployed both the CSS-6 and CSS-7 SRBM. In addition, the PLA could have a first generation, air-launched LACM in its inventory. Should Beijing choose escalation, a rapid transition from relatively low-intensity blockade operations to massive missile strikes would be a likely step, particularly as a pretext to an invasion. These missile attacks most likely would be high-volume, precision strikes against priority military and political targets, including air defense facilities, airfields, Taiwan's C2 infrastructure, and naval facilities. China, however, could encounter problems coordinating missile firings with other concurrent military operations, such as air and maritime engagements. Exclusive Taiwan reliance on active missile defenses and associated BM/C3I, however, will not sufficiently offset the overwhelming advantage in offensive missiles which Beijing is projected to possess in 2005.
Air Superiority. Maintaining air superiority over the Taiwan Strait would be an essential part of any Chinese effort to mount a military operation against Taiwan. China currently has an overwhelming quantitative advantage over Taiwan in military aircraft and will retain that advantage beyond 2005. On the other hand, Taiwan's more modern aircraft will provide it with a qualitative advantage that should be retained at least through that period. PLA electronic warfare operations against air defense radars, disruption of command and control networks, and/or large scale conventional SRBM and LACM strikes against airfields and SAM sites would reduce the effectiveness of Taiwan’s air defenses.
The future effectiveness of the TAF will depend on the implementation of sound pilot training, sufficient logistic and maintenance support, and the ability of the TAF to integrate satisfactorily several disparate airframes into a cohesive, operational fighting force.
For its part, Beijing is faced with similar training, maintenance, and logistics challenges, complicated further by a still questionable capability on the part of its aerospace industry to keep pace with rapidly evolving technologies. Nevertheless, while the majority of the mainland's air fleet will still be composed of second and third generation aircraft, the sheer numerical advantage of older platforms augmented by some fourth generation aircraft could attrit Taiwan's air defenses sufficiently over time to achieve air superiority.
Amphibious Invasion. An amphibious invasion of Taiwan by China would be a highly risky and most unlikely option for the PLA, chosen only as a last resort to force the total surrender of the island. It most likely would be preceded by a variety of preparatory operations to include a blockade, conventional missile strikes, and special operations on Taiwan. These operations would play a critical role in determining how China would pursue the coup de grace, with an amphibious assault only one facet of a multi-pronged invasion plan. Beijing's amphibious lift capability is extremely limited at present and there are no indications that China is devoting resources to improve significantly its amphibious assault capability. As a result, success only would be achieved with a massive commitment of military and civilian assets over a long period of time and without third party intervention; furthermore, an invasion would bring almost certain damage to China's economy and its diplomatic interests, especially in the Asia-Pacific region.
The first move in an invasion plan likely would be a SLOC/blockade interdiction operation. The PLAAF and PLANAF would try to establish an air defense umbrella over the Taiwan Strait in preparation for local air superiority operations. Ground-based air defense assets would deploy forward and be integrated into the umbrella. Naval surface actions groups would begin operations near Taiwan's major ports. Announced missile closure areas and port mining by submarines would be designed to canalize traffic and force Taiwan naval vessels into engagement areas. Ground force mobilization likely would begin and PLA combat air patrols over the Taiwan Strait would intensify. Invasion operations would follow sufficiently close on the heels of conventional missile attacks to prevent Taipei from repairing and reconstituting damaged facilities. As the PLA's amphibious lift capacity in 2005 would still be limited, an amphibious over-the-beach assault would be extremely problematic. Rather, airborne, airmobile, and special operations forces likely would conduct simultaneous attacks to the rear of Taiwan's coastal defenses to seize a port, preferably in close proximity to an airfield. Seizing a beach-head likely would constitute a supporting attack. An airborne envelopment would facilitate amphibious operations by cutting off Taiwan's coastal defenders from supply lines and forcing them to fight in two directions.
Beijing's suppression of Taiwan's air defenses would be followed rapidly by a "second-wave" air attack which would attempt to establish air superiority over an invasion corridor in the Taiwan Strait. Priority for air defense protection and fighter escort operations would shift from bombers carrying ASCMs to fixed- and rotary-wing transports ferrying additional airborne and airmobile assault forces. Both China's amphibious fleet and a large portion of its huge merchant fleet would complete rapid reaction unit upload operations and depart from ports along the central coast. China also likely would saturate the Taiwan Strait with a huge number of noncombatant merchant and fishing vessels, with the aim of confusing and overwhelming Taipei's surveillance and target acquisition systems. The PLA's success in establishing and maintaining a foothold on the island would rest on a variety of intangibles to include personnel and equipment attrition rates on both sides of the Strait; the interoperability of PLA forces; and the ability of China's logistic system to support adequately optempo operations.
In order for an invasion to succeed, in other words, Beijing would have to possess the capability to conduct a multi-faceted campaign, involving air assault, airborne insertion, special operations raids, amphibious landings, maritime area denial operations, air superiority operations and conventional missile strikes. The PLA likely would encounter great difficulty conducting such a sophisticated campaign by 2005. Nevertheless, the campaign likely would succeed--barring third party intervention--if Beijing were willing to accept the almost certain political, economic, diplomatic, and military costs that such a course of action would produce.
Information Dominance. The Chinese currently are focusing on eliminating specific deficiencies they have in both areas of IO/IW technology and training. The PLA is engaged in efforts to improve the staff planning process by applying joint forces concepts learned from studying foreign IO/IW doctrine. Recent IO/IW military exercises claim to have included computer network attack and defend exercises. Public disclosure of these IO/IW exercises serves as an informational tool for the PLA to the future importance of IO/IW in Chinese military doctrine and reaffirms China's intent to continue developing and improving its IO/IW capability. In spite of these activities, the Chinese have many challenges to overcome and Beijing's ability to paralyze Taiwan's command and control appears limited at best.
On the other side of Taiwan Strait, IO may be an attractive--but untested tool--in multiplying the effectiveness of Taiwan's military forces. As one of the world's largest producers of computer components, Taiwan has all of the basic capabilities needed to carry out offensive IO-related activities, particularly computer network attacks and the introduction of malicious code. Formal doctrine development to guide future employment of these capabilities already may be in progress. As Taiwan increases its role in the manufacture of new computer warfighting systems, Taipei's capability to exploit its position for IO activities can be expected to increase substantially.
V. CONCLUSIONS
During the twenty-year period from 1979 to 1999, the security situation in the Taiwan Strait has exhibited simultaneously both significant change in some respects and remarkable constancy in others. The greatest change has occurred in the political and diplomatic arenas, a reflection of the political changes which have taken place in both Beijing and Taipei, and between Beijing and Taipei. On the other hand, despite the modest qualitative improvement in the military forces of both China and Taiwan, the dynamic equilibrium of those forces in the Taiwan Strait has not changed dramatically over the last two decades, except in a few niche areas like China's deployment of SRBMs.
Despite anticipated improvements to Taiwan's missile and air defense systems, by 2005, the PLA will possess the capability to attack Taiwan with air and missile strikes which would degrade key military facilities and damage the island's economic infrastructure. China will continue to give priority to long-range precision-strike programs. Similarly, despite improvements in Taiwan's ability to conduct ASW operations, China will retain the capability to interdict Taiwan's SLOCs and blockade the island's principal maritime ports. Should China invade Taiwan, such an operation would require a major commitment of civilian air and maritime transport assets, would be prolonged in duration, and would not be automatically guaranteed to succeed. In the end, any of these options would prove to be costly to Beijing--politically, economically, diplomatically, and militarily.
Beyond 2005, development of a modern military force capable of exerting military influence within the region, achieving deterrence against potential enemies, preserving independence of action in domestic and foreign affairs, protecting the nation's economic resources and maritime areas, and defending the sovereignty of the nation's territory will remain one of China's national priorities. Beijing will strive to create a smaller, more modern, better trained, more professional, and better logistically supported force, with an emphasis on air, naval and missile forces. China will continue to improve its regional force projection capabilities, but will not possess the conventional military capabilities to exert global influence.
The PLA will field large numbers of increasingly accurate SRBMs and introduce LACMs into its inventory. China's naval forces will continue their transition from a large coastal defense force to a smaller, more modern force able to conduct limited sea control operations against regional opponents in the East and South China Seas. China's air force will continue to assimilate greater numbers of fourth generation aircraft into its inventory, upgrade its regional IADS, and expand its airborne refueling and AEW capabilities. China will retain a numerical advantage over Taiwan in terms of both personnel and weapons.
On the other side of the Taiwan Strait, by 2005, Taipei will possess a qualitative edge over Beijing in terms of significant weapons and equipment. The TAF will have over 300 fourth generation fighters. Six French- built Lafayette-class frigates, eight U.S. Knox-class frigates, and eight Perry-class frigates will form the nucleus of Taiwan's naval force. Taiwan will possess an advanced air defense network, comprising an AEW capability, an automated C2 system, and several modern SAM systems, which will provide Taiwan with an enhanced defensive capability against both aircraft and missiles. The mobility and firepower of Taiwan's ground forces will have been improved with the acquisition of additional tanks, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery and attack helicopters.
Taiwan's primary security goal beyond 2005 will be to maintain the status quo, while retaining its long-term objective of eventual peaceful reunification with China on terms favorable to Taipei. Taiwan will seek to advance its international status, maintain a strong economy, modernize its military forces, and further democratize the island's political system. At the same time, Taipei will endeavor to expand political, cultural, and economic ties with Beijing, thereby reducing tensions with China and lessening the prospects of military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan's military strategy will remain defensive. Its success in deterring potential Chinese aggression will be dependent on its continued acquisition of modern arms, technology and equipment and its ability to deal with a number of systemic problems -- primarily the recruitment and retention of technically-qualified personnel and the maintenance of an effective logistics system--lest Taipei once again risk losing its qualitative edge.
Wednesday, February 13, 2008
Tuesday, February 12, 2008
超級強權
來源:wiki
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<<超級大國~超級強權>>
1.超級大國 (Superpower):
是一個國家具有第一等級的國際系統和能力,能去影響事件和投射力量到全世界規模範圍;它被考慮是一個比主要強權 (major power)更高等級的強權。
在冷戰期間這規規範能適用到蘇聯和美國。但是在世界二次大戰,英聯邦帝國也被應用於此定義下, 雖然它短時間的。
2.超超級大國(hyperpower):
當前存在一個超級大國~美國; 有時, 給世界的單極本質,它被稱是 hyperpower。
3.湧現的超級大國(emerging superpowers):
在所有其它國家之中, 歐共同體、中國和印度,看上去有最巨大潛力,能在21世紀內達到超級大國或近超級大國狀態,她們經常被命名為~湧現的超級大國。
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<<起源>>
在1943 年美國哥倫比亞大學對外政策教授 W. T. R. Fox , 在超級大國一書中,相對地新的和鑄造定義了它當前的政治意思。這詞辨認一個新類別力量, 能在世界中佔領最高的狀態,因為戰爭然後被發怒展示,國家能戰鬥與挑戰在全球範圍內的其他國家。
根據他在那片刻的聲明,世界上有三個超級大國: 美國、蘇聯、和大英帝國。
1.戰後英國的沒落:
蘇伊士危機說明了大英帝國由於二次世界大戰在經濟上的破壞, 如果不犧牲重建上的努力,就無法再與蘇聯和美國競爭, 在一個同等立足處。甚而當行動在考慮與法國和以色列。因而英國成為了美國的首要盟友, 和冷戰時美國側最重要和最強有力的底下屬國。
2.美國強盛:
當世界大戰的多數戰鬥了遠離它的國界,美國沒有如歐洲或亞洲在戰時遭受到工業破壞,或巨大的平民傷亡。
在戰爭期間,美國建立了強大的工業和技術基礎, 很大地推進了它的軍事力量,進入一個在世界舞臺的主要位置。
3.冷戰時美蘇雙極世界:
在戰後幾乎所有歐洲國家與美國或蘇聯聯盟,儘管企圖創造多民族聯合或立法機關(譬如聯合國), 不過,美國和蘇聯卻是最近湧現冷戰下的政治統領和經濟實力,和有非常不同的視野關於戰後世界。
這被反射了在北約和華沙條約軍事聯盟。這些聯盟暗示,這兩個國家是一個湧現的雙極世界的一部分,與一個早先多極世界對比。
一定數量的國家如英國、法國、中國,實施各種各樣的計畫,試圖獲取他們自己的獨立"超級大國" 狀態, 譬如核武器的發展, 以此當作成為一個"世界球員"的通過關卡。
4.關於冷戰新思維~兩個團體的競爭:
由一些學者在冷戰後的時代發出一個挑戰式思維:就是冷戰期間的競爭大約只有二個國家,甚至只有二個團體, 他們注意到, 雙極世界只存在二個所謂超級大國的所有各種運動和衝突,如果你忽略它的發生就不會感覺受到影響。
另外,在超級大國之間,許多衝突戰鬥以"代理人戰爭"方式來實施,這多半是介入比標準冷戰對抗還要複雜的問題。
5.唯一超超級大國,或多極力量均衡理論:
在90年代初期蘇聯瓦解後, 定義 hyperpower 開始被應用到美國, 作為冷戰後時代的單一剩餘超級大國。
這個定義, 由French外交部長Hubert V3edrine 在90年代鑄造,這是有爭議的關於美國被這樣分類是否有效。
一名著名反對這種理論的對手, Samuel P. Huntington, 傾向支持於"多極力量均衡"的理論。
6.古代歷史上的超級強權:
有些人企圖舒展超級大國在時間上的定義範圍。一些考慮能夠作為超級大國如Mongol帝國、古老羅馬、甚至是亞歷山大帝國 ,然而這種說法並不普遍, 並且傾向是否有效的爭執。
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冷戰時代:
冷戰期間,蘇維埃社會主義共和國和美國,在政治上和經濟上互相對抗。
蘇聯,代表了共產主義 ,但更加正確地說是Stalinism 思想體系 , 帶領了華沙條約, 以東方集團被稱呼著在西方。
美國,代表了資本主義思想體系,和帶領了北約,在冷戰期間。
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蘇聯和美國,履行了超級大國標準:
1.蘇聯
政治
強的政府系統。共產主義理想對全球傳播影響。永久安理會常任理事國。堅實聯繫東歐和發展中國家。
地理
2200萬平方公里,世界最大的國家。礦物浩大的儲蓄,和大的種田區域。
文化
浩大的影響涵蓋鄰居、變化的和攸久的歷史文化。通過社會主義和共產主義政府組織,被揮動的影響在世界。
軍事
曾經世界最大的軍隊。相當大的空軍, 轟烈的海軍。大核武庫、世界最大的疆土有豐盈戰略資源,
先進的軍事和太空技術的開發能力。
太空技術
在20世紀只有二個國家參加有人的太空探險和建立太空站,在機器人探險和衛星技術具有傑出地位。
經濟
世界上最大的計畫經濟中心。生產居世界產業輸出的20%
人口統計
人口29300萬。
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2. 美國
政治
強和穩定的聯邦共和國。對全球的影響。強的公司允許美國對資本國家施加進一步的影響。永久安理會常任理事國。堅實聯繫與西歐。
地理
960萬km2,世界第三大國家,礦物浩大的資源, 大農業生產。
文化
巨大的影響大多數大陸, 國際文化,與西歐。公司販賣美國文化在世界。言論自由對世界有吸引力。
軍事
全世界廣泛部署基地。技術上先進的軍隊。最大的核武存儲,不僅部署於本國發射窖,而且在歐洲也有駐防。
太空技術
在20世紀只有二個國家參加有人的太空探險和建立太空站,在機器人探險和衛星技術具有傑出地位。
經濟
世界最大的資本主義經濟。非常強的貨幣,美元。
人口
人口大約28000萬。
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<<標準>>
超級大國的標準不被清楚地定義,在不同來源間也許結果不同。以下標準應該被解釋作為一張非詳盡的名單:一般與超級大國聯繫在一起的因素。
<當前的因素>
1.文化
強的文化影響, 有軟的力量。文化影響暗示一個被開發的哲學和思想體系。
2.地理
它應該有一個寬廣土地或海域在它的控制下。疆土允許國家對探勘礦物和種植食物, 增加它的自給自足。這是一個重要因素在戰爭時,因為它允許可能性:譬如撤退,重新組合,和整頓,並且安置遙遠的雷達,和飛彈發射地窖。甚而從軍事上常識來講,一個更加富有的國家,如果只有更小的疆土,是更加脆弱的。
3.經濟和財政
優越經濟實力,這被形容為對原材料取得、容量、國內市場生產力、全球貿易與全球財政的領導位置、資本累積能力、研發等項目。人類太空探險也許被考慮是一個鑰匙,定義冷戰超級大國的經濟特徵,因為這能力是他們數十年間強烈競爭的動力源泉。太空探險代表具有能力耗費在猛烈的大型戰爭。
4.人口統計的
超級大國應該有大量和有教育的平民, 應該有高度發展的基礎設施,發出聲的文化和經濟能力,能塑造他們附近的地區,如同在自己的直接控制之下。
5.軍事
超群絕倫的軍事能力, 為相對無懈可擊、能阻止或造成巨大損傷, 有能力有效地射出全球統合軍事力量,包括核武器。
6.政治或思想
一個作用的政治系統。能動員資源為世界政治目標和巨大思想影響
<可能的因素>
1.礦物燃料超級大國
礦物燃料是越來越缺乏的和被預計耗盡在本世紀。因此對礦物燃料取得的變得越來越重要。對礦物燃料的依賴,能導致礦物燃料的價值的增殖,譬如石油。資源豐富的國家像俄國,能很好獲取礦物燃料。
2.技術超級大國
它由許多國際社會的成員預言了, 包括 Dick Morris (前比爾・克林頓總統的顧問), 在以後的十年,技術成長會導致製造業勞力過剩,和丟失它在經濟上的位置。這樣情況特別會損壞中國經濟。
* 機器人學,特別日本和美國,能結束對製造就業的需要。在製造業的勞工會比機器人力量更加無效率。
* 由於技術革命,服務和資訊技術區段會增加成長。
* 全球化手段,多數技術在將來將是普遍通過網際網路和其它全球服務。
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現今的超級大國
1.單一超級大國
冷戰後的世界被認為一個單極世界, 因為美國是世界的單一剩餘超級大國, 以最大的經濟和軍力。
然而,俄國作為蘇聯合法繼承人狀態, 並且保留超級大國力量。(即大核武庫、世界最大的疆土具有豐盈戰略資源, 和某些方面先進的軍事和空間技術開發能力)
2.霸權穩定理論
一些分析員認為霸權穩定理論,解釋當前的演變在國際關係。
霸權狀態傾向於盡力透支他們的力量, 並且新敵手逐漸將變得更加強有力, 替換或最終抵消被減弱的霸權。一些相信這當時實際上發生。其它力量能可能受益於這抵消, 最終追上美國的主導的位置。
3.一個可能的信號
一個多極世界湧現上升是: 中國、印度和歐共體, 每個以巨大經濟/政治的潛力。
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美國
美國當前唯一履行超級大國的標準。因此, 這也許稱 hyperpower
地理因素
* 美國是第三大國家, 在俄國和加拿大後, 涵蓋16.5%的世界表面。
人口統計的因素
* 它有多的, 雖相對地成長慢的人口,幾乎3億,大約5%的世界人口。
* 它有一個高人的發展索引
政治因素
* 這是一個穩定的兩黨民主共和國。
* 它貢獻大約22%聯合國預算, 和是聯合國安全理事會的一名永久成員(有否決權) 。
* 它關於世界問題由其它國家支持, 特別是英國、澳洲、日本和以色列。
* 統合全球性影響在經濟, 政治, 文化, 軍事, 科學和技術。
經濟和財政因素
* 美國是世界最大的國民經濟,和有幾乎30%全球國民生產總值。
* 美國的基礎設施是計劃好和高度發展的。
* 這是總部為許多全球性公司和財政機關。
* 它舉行一個關鍵角色在許多領域
譬如新材料、電子和電信、資訊技術、 航空航天、 能量、 nanotechnology、 生物工藝學、醫學、bioinformatics、化學工程,和軟體。
* 它有在世界上最大的資本市場, 並且是最大的債務國, 在 2005年更欠多達9兆,債務生長率三十億USD/每工作日。
* 國家是關鍵生產商在農業和商品區域 , 雖然它依靠石油進口。
* 它有對財政國際機構的果斷影響,譬如國際貨幣基金組織和世界銀行, 並且美元,是最重要的儲備,和可自由兌換貨幣在世界上。
軍事因素
* 美國在它的軍事花費上,比下十二個國家總合更多。它有第二大核武庫(在俄國以後) 並且組合一些世界的最技術上先進的武器系統,以遠征能力射出軍事力量,對世界上任一點。
空間技術因素
* 美國繼續操作和開發先進的太空技術。它操作宇航飛機,並且計劃有人探索月亮和火星。它是國際太空站的二位主要建造者的當中一個。
文化因素
* 美國文化是全世界顯要, 特別是在英文世界(軟力量)。
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湧現的超級大國
指在許多媒介來源有潛力成為超級大國的國家。如中國, 歐共體,和印度
1.中國
中華人民共和國,當前是世界的第四大經濟。根據真正的國民生產總值 (PPP),第二大經濟。並且被認為一個上升的超級大國由於它的大,高度有生產力的人口,迅速地增長的經濟,年增長率的9.2% . 並且迅速地增長的軍事消費和能力。
中國的陸軍是世界上最大規模,它擁有幾百件核武器,和是第三個國家能送人入太空。是聯合國安全理事會當中具有否決權之一的永久成員。
2.歐共同體
包含英國、德國、西班牙 、法國、荷蘭和比利時,前殖民地力量,與19個其它國家。如果考慮作為一個充分的單位, 歐共體可能被認為超級大國。
它當前被爭論, 歐共體太偏向政治上和文化上才被考慮作為一個唯一單位, 特別是從二力量主要槓桿- 對外政策和防禦,主要由會員國單獨行使。
它有世界上最大的經濟, 如果算作是一個唯一團體。它的成員, 英國和法國, 是聯合國安全理事會的永久成員,具有否決權。英國和法國當前有一些核威懾物,並且有少量技術限制,防止其它歐共體的成員加入。幾個歐洲國家活躍地,並且參與新太空競賽。
3.印度
印度共和國當前是世界的第十二大經濟。根據真正的國民生產總值(PPP),和第四大經濟。年增長率8.1%。
它並且保祐了以一個強的地理位置, 由喜馬拉雅山保護北部。被考慮作為一個可能的未來超級大國,因為它有一增長的熟練勞工,和最迅速發展的經濟的當中一個(特別是在服務和軟體產業)。
印度並且計劃一個無人任務對月亮(被命名 Chandrayaan-1)。印度擁有一個未知的數字(大概幾十) 的核武器和保有世界上第二大陸軍規模。
印度最近與美國簽署了一個民用核子交易,以提供印度成長所需的能源。印度的強的文化歷史迅速傳播到西方世界。
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<<超級大國~超級強權>>
1.超級大國 (Superpower):
是一個國家具有第一等級的國際系統和能力,能去影響事件和投射力量到全世界規模範圍;它被考慮是一個比主要強權 (major power)更高等級的強權。
在冷戰期間這規規範能適用到蘇聯和美國。但是在世界二次大戰,英聯邦帝國也被應用於此定義下, 雖然它短時間的。
2.超超級大國(hyperpower):
當前存在一個超級大國~美國; 有時, 給世界的單極本質,它被稱是 hyperpower。
3.湧現的超級大國(emerging superpowers):
在所有其它國家之中, 歐共同體、中國和印度,看上去有最巨大潛力,能在21世紀內達到超級大國或近超級大國狀態,她們經常被命名為~湧現的超級大國。
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<<起源>>
在1943 年美國哥倫比亞大學對外政策教授 W. T. R. Fox , 在超級大國一書中,相對地新的和鑄造定義了它當前的政治意思。這詞辨認一個新類別力量, 能在世界中佔領最高的狀態,因為戰爭然後被發怒展示,國家能戰鬥與挑戰在全球範圍內的其他國家。
根據他在那片刻的聲明,世界上有三個超級大國: 美國、蘇聯、和大英帝國。
1.戰後英國的沒落:
蘇伊士危機說明了大英帝國由於二次世界大戰在經濟上的破壞, 如果不犧牲重建上的努力,就無法再與蘇聯和美國競爭, 在一個同等立足處。甚而當行動在考慮與法國和以色列。因而英國成為了美國的首要盟友, 和冷戰時美國側最重要和最強有力的底下屬國。
2.美國強盛:
當世界大戰的多數戰鬥了遠離它的國界,美國沒有如歐洲或亞洲在戰時遭受到工業破壞,或巨大的平民傷亡。
在戰爭期間,美國建立了強大的工業和技術基礎, 很大地推進了它的軍事力量,進入一個在世界舞臺的主要位置。
3.冷戰時美蘇雙極世界:
在戰後幾乎所有歐洲國家與美國或蘇聯聯盟,儘管企圖創造多民族聯合或立法機關(譬如聯合國), 不過,美國和蘇聯卻是最近湧現冷戰下的政治統領和經濟實力,和有非常不同的視野關於戰後世界。
這被反射了在北約和華沙條約軍事聯盟。這些聯盟暗示,這兩個國家是一個湧現的雙極世界的一部分,與一個早先多極世界對比。
一定數量的國家如英國、法國、中國,實施各種各樣的計畫,試圖獲取他們自己的獨立"超級大國" 狀態, 譬如核武器的發展, 以此當作成為一個"世界球員"的通過關卡。
4.關於冷戰新思維~兩個團體的競爭:
由一些學者在冷戰後的時代發出一個挑戰式思維:就是冷戰期間的競爭大約只有二個國家,甚至只有二個團體, 他們注意到, 雙極世界只存在二個所謂超級大國的所有各種運動和衝突,如果你忽略它的發生就不會感覺受到影響。
另外,在超級大國之間,許多衝突戰鬥以"代理人戰爭"方式來實施,這多半是介入比標準冷戰對抗還要複雜的問題。
5.唯一超超級大國,或多極力量均衡理論:
在90年代初期蘇聯瓦解後, 定義 hyperpower 開始被應用到美國, 作為冷戰後時代的單一剩餘超級大國。
這個定義, 由French外交部長Hubert V3edrine 在90年代鑄造,這是有爭議的關於美國被這樣分類是否有效。
一名著名反對這種理論的對手, Samuel P. Huntington, 傾向支持於"多極力量均衡"的理論。
6.古代歷史上的超級強權:
有些人企圖舒展超級大國在時間上的定義範圍。一些考慮能夠作為超級大國如Mongol帝國、古老羅馬、甚至是亞歷山大帝國 ,然而這種說法並不普遍, 並且傾向是否有效的爭執。
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冷戰時代:
冷戰期間,蘇維埃社會主義共和國和美國,在政治上和經濟上互相對抗。
蘇聯,代表了共產主義 ,但更加正確地說是Stalinism 思想體系 , 帶領了華沙條約, 以東方集團被稱呼著在西方。
美國,代表了資本主義思想體系,和帶領了北約,在冷戰期間。
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蘇聯和美國,履行了超級大國標準:
1.蘇聯
政治
強的政府系統。共產主義理想對全球傳播影響。永久安理會常任理事國。堅實聯繫東歐和發展中國家。
地理
2200萬平方公里,世界最大的國家。礦物浩大的儲蓄,和大的種田區域。
文化
浩大的影響涵蓋鄰居、變化的和攸久的歷史文化。通過社會主義和共產主義政府組織,被揮動的影響在世界。
軍事
曾經世界最大的軍隊。相當大的空軍, 轟烈的海軍。大核武庫、世界最大的疆土有豐盈戰略資源,
先進的軍事和太空技術的開發能力。
太空技術
在20世紀只有二個國家參加有人的太空探險和建立太空站,在機器人探險和衛星技術具有傑出地位。
經濟
世界上最大的計畫經濟中心。生產居世界產業輸出的20%
人口統計
人口29300萬。
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2. 美國
政治
強和穩定的聯邦共和國。對全球的影響。強的公司允許美國對資本國家施加進一步的影響。永久安理會常任理事國。堅實聯繫與西歐。
地理
960萬km2,世界第三大國家,礦物浩大的資源, 大農業生產。
文化
巨大的影響大多數大陸, 國際文化,與西歐。公司販賣美國文化在世界。言論自由對世界有吸引力。
軍事
全世界廣泛部署基地。技術上先進的軍隊。最大的核武存儲,不僅部署於本國發射窖,而且在歐洲也有駐防。
太空技術
在20世紀只有二個國家參加有人的太空探險和建立太空站,在機器人探險和衛星技術具有傑出地位。
經濟
世界最大的資本主義經濟。非常強的貨幣,美元。
人口
人口大約28000萬。
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<<標準>>
超級大國的標準不被清楚地定義,在不同來源間也許結果不同。以下標準應該被解釋作為一張非詳盡的名單:一般與超級大國聯繫在一起的因素。
<當前的因素>
1.文化
強的文化影響, 有軟的力量。文化影響暗示一個被開發的哲學和思想體系。
2.地理
它應該有一個寬廣土地或海域在它的控制下。疆土允許國家對探勘礦物和種植食物, 增加它的自給自足。這是一個重要因素在戰爭時,因為它允許可能性:譬如撤退,重新組合,和整頓,並且安置遙遠的雷達,和飛彈發射地窖。甚而從軍事上常識來講,一個更加富有的國家,如果只有更小的疆土,是更加脆弱的。
3.經濟和財政
優越經濟實力,這被形容為對原材料取得、容量、國內市場生產力、全球貿易與全球財政的領導位置、資本累積能力、研發等項目。人類太空探險也許被考慮是一個鑰匙,定義冷戰超級大國的經濟特徵,因為這能力是他們數十年間強烈競爭的動力源泉。太空探險代表具有能力耗費在猛烈的大型戰爭。
4.人口統計的
超級大國應該有大量和有教育的平民, 應該有高度發展的基礎設施,發出聲的文化和經濟能力,能塑造他們附近的地區,如同在自己的直接控制之下。
5.軍事
超群絕倫的軍事能力, 為相對無懈可擊、能阻止或造成巨大損傷, 有能力有效地射出全球統合軍事力量,包括核武器。
6.政治或思想
一個作用的政治系統。能動員資源為世界政治目標和巨大思想影響
<可能的因素>
1.礦物燃料超級大國
礦物燃料是越來越缺乏的和被預計耗盡在本世紀。因此對礦物燃料取得的變得越來越重要。對礦物燃料的依賴,能導致礦物燃料的價值的增殖,譬如石油。資源豐富的國家像俄國,能很好獲取礦物燃料。
2.技術超級大國
它由許多國際社會的成員預言了, 包括 Dick Morris (前比爾・克林頓總統的顧問), 在以後的十年,技術成長會導致製造業勞力過剩,和丟失它在經濟上的位置。這樣情況特別會損壞中國經濟。
* 機器人學,特別日本和美國,能結束對製造就業的需要。在製造業的勞工會比機器人力量更加無效率。
* 由於技術革命,服務和資訊技術區段會增加成長。
* 全球化手段,多數技術在將來將是普遍通過網際網路和其它全球服務。
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現今的超級大國
1.單一超級大國
冷戰後的世界被認為一個單極世界, 因為美國是世界的單一剩餘超級大國, 以最大的經濟和軍力。
然而,俄國作為蘇聯合法繼承人狀態, 並且保留超級大國力量。(即大核武庫、世界最大的疆土具有豐盈戰略資源, 和某些方面先進的軍事和空間技術開發能力)
2.霸權穩定理論
一些分析員認為霸權穩定理論,解釋當前的演變在國際關係。
霸權狀態傾向於盡力透支他們的力量, 並且新敵手逐漸將變得更加強有力, 替換或最終抵消被減弱的霸權。一些相信這當時實際上發生。其它力量能可能受益於這抵消, 最終追上美國的主導的位置。
3.一個可能的信號
一個多極世界湧現上升是: 中國、印度和歐共體, 每個以巨大經濟/政治的潛力。
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美國
美國當前唯一履行超級大國的標準。因此, 這也許稱 hyperpower
地理因素
* 美國是第三大國家, 在俄國和加拿大後, 涵蓋16.5%的世界表面。
人口統計的因素
* 它有多的, 雖相對地成長慢的人口,幾乎3億,大約5%的世界人口。
* 它有一個高人的發展索引
政治因素
* 這是一個穩定的兩黨民主共和國。
* 它貢獻大約22%聯合國預算, 和是聯合國安全理事會的一名永久成員(有否決權) 。
* 它關於世界問題由其它國家支持, 特別是英國、澳洲、日本和以色列。
* 統合全球性影響在經濟, 政治, 文化, 軍事, 科學和技術。
經濟和財政因素
* 美國是世界最大的國民經濟,和有幾乎30%全球國民生產總值。
* 美國的基礎設施是計劃好和高度發展的。
* 這是總部為許多全球性公司和財政機關。
* 它舉行一個關鍵角色在許多領域
譬如新材料、電子和電信、資訊技術、 航空航天、 能量、 nanotechnology、 生物工藝學、醫學、bioinformatics、化學工程,和軟體。
* 它有在世界上最大的資本市場, 並且是最大的債務國, 在 2005年更欠多達9兆,債務生長率三十億USD/每工作日。
* 國家是關鍵生產商在農業和商品區域 , 雖然它依靠石油進口。
* 它有對財政國際機構的果斷影響,譬如國際貨幣基金組織和世界銀行, 並且美元,是最重要的儲備,和可自由兌換貨幣在世界上。
軍事因素
* 美國在它的軍事花費上,比下十二個國家總合更多。它有第二大核武庫(在俄國以後) 並且組合一些世界的最技術上先進的武器系統,以遠征能力射出軍事力量,對世界上任一點。
空間技術因素
* 美國繼續操作和開發先進的太空技術。它操作宇航飛機,並且計劃有人探索月亮和火星。它是國際太空站的二位主要建造者的當中一個。
文化因素
* 美國文化是全世界顯要, 特別是在英文世界(軟力量)。
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湧現的超級大國
指在許多媒介來源有潛力成為超級大國的國家。如中國, 歐共體,和印度
1.中國
中華人民共和國,當前是世界的第四大經濟。根據真正的國民生產總值 (PPP),第二大經濟。並且被認為一個上升的超級大國由於它的大,高度有生產力的人口,迅速地增長的經濟,年增長率的9.2% . 並且迅速地增長的軍事消費和能力。
中國的陸軍是世界上最大規模,它擁有幾百件核武器,和是第三個國家能送人入太空。是聯合國安全理事會當中具有否決權之一的永久成員。
2.歐共同體
包含英國、德國、西班牙 、法國、荷蘭和比利時,前殖民地力量,與19個其它國家。如果考慮作為一個充分的單位, 歐共體可能被認為超級大國。
它當前被爭論, 歐共體太偏向政治上和文化上才被考慮作為一個唯一單位, 特別是從二力量主要槓桿- 對外政策和防禦,主要由會員國單獨行使。
它有世界上最大的經濟, 如果算作是一個唯一團體。它的成員, 英國和法國, 是聯合國安全理事會的永久成員,具有否決權。英國和法國當前有一些核威懾物,並且有少量技術限制,防止其它歐共體的成員加入。幾個歐洲國家活躍地,並且參與新太空競賽。
3.印度
印度共和國當前是世界的第十二大經濟。根據真正的國民生產總值(PPP),和第四大經濟。年增長率8.1%。
它並且保祐了以一個強的地理位置, 由喜馬拉雅山保護北部。被考慮作為一個可能的未來超級大國,因為它有一增長的熟練勞工,和最迅速發展的經濟的當中一個(特別是在服務和軟體產業)。
印度並且計劃一個無人任務對月亮(被命名 Chandrayaan-1)。印度擁有一個未知的數字(大概幾十) 的核武器和保有世界上第二大陸軍規模。
印度最近與美國簽署了一個民用核子交易,以提供印度成長所需的能源。印度的強的文化歷史迅速傳播到西方世界。
馬漢海權論與海軍戰略論簡介
http://taiwantp.net/
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馬漢《海權論》與《海軍戰略論》簡介
U235 於 2002/06/25 20:52
前言
佔據地球70%以上面積的海洋水域，始終與人類生存發展有著密不可分的關係。海洋不僅是一個開闊而廉價的交通線，且隨著科技發達與其蘊藏著豐富資源的發現，已成為世界各國競相意圖控制的領域，更是國際權力角逐的戰場，以及國家生存發展的重要憑藉。對於一個資源不足而依賴貿易活動甚切的海島國家而言，尤其為生命線所寄拖。人類的海洋活動自古不曾間斷，海洋活動力的強弱，也曾實際主導了戰爭的勝負和國家的興衰。如：古代雅典就曾靠制海權而打敗了斯巴達，迦太基人也憑藉其龐大的船團而盛極一時；英國更由於能掌握海洋，屢敗西班牙及法國艦隊，而稱霸全球，但直至18世紀末以前，始終缺乏有系統的海權思想與海軍戰略論著；直到1890年馬漢發表：《海權對歷史的影響》，海權研究之風氣才為之大開，而制海權的爭奪也變成一種不可抑止的趨勢。美國海軍成長為今天遏制全球17個重要海峽，足以為世界任何地點的戰爭提供海上支援的世界海上霸主，馬漢之海權論及其眾多奉行者功不可沒也。
馬漢生平簡介
馬漢(Alfred Thayer Mahan艾爾弗雷德.塞耶.馬漢1840─1914)美國海洋歷史學家、美國海軍少將，近代海權論的創立者，一生致力於美國海權的建立而奉獻。其父丹尼斯-馬漢為西點軍校的名教授，美國南北戰爭雙方的將領大多都出自其門下。
1840年9月27日生於美國西點。
1854年馬漢進入紐約的哥倫比亞學院，兩年後轉入美國安納波利斯海軍官校三年級就讀。
1859 年以第二名優異成績畢業於美國海軍軍官學校，兩年後美國南北戰爭爆發，嗣後隨艦參加美國內戰。最初馬漢和美國一般海軍軍官一樣，爾後20餘年歷練不同的海陸職務。曾遠航南非、印度洋與日本，當他擔任艦務官時，認識了艦長魯斯代將(Stephen B.Luce1827-1917)，此人對馬漢一生的事業影響，有如沙倫和斯特之對克勞塞維茲。
1862年在海軍學院任教。
1863－1867年任塞米諾爾號艦長。
1867－1869年在易洛魁號上赴遠東巡航。
1872－1874年任黃烽號艦長。
1877－1883年任安納波利斯海軍軍校軍械部與射擊部主任。
1883 －1885年任漢諸塞號艦長。馬漢的船艦經常駐泊在南美，在讀到一本《羅馬史》(Mommsens,History of Rome)，探討漢尼拔當年經由陸路進入意大利的理由；馬漢由此做了個擴及於海洋的推論，獲致一個結論：“海洋的控制，是一個從來不曾有過，有系統認識和解釋的歷史因素”；於是開始進一步對17、18兩個世紀的海、陸軍戰史《伯羅奔尼撤戰爭史、續編》、《遠征記》、《羅馬史》、《羅馬帝國史》、《法國海軍史》，馬漢尤其攻讀了約米尼的著作《1792~1801年革命時期的軍事和批評史》和《戰爭藝術概論》，作有系統的研究對比。
1885年馬漢發表《墨西哥灣與內海》一書，深受當時海軍戰爭學院創辦人魯斯的賞識，受聘前往紐波特海軍學院任教，專任海權史學與戰略學的講述。
1886－1888年又繼任魯斯為海軍大學校長，專心於海權理論的研究和宣揚，並成為日後海權理論的權威。
1888年就任西北海軍船塢基地主席。
1890年出版《海權對歷史的影響1660－1783》(The Influence of Sea Power opon History)。
1892 年出版《海權對法國革命及帝國的影響》(The Influence of Sea Power opon the French Revolution and Empire)相繼出版，使其廣受好評，尤其受到英國學界的讚賞與敬仰，“牛津”和“劍橋”大學相繼贈與榮譽學位。
1892－1893再度出任海軍大學校長。
1893-1895年任芝加哥號艦長。
1896年服務軍旅40年後退休，仍然繼續研究寫作相關海權論著。
1898年擔任美西戰爭的指揮官。
1899年第一次海牙和平會議，以美國代表團顧問身份及美國海軍作戰委員會委員出席，堅決反對裁軍。
1902－1903年馬漢被選為美國歷史學會的會長。
1906年美國國會通過法案，把所有曾在內戰時服役的海軍上校皆昇為備役少將，馬漢雖接受了這份榮譽，但在著作上，仍保留其“上校”階級。
1908年出任美國海軍事務委員會主席。
1911年發表《海軍戰略論》(Nanal Strategy，Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Militray Operaction on Land)
1914年12月1日因心臟病發作，逝世於華盛頓海軍醫院，享年74歲。
馬漢著作甚多，總計寫了20本書和137篇論文。有關海權的理論散見於其著作中，並未有專書。其中以《海權對歷史之影響1660-1783》、《海權對法國大革命和帝國的影響(1793-1812)》及《海軍戰略論》較著名。是世界公認的海權先知者，也是世界上最具權威的海軍史學家和戰略家，這三部著作的歷史影響足以動搖當代每個人的生活方式與思維習慣。
海權論與海軍戰略簡史
海軍戰略是隨著海戰史的發展而發展的。古代海軍的海上作戰行動，多為陸上作戰的從屬，尚未形成“海軍戰略”這一概念。隨著海上戰爭和海軍的發展，海上作戰行動逐漸伸向遠洋，從而脫離了對陸上戰場的從屬地位。
15世紀末16世紀初起，西班牙、葡萄牙、荷蘭、英國、法國等殖民主義國家為了掠奪海外殖民地，保護殖民權益，爭奪海上霸權，其海軍遠渡重洋，對殖民地進行武力征服，相互之間也進行了多次戰爭。這是西方海軍戰略理論的基礎。
19 世紀末，美國已發展到市場經濟主義向外擴展階段，其海軍有了較強的實力，開始了向海外的擴張。與此同時，美國海軍理論家馬漢，提出適應美國擴展需要的海權論學說和以海權論為中心的海軍戰略理論。強調要以優勢的海上力量控制海洋，利用公海向海外投送兵力，去確保海上航運的安全海疆，目標自是建立稱霸的海軍。其學說和戰略理論成為美國海軍理論的基礎，並對其他國家的海軍戰略理論產生了重要的影響。
1918年起蘇聯海軍開始建立，到1945年二次大戰結束及以後一段時間，基本上是一支近海防禦力量(要塞艦隊)；自20世紀60年代以後，逐漸發展成為一支具有遠洋進攻能力的海軍(存在艦隊)。
70年代以來，美國和蘇聯競相發展新型核子潛艇，能夠發射遠程戰略導彈，除用於戰略襲擊外，主要作為實行核報復(即第二次打擊)的工具。美國、蘇聯的海軍部署和活動於世界各大洋，還把商船隊、漁船隊和海洋考察船隊作為他們推行其海洋戰略的輔助力量。
中國人民解放軍海軍是以國家的軍事戰略指導下，在陸軍、空軍和沿海廣大人民群眾、海上民兵的協同支援下，實行近海防禦作戰，其任務是抗擊外國海軍從海上入侵，保衛本國的領海和海疆，維護國家的海洋權益。
臺灣-中華民國，島嶼四面環海，對馬漢的海權論與海軍戰略，豈僅陸海空軍將領者應熟習而師法，豈僅海權國家奉之為泰斗而已，甚盼以島國為本之全體國民以至最將領及最高統帥，若皆能虛心涵泳體會，蘄其深造自得，則將更深一層，融為我島國軍戰爭藝術之啟示也！
馬漢的思想背景
馬漢的一生是處於美國極欲向外擴展，成為世界貿易強國之時，需要建設強大的海軍，和指導海權發展的戰略理論依據的時代，其思想背景的形成，可以概括分為以下六點：
一、美國南北戰爭後，美國人眼光內向，以西部開發為焦點，而忽視其外交關係和海外利益。
二、19世紀末，世界是以歐洲為中心，並受歐洲支配，美國被偏處於邊緣地帶的地位。
三、歐洲工業革命第一階段已趨於結束，新的階段正要開始，蒸氣和電力正在使陸海交通轉型。
四、自然科學與社會科學都大有進步，尤其達爾文主義成為國際競爭的基礎。
五、歐洲列強都採取擴張政策，紛紛向海外建立殖民地，殖民主義、帝國主義已成當時主流。
六、馬漢接受美國海軍戰爭學院創辦人魯斯的指導，將約米尼(Antoine Henri Jomini 1779-1869)《戰爭藝術》中的陸戰規律應用到艦隊作戰，以之向學員講授，並於1911年以《海軍戰略：與陸軍上事行動原則及實踐的比較和對比》，中譯本《海軍戰略論》之書名出版。
七、馬漢兩部主要的著作，基本是以英法兩國戰史為論點：
(一)1688－1815年拿破崙失敗，在英法長期戰爭中的每一階段，都是制海權的得失決定勝負。馬漢說：並未企圖在陸上採取大規模軍事行動，而僅憑控制海洋和歐洲以外的世界，英國政治家即能確保其國家的利益。
(二)影響海權發展的先天因素(說明不列顛的海洋優勢)：馬漢印象最深的是英國人如何經由海權的獲致，而促使其財富及國力的增長，另一方面他又嚴厲地攻訐法國人，由於背向海洋而重視大陸，終於一蹶不振。
(三)地理位置(不列顛為橫越海路的島嶼，在戰略上具極大的利益)最理想的位置是居中央位置的島嶼，靠近主要的貿易通道上，有良好的港口的海軍基地。
馬漢學說對世界的影響
馬漢的海權論，是在美國南北戰爭後產生的，適應了美國為確保海運對自由市場經濟半殖民主義政策的需要，成為當時美國政府制定“海洋政策”和“海軍發展政策”的理論依據，並對其他強國海軍的“海洋戰略”發生重大影響。
馬漢的《海權對歷史的影響》出版之後，美國及許多國家的政策和思想都受影響，尤其當時英國的海洋優勢，正受到法、俄兩國所構成的聯合威脅，馬漢的著作使英國政府獲得一種現成的工具，以來代替其政策辯護，得以獲得重整軍備的成本；德皇威廉二世著手擴建海軍，馬漢的著作亦成其手中最佳的宣傳武器；日本正走向帝國主義和海軍主義的道路，馬漢的著作恰好可以對它提供政治性和戰略性的理由。
馬漢的思想不僅刺激了歐洲諸國與日本走向海軍造艦競賽，也鼓勵了海外殖民地的擴張，英國史學家韋布斯特(Charles Webster)就認為馬漢是引起第一次世界大戰的原因之一。總之，馬漢的海權思想和海軍戰略理論，一直支配著西方世界國家的海洋政策和戰略，對近代史影響即深且鉅，至今歷久不衰。
一、美國：馬漢的書固然是以英國歷史為實質肉容，其理想卻是以美國的前途為建言的目標，呼籲美國政府重視海洋，能採取積極的海洋政策，使美國迅速走向世界權利的大道；在美國，馬漢於揚名海外之後才受到尊重，但美國的海洋政策受其思想的影響，也最深遠。就實務而言，不僅1898年的美西戰爭及巴拿馬運河的開通受其鼓吹，美國的遠東政策更經常受其影響。1901年老羅斯福當選美國總統後，極受馬漢海權思想之影響，致力發展海權；包括美國艦隊的擴建及積極奪取太平洋各戰略島嶼外，積極海洋的政策、遠東政策(對華門戶開放)及巴拿馬運河之開通及加勒比海之戰略海上基地，馬漢的鼓吹和聲援，均居重要地位，一直到第二次世界大戰，所有美國海軍軍官在討論或準備戰爭時，均仍遵守馬漢的理念，並採取他的方法。美國今日實力能獨步全球，美國海軍成長為今天遏制全球17個重要海峽，足以為世界任何地點的戰爭提供海上支援的世界海上霸主，而且他的思想還深刻地改變了幾代人頭腦中固有的大陸主義的觀念，使世界戰爭的樣式與格局發生了一場海上革命。
二、英國：馬漢發表其《海權對歷史的影響》後，不久就被譯成德、日、俄、義、瑞典、法文，其第一個受到影響的是英國，當時英國海洋優勢飽受俄、法兩國聯合威脅，在1889年英國政府提出海軍擴充計畫時，馬漢著作的理論，立即成為英國政府政策最強力的辯護理由。英國人說：英國之所以能有一支堅強的海軍，毋須感謝保守黨或自由黨，而應感謝馬漢上校！
三、法國：法國很重視馬漢對於法國海軍政策的批評，並且稱讚其思想具有真正的創造性。
四、德國：德皇威廉二世及海軍部長鐵畢茲(Von Tripitz)亦深受馬漢影響亦不下於英國，雖然德國在馬漢發表其鉅著前就已著手擴建海軍；而馬漢著作，卻成為德國政府的最佳宣傳利器。但德國卻忽略了馬氏的一項重要訓條：“一個國家無法同時發展陸權與海權”，導致德國陸軍反而受經費影響而減低其戰力。
五、日本：當時日本正走向帝國主義和海軍主義的道路，馬漢的著作被譯成日文，為日本政府提供政治性和戰略性的理論根據，日本海軍學校把馬漢的著作當作教科書，各級學校圖書館也均收藏。
海權思想
馬漢用《海權對歷史的影響》及《海權對法國革命及帝國的影響》兩本鉅著，來探討他的海權哲學(Philosophy of sea power)，他根據英法兩國歷史，發現海權是民族(國家)偉大性不可或缺的因素，當運用適切時，海權可增長財富國力，運用不當時，則帶來國運衰頹。
主張擁有並運用具有優勢的海軍和其他海上力量，去控制海洋，以實現己方戰略目的的軍事理論。也有人譯作海上實力論。分析研究了英國同荷蘭、西班牙、法國等海軍強國為爭奪海洋霸權而進行的多次海戰以及美國獨立戰爭中的海戰，闡明瞭海權對這些戰爭的勝負，對有關國家、殖民地和海上貿易所具有的重大影響及作用。至1911年，馬漢又寫成《海軍戰略》一書，形成了他的海軍理論體系。
馬漢的海權論認為，以貿易(指商品輸出)立國的國家，必須控制海洋。奪取並保持制海權，特別是與國家利益和海外貿易有關的主要交通線上的制海權，是國家強盛和繁榮的主要因素。要奪取和保持制海權，必須具有佔優勢的海上實力，即強大的艦隊和商船隊以及發達的基地網。他從戰略角度分析了一國的地理位置、自然環境、領土範圍、人口數量、民族性格和政府政策(包括發展海上實力的政策)等因素對海權的影響，提出海軍戰略就是在平時和戰時建立並加強海上實力，以實現國家的戰略目標。他認為，奪取制海權的方法是艦隊決戰和海上封鎖，而要完全奪得制海權，只有通過艦隊決戰。他強調集中兵力，把集中兵力視為基本的作戰原則和貫徹海軍戰略的主要手段。他主張美國應建立強大的遠洋艦隊，首先控制加勒比海地區和中美洲地峽，爾後進一步控制其他海洋。還主張美國在太平洋同其他列強實行“合作”，以獲取利益，並爭奪中國市場。
NO:278_2
U235 於 2002/06/25 20:52
Re:哲學研究-軍事思想-馬漢.海權思想
海權論思想要義
馬漢歸納出影響海權發展的一般因素有六項，即：“地理位置”、“自然地理形態”、“領土大小”、“人口數量”、“民族性”、“政府的性質和政策”。
海權的六項基本要素
一、地理位置：最理想的位置是居中央位置的島嶼；靠近主要的貿易通道上，有良好的港口和海軍基地。不列顛群島與歐洲大陸的距離不遠不近，既足以使英國獲得對抗外敵入侵的相當安全保障，又便於打擊敵人，換言之，進可攻退可守。例如：英國以英吉利海峽和歐陸相隔大，不僅有水為屏障，且距歐陸近，因此英國不須維持大陸軍，而可集中國力發展海權，以優勢的海軍來封鎖歐陸港口，並控制出入歐洲北部的航線。與英國成強烈對比的是法國，他不僅要維持大陸軍，而其海軍也必須分駛大西洋與地中海，因此在海權競爭中，法國對英國自然居於劣勢。
二、自然地理形態：具綿長之海岸線，及擁有良好可用的港埠；海岸線可決定向海洋發展的難易程度，良好港灣則代表向海發展的先天潛力，而土地的肥沃與否，則影響人民討海為生的意願和需求。一國的海岸線是其邊界的一部份，凡是一個國家其疆界易於與外界接觸者，其人民便較容易向外發展，與外面世界相交往。地形平坦、土地肥沃可能使人民安土重遷，不願投身海洋，如法國；反之，則逼使人民不得不討海維生，如荷蘭、葡萄牙。島國及半島國家受限於地形上的因素，若欲發奮圖強，則必須重視海權的發展。
三、國家領土大小範圍：供應必要物資，但地形未經河川嚴重分割，大到難於防守；馬氏認為國土的大小必須與人口、資源及其他權力因素相配合。一個國家人口的總數與海岸線總長度的比例，具極大重要性。否則廣大的領土可能反而成為弱點。如面積太大，而人口與資源不成比例的國家，防守密度低，國家的危險性增高，假使又被河川或港口所割裂，則更是一大弱點。以美國內戰時的南方為例，以人口和資源的比例而言，其面積是太大了，尤其是有了太長的海岸線和太多的內陸水道，兵力易被分割而導致失敗。領土幅員應和人口、資源等因素相配合，地廣人稀、過度綿長的海岸線及內陸水道眾多等，有時反而成為弱點，如美國南北戰爭時之南方領土即是。
四、人口數量：提供從事海洋事業的人口培育，儲備海軍後備力量；人口數量和素質對海權均為重要基楚，海權國家不僅應有相當數量的從事航業人口，而其中直接參加海洋生活的人數更應站相當高度的比例。國家的平時航海事業(包括航運和貿易)足以決定其海軍在戰爭中的持久力。英國即為典型例證，他不僅是航海國家，而且也是造船和貿易國家，擁有發展海權的必要人力與技術資源。想向海洋發展的國家，不僅應有相當數量的人口，而且其直接或間接參加海洋活動的人數，也應占相當的比例。
五、民族性：面向海洋，具冒險犯難的性格，促進商機及航運發展；國民對海上貿易的意願及航海生產能力的心理因素亦極重要。人人以向海洋尋求財富為榮，航海事業自然蓬勃。海商與海軍的結合，再加上殖民地的開拓，終使英國成為海權霸主。主要為貿易願望(重商主義)和生產能力；有此心理基礎，人民才會走向海洋尋求財富。海洋商業與海軍的結合，再加上殖民地和海外市場的開拓，遂使英國成就有史以來的最大海洋強國。
我們正倡導全民正當休閒活動，惟受限於台灣地狹人稠，無法闢建足夠的休閒場所。台灣連綿的海岸適於規劃海上遊憩活動，例如遊艇、潛水、海釣、滑翔翼、拖曳傘、水上摩托車、賽船、泛舟、帆船、衝浪、滑水等活動，可增加全民休閒運動空間，同時提供青少年育樂的大自然天地，以紓解青少年問題，這些多元的海上活動，亦可透過海事教育逐步規劃實施。
六、政府的性質和政策：政府的戰咯主張，影響海軍武力的運用；政府必須明智而堅毅，始能對海權作長期發展。英國的成功主因即在此。自詹姆士一世開始，英國的國家政策即一直以追求海外殖民地、海上貿易和海軍優勢為目的。政府若明智而堅毅，培養其人民對海洋的興趣，則海權的發展也自然比較容易成功。英國自詹姆士一世時代開始，其國家政策就一直以追求殖民地、商業和海軍優勢為目的，故能奠定海洋強權基礎。馬漢認為英國之成就為空前海洋強權，除了具備上述基本條件的優勢外，其政府海權運作的適切，實居關鍵。在海權運作方面，馬漢認為英國若無海運貿易能力，無廣大殖民地(資源、基地和市場)，以及訓練有素的海員和船艦，則英國雖有先天優越條件，亦將無能為力，尤其在戰爭工具運用上，即制海權爭取上，英國通常均以在海上擊滅敵國艦隊或對敵港口建立封鎖為一貫指導，更是重要因素，相反的，法國卻熱衷於領土的征服而未著眼於擊滅英國艦隊，於是結果便完全不同。
當前海事教育問題之探討
馬漢海權論之中心思想
一、馬漢引證英國在拿破崙時代的戰爭中獲得海上霸權的事實，來證明欲發展海權必須以強大的海軍控制海洋，以掌握制海權：拿破崙幾次企圖渡過海峽征英皆告失敗後，於1798年征埃時，其海軍在尼羅河海戰時遭英國納爾遜將軍所率領的艦隊重創，地中海制海權盡失，本國與埃及遠征軍的交通線被切斷而告失敗。1801 年，拿破崙為了削弱英國的商業，號召各國武裝中立，俄國、丹麥、瑞典及普魯士皆參加，一致反對在波羅的海行使交戰國權利。英國必須仰賴波羅的海各國輸入橡木、繩索和帆布，所以無法容忍上述諸國參加武裝中立，乃派遣波羅的海艦隊，以武力來打破拿破崙的武裝中立政策。在哥本哈根海戰中擊敗丹麥海軍艦隊取得進出波羅的海的自由後並進入芬蘭灣，打破武裝中立的政策。1805年在特拉法加海戰中，英國艦隊擊敗法西聯合艦隊，建立英國海軍的無敵霸權。
二、 海權的發展屬外線作戰，以攻擊為主要任務，陸權對海則以防禦為主。
陸海權的合作，是走向合和平繁榮與發展，如：英國的殖民制度轉向邦聯制、美洲、東協、歐洲共同市場；陸海權發展的任一方走向錯誤的方向，就是走向戰爭，如：一次大戰的歐陸、二次大戰“德國”與“日本”，企圖統治全世界。純陸權的防禦發展如：蒙古之四大汗國、清帝國初期之禁海。
三、有優勢之海軍，優良的海外基地、海港，才能與敵人抗衡，發揮海權之力量。
(一)海軍的目的在於會戰，而最終的目的則為取得制海權以控制海洋，因此艦隊所需要的不是速度，而是強力的攻擊火力，擁有優勢的海軍，才能控制海洋。
(二) 擁有廣大又富饒的海外殖民地及優良海港，有利於艦隊補給、維修，對延伸海軍戰鬥能力有很大助益。海權必須能確保自己的交通線安全，並同時能切斷敵人的交通線。交通線愈長，則海權所能賜與的利益也就愈大。而交通線的建立，就依賴線上的各個海外基地(殖民地)與海港了。英國在18世紀在地中海南岸擁有眾多海外基地，因此方能封鎖法國海岸，擁有地中海制海權；法國拿破崙遠征埃及，其目的即欲切斷英國經地中海到印度之交通線。
三、 丹麥的日德蘭半島與西蘭島控制北海與波羅的海的航道咽喉；直布羅陀海峽緊扼大西洋與地中海的交通；蘇彝士運河為地中海與印度洋的海運衢道，若能掌握這些戰略要地，就可發揮以海制陸的優勢。
海權控制陸權的地帶
一、海峽：海峽是交通樞紐地帶，掌握海峽即可控制敵人之海上運輸，阻止其海權之發展。如獨立國協從波羅的海出大西洋之交通線受制於松德海峽；從黑海出地中海又受制於達達尼爾海峽及博斯普魯斯海峽，致使其海權發展自帝俄迄今仍無法獨霸於世。
二、半島：半島伸入海中可享海上交通、運補之利，亦可發揮陸海協同作戰之效果。如19世紀拿破崙時代的西班牙半島戰爭，英藉海上運補遠優於法軍藉陸路運補，致法軍在半島戰爭中失敗。
三、島嶼：島嶼如獲有優勢的空權與海權，則可發揮其控制陸權之戰略據點價值。如日本、台灣、菲律賓各自擁有堅強的空權與海權，才使中共勢力無法向太平洋及印度洋伸展，其戰略位置舉足輕重。地中海北岸的一系列島嶼亦是以海制陸的戰略據點，為世界霸權爭奪的對象。
海權國之基本條件
一、海軍條件：要有海軍、海上基地、海運路線(交通線)且不受他國控制。美國在20世紀雖擁有強大海軍艦隊，但被分隔於兩洋，無法達到“集中”、“節約”之原則，因此馬漢力主美國應開鑿並控制巴拿馬運河及控制加勒比海諸島以保障太平洋與大西洋航運路線之安全。美奉行馬氏之觀點而成今日海上之霸權。
二、海運條件：必須擁有龐大之商船、港口及順暢之海上航路，並有海外商業及經濟關係。從海權的意義來看，海權乃為控制海洋及利用海洋，以達成國家目標之能力，而拓展海權之主要工具為海軍武力及商漁船隊，武力用以制海以保障海上商漁船隊與交通線(海上航路)之安全，而商漁船隊可開發海外商業及經濟利益，厚植國力，平時商業船隊可賺取大量經濟利益，戰時可支援海軍艦隊作戰，如福島戰爭，英國即徵調很多油輪、貨輪、客輪、協助運補兵力及戰略物資。
三、海外商業條件：國民大量移民於國外殖民地，並建立雄厚的經濟實力，對國力之擴張具有極大優勢。17、18世紀，英國在其海軍武力配合其商業船隊在世界四處拓展其殖民地，獲致豐厚的經濟利益，而成為海上霸權，有日不落國之稱。台灣為一海島，四周環海，海岸線連綿1,000公里，是道地的海洋國家。為確保國家生存與安全，除維護海權(Sea Power)外，另為解決島上資源貧乏問題，改善國計民生，必須利用航運（海運）進口各種大宗貨品與原料，更要對外拓展貿易、賺取外匯。
構成海權的後天條件
一、工業生產：一個國家欲發揮和維持巨大的生產力，作為海權的背景，就必須從世界各地獲取大量不同的原料，經過加工轉變為各種戰咯物質，厚植國力；「工業生產」可說是建立海權的工具。
二、航運能力：商、漁業航隊精巧發達，除可促進國家的繁榮，其航運能力的發展亦是工業生產能力及海軍發揮海權力量的支撐。
三、基地：海軍若沒有良好的後方基地、中繼基地、前進基地，就難於發揮制海戰力，況且海外基地(殖民地)更是外貿的市場依據。
四、海軍武力：為控制主要海上交通線、海上戰略要點、重要港口及海岸、鄰近之陸上要域、航運及基地護衛的基本力量。
上述四項因素構成海權條件，並非是機械式的合成，而是在其合成的過程中，同時又產生彼此激發的作用。
工業生產、航運能力、基地、海軍武力四者息息相關。因為有雄厚的工業生產，才能造船造艦；有強大的航運能力，才能由世界各地輸入戰略物質與原料，才能拓展外貿，增加國家財富；有了基地，才能擁有海外市場，航運才有運輸目標，海軍武力才有發揮戰力的據點；具備海軍武力，才能確保制海，維護航運與基地的安全，四者相互支持，缺一不可，這也就是海權的本質。對資源不足而依賴外貿甚殷的國家來說，海上交通無異是生命線所寄，要想贏得台海防衛戰爭勝利，精實海權實力勢在必行，面對海洋世紀來臨，現代軍人，對海權思想與海軍戰略，實在不可不知。
NO:278_3
U235 於 2002/06/25 20:53
Re:哲學研究-軍事思想-馬漢.海權思想
海軍戰略內容
海軍戰略是由國家最高軍事領導機關根據本國的政治、經濟、軍事戰略、領土範圍、海洋地理環境、科學技術、國際形勢以及可能的作戰對象等條件制定。其內容主要包括海軍的建設、作戰、訓練和科學技術研究等方面。諸如海軍的建設方針，海軍內各兵種的構成、比重，領導和指揮體制及部隊的組織編制，武器裝備和軍需物資的規劃、生產和儲備，海軍基地、港口的分佈和建設，海上戰場的選定和準備，海軍後備力量的建設和戰時動員計畫；海軍的作戰方針，海上戰爭的目的、任務，海上戰區的劃分，海軍作戰部隊和勤務支援部隊的部署，控制海上戰略要點，奪取和掌握海洋戰區制海權和制空權的行動計畫，指揮和後勤系統的組織；海軍教育訓練的方針、原則、體制，以及海軍知識結構的確定等；海軍軍事科學研究的體制和規劃，海軍軍史、戰史、作戰理論和戰略、戰術的研究，各種訓令、教令、準則、操作的制定，艦艇、飛機和各種武器、裝備的發展方向、設計論證，研究海洋環境對海軍的影響，海軍的遙測學、海軍科學研究方法學等海軍邊緣科學理論的建設，等等，都屬於海軍戰略的範疇。現代海軍，已經發展成為一個具有很高的機動性和很強的突擊威力，並具有戰略襲擊能力的軍種。世界許多國家正競相開發海洋，有的海軍強國企圖稱霸海洋，在海洋權益上的鬥爭日趨激化，海軍的戰略地位越來越為人們所重視。
一、海軍戰略類型
在不同的歷史時期，不同國家的海軍實行不同的海軍戰略。其基本戰略類型有兩種：即“守勢作戰”和“攻勢作戰”。在戰略指導上，實行“守勢作戰”時，通常進行海上戰術、戰鬥的“攻擊作戰”；實行“攻勢作戰”時，於戰術、戰鬥攻擊的同時，在必要的一方，輔以必要的海上戰術、戰鬥的“防禦作戰”。
二、制海權
交戰一方的海軍，在一定時間對一定海區的。目的是確保己方兵力海上行動的自由，剝奪敵方兵力海上行動的自由；保護己方海上交通運輸的安全，阻止敵方的海上交通運輸，亦即使該海洋區域為己所用而不為敵所用。根據控制海洋區域的目的、範圍和持續時間，可分為“戰區制海權”、“戰略制海權”、“戰術制海權”。制海權不是絕對的，在優勢一方取得總制海權的情況下，劣勢一方也可能在一定的時間內，對局部海區取得局部制海權，一如空軍之局部空優與突襲(入)。
奪取制海權的戰爭在西元前5世紀的希波戰爭(492－449B.C.)就出現過。而馬漢為首創把制海權問題，綜合為軍事理論；隨著海軍武器裝備的不斷發展，海軍奪取制海權的手段也不斷變化。19世紀以前，主要使用水面艦艇，以後除水面艦艇外，還有潛艇和空軍，20世紀50年代起，又增加了核戰略導彈。在現代條件下，奪取和保持制海權，還包括奪取該海域上空的制空權，並需綜合使用海軍各種作戰兵力、兵器和多軍種聯合作戰方式才能達到。
三、海上封鎖
用武力切斷敵方海岸或某一海區與外界海上聯繫的進攻性作戰行動。分為“全面封鎖”和“局部封鎖”、“水上封鎖”、“水下封鎖”。目的是限制敵方艦船機動，孤立敵方島嶼或海岸區的兵力集團，掌握制海權，切斷敵方海上交通運輸。海上封鎖主要由海軍水面艦艇、潛艇和空軍配合實施，封鎖的方式有兵力封鎖、水雷封鎖，或兵力封鎖與水雷封鎖相結合。海上封鎖的地點，通常選在敵方的海軍基地、港口或主要航道以及海峽附近海區。
早在希波戰爭中，波斯艦隊就運用過海上封鎖。在以後的戰爭中，海上封鎖不斷得到發展。第一次世界大戰，英國艦隊就封鎖了德國的出海口，使德國艦船一度失去行動自由，海上運輸幾乎陷於停頓；隨後，德國海軍使用潛艇對英國實施海上(水下)封鎖。第二次世界大戰後期，美軍使用空軍實施大規模佈設水雷，對日本進行海上封鎖，斷絕了日本的原料和糧食等的輸入，切斷了日本本土與其所佔太平洋島嶼之間的海上聯繫。美軍在越南戰爭和英軍在馬爾維納斯群島之戰中，也實施過海上封鎖。在未來戰爭中，海上封鎖仍將是一種有效的作戰型式。
按國際條約和公約的規定，進行海上封鎖必須正式宣佈，指明封鎖的開始時間和地理界限，以及中立國艦船離開封鎖區域的期限。吾人非常懷疑，如果中-臺之間發生戰爭，中共是否會事先提出聲明，後才實施行動！
馬漢海軍戰略論精華
是指導海軍建設和作戰的方略。屬於國家軍事戰略，是國家軍事戰略在海軍中的運用。海軍之有馬漢正像陸軍之有克勞塞維茲，對於闡明海權在歷史中所扮演的角色及其重要意義，為馬漢最傑出的成就，能以全部歷史為背景來寫海軍史，並同時注意到政治及經濟因素者，馬漢實為第一人。
“集中”、 “中央位置”、“內線”、“海上交通線”、“絕對攻勢”等為馬漢海軍戰略論精華，其基本的理論架構，受約米尼《戰爭藝術》的影響頗深；“集中”與“中央位置”能迫敵分散兵力，“內線”能使兵力迅速到達某一點，海軍戰爭中唯一決定因素還是戰鬥艦隊，其真正的目的不是盡量增強某一艘船的威力，而是要使整個艦隊發揮最大的攻擊能力；因此，馬漢有一句常為人引述的名言：“絕勿分散艦隊！”。他說：交通是一個概括性的名詞，不是地理線，如陸軍所採取的道路，而是軍艦的必需補給，一個軍事實體與國家權力之間經常保持連絡的運動線。
一、集中原則：
集中乃獲致戰果的根本，集中的涵義有三：其一是“目標集中”。馬漢引用拿破崙的名言說：目標專一就是成功的祕訣，強調：切勿在同一時間內，作兩種意圖 (追逐兩個目標)；艦隊兵力部署，應能相互支援，密切聯繫，不得各自為戰。其二是：“優勢與牽制”；在決戰線上保持優勢兵力，以優勢主力攻擊敵之一點，另在其他點牽制敵軍，以便主力攻擊能獲致戰果。其三是：“火力集中”，當遭遇敵兩艘戰艦時，要集中火力合力攻擊其一艘，千萬不要各戰一艘。馬漢用：“永遠不要分散艦隊”一語強調集中原則的重要性。
二、中央位置：
馬漢認為位置是一種形勢，中央位置能提供一個提早到達目的的捷徑，但日俄戰爭之俄軍，雖據有旅順，卻因海戰失敗而未蒙其利，故中央位置須加上力量，才會形成真正有利的結果。換言之，擁有位置適中、形勢強固、資源豐富的海軍基地，海戰時就可居於先天有利地位，但並不保証絕對勝利。
三、內線：
內線就是從中央位置，向一個或數個據點延伸，用以取得阻止敵軍會合的中心位置，以便用劣勢兵力牽制一面之敵，另以主力集中攻擊他面之敵。換句話說：內線的定義，是作戰的一方能迅速調動兵力，集中對任何一面之敵，加以有效的運用。要言之，內線是較敵人運用的路線為短的一條路線。這又是一個作戰方便的手段，並非絕對勝利的保証。
四、海上交通線：
係陸上部隊與海上艦隊自由運動以維持戰力的空間，為補給線和連絡線的總稱，對軍事供應和勝負具有密切關係，是大軍作戰命脈，能支配戰爭，故有生命線之稱，必要時，又可使軍隊自由撤退，故又有逃命線之稱。不過，馬漢所說的交通線，並非指軍隊必經之途的地理線，而是船艦載量有限所無法攜行的必要補給品。他明確地指出所謂補給品：第一是燃料、第二是彈藥、最後才是糧食，而海軍艦隊的補給來源就是靠海軍基地。故馬漢真正的意思是，來自海軍基地的後勤補給與修，是成就海軍戰略持續的必要因素。
五、絕對攻勢：
海上作戰要保持絕對機動與攻勢，反對把海軍充當四通八達而漫無疆界的海洋防禦工具。他說：“在一切海戰中只有一項基本原則，即：唯有攻擊才能確保防禦的安全”、“海軍放棄了攻擊性能，等於放棄其最有效的基本功能”、 “在海上採取守勢，是絕對不利的，除了為形勢所迫採守勢之外，千萬別自動採取守勢，擁有優勢兵力者固應主動邀敵決戰，即使因兵力劣勢先行避戰，也當使敵不明我之動向，迫敵轉移兵力，再相機誘敵而擊滅之”。馬漢對劣勢海軍的運用，其實和柯白所說的“存在艦隊(Fleet in being)”有些類似。
近代戰略學者羅辛斯基(Herbert Rosinski)論制海權時，認為馬漢對海軍的運用，並不以“在其防衛區域的近前方建立防線為滿足”，而是要“獲得完整的制海權為理想”。羅辛斯基歸納馬漢言論的意義說：“因為海是一個整體，其中沒有任何部分可以劃分和設防，所以要對我方在海上或經過海上的利益提供有效保護，則唯一的方法就是把敵人逐出整個海洋之外......而在海上，僅只為了本身安全之故，我們也仍將被迫必須徹底擊滅敵軍，並將其逐出海洋之外”。
結論
古希臘學者修昔底德(Thucydides，西元前 460-406)指出：海權(Sea Power)是海的權力(Power of the sea)不屬於任何人，而僅當人們知道如何利用此種權力時，海才會把此種權力賜與他。歷史的軌跡告訴我們，過去忽視海洋的人，平時必難以發展，戰時必遭受重大挫敗。中共曾對“世界海戰史”、“鴉片戰爭”、“中、日甲午戰爭” 海戰歷史進行大量研究，得到的結論是：“守土型的國防觀念，是海權意識淡薄的突出表現，在海洋時代必然貽誤大局......要保證國土安全，首先要保證國家的海疆安全”，而致力於擴建海軍，以爭取海權。但後世史學家對其仍不免有所批評，如：
一、在歷史中還有若干非海洋帝國的興起，他都未曾考慮。
二、海權因素故然重要，但導致拿玻崙失敗又遂有其他因素的存在。
四、 英國在17和18世紀中的成功，海權雖為重要理由，但並非唯一的理由。
發展海權的第一步，就是研究海權思想和海軍戰略理論，馬漢的思想，正可以給海軍一個有力的指引；雖然馬漢的思想並非十全十美，而且有些已嫌不合時宜，但吾人若能師其意而不泥其古，兼採其他海洋戰略學者卓見以資互補，致力實踐於國防建設實務，必然裨益無窮。
第二次世界大戰結束時，美國國務卿海約翰曾言：地中海是昨日之洋，大西洋是今日之洋，太平洋是明日之洋。時值邁入21世紀，位居西太平洋“中央位置”、東南亞戰略要衝的中華民國台灣，對馬漢的海權論應有更深一層的詮釋與認識。
台灣中華民國，在四面環海資源有限，本島戰略縱深不足，戰時當以臺海週圍之海域為決戰戰略縱深，自然平時海、空交通運輸安全之確保，即是我國的生命線。
台灣諸島群位於中國大陸海岸線之中央位置，是控制中共向海洋發展必經要衝，為中國大陸權成就強海權之際，對於台灣問題，不願放棄訴諸武力，美國海權之對於南北韓及越南問題，也都是大陸權與世界第一大海權對抗的因素之一。
不論是為了維護中華民國的永續生存發展，或是抵制中國的威脅，以維護海、空航道安全，臺灣均不得不致力於發展制陸空海權實力。既已處於西太平洋中央位置和空海內線有利位置，加上“質精、適量、戰力強”的空海島上防衛力量，陸軍依島群制海制空、護衛支援海空作戰，海軍依海護島(群)護空、實施制海空陸作戰，空軍依島護島護海護空、實施制海空陸作戰，以及結合諸友邦支援，未來的臺海防衛戰爭，才能立於不敗之海上。
亦在此呼籲中國：
◎不要忘了馬漢的重要訓示“一個國家無法同時發展陸權與海權”，歷史的宿命如果真是“陸權與海權的對抗”，拿下這個“臺灣島群”，將是真正陸海權對抗的開始，中國的生存發展真的需要與太平洋諸海權對抗嗎？
◎中國現在之發展有需要，如同美國南北戰爭後之向海發展嗎？中國之發展海權能取代美國成為世界級海上霸權嗎？
◎從中國研究《地緣政治》見“森”之後，怎可往牛角尖裏鑽，不見“林”“木”反以往東南向挑起《陸海權對抗》的“不放棄以武力解決臺灣問題”只見“草(島)”的閉著眼放火燒嗎？
◎如果中國之陸權，真沒有能力向西北陸地繁榮經濟，反而向最能幫助中國繁榮的最大一部海權，臺、日、美採取對抗的心態，才是消耗與不智！
參考資料：
海權論(馬漢)
1.所謂“存在艦隊”的觀念，就是：“只要海軍艦隊仍然存在，則對兵力較強的一方，就永遠構成潛在威脅”。“存在艦隊”用以阻止優勢敵軍獲得制海權的手段為：採取守勢，拒絕納爾遜式的正規海戰(Regular battle)，並抓住一切機會來進行攻擊。
2.制海權乃是為一種特定目的而控制海洋交通，其意義即為使我海上行動不受阻礙或反對的能力，以及阻止對方如此行動的能力。這個定義是英國海洋戰略學家柯白(Sir Julian Corbert，1854~1922)所界定的。
3.海軍思想的發展，國防部史編局譯印。
4.中華戰略學刊民83年春季刊，劉達材《海權論》。
5.中共海權意識崛起初探，黃埔雙月刊541期。
6.陸軍軍官團因進修書籍《馬漢海軍戰略》中譯版序文。
7.戰略家思想與著作，鈕先鍾，麥田出版社。
8.西方戰略思想史，鈕先鍾，麥田出版社。
9. 21世紀的戰略前瞻，鈕先鍾，麥田出版社。
10.http://www2.fjtc.edu.tw/mio/Strategic/%E8%A5%BF%E6%96%B9%E5%85%B5%E5%AD%B8/Mahan.htm
11.馬漢的海權思想與海軍戰略
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馬漢《海權論》與《海軍戰略論》簡介
U235 於 2002/06/25 20:52
前言
佔據地球70%以上面積的海洋水域，始終與人類生存發展有著密不可分的關係。海洋不僅是一個開闊而廉價的交通線，且隨著科技發達與其蘊藏著豐富資源的發現，已成為世界各國競相意圖控制的領域，更是國際權力角逐的戰場，以及國家生存發展的重要憑藉。對於一個資源不足而依賴貿易活動甚切的海島國家而言，尤其為生命線所寄拖。人類的海洋活動自古不曾間斷，海洋活動力的強弱，也曾實際主導了戰爭的勝負和國家的興衰。如：古代雅典就曾靠制海權而打敗了斯巴達，迦太基人也憑藉其龐大的船團而盛極一時；英國更由於能掌握海洋，屢敗西班牙及法國艦隊，而稱霸全球，但直至18世紀末以前，始終缺乏有系統的海權思想與海軍戰略論著；直到1890年馬漢發表：《海權對歷史的影響》，海權研究之風氣才為之大開，而制海權的爭奪也變成一種不可抑止的趨勢。美國海軍成長為今天遏制全球17個重要海峽，足以為世界任何地點的戰爭提供海上支援的世界海上霸主，馬漢之海權論及其眾多奉行者功不可沒也。
馬漢生平簡介
馬漢(Alfred Thayer Mahan艾爾弗雷德.塞耶.馬漢1840─1914)美國海洋歷史學家、美國海軍少將，近代海權論的創立者，一生致力於美國海權的建立而奉獻。其父丹尼斯-馬漢為西點軍校的名教授，美國南北戰爭雙方的將領大多都出自其門下。
1840年9月27日生於美國西點。
1854年馬漢進入紐約的哥倫比亞學院，兩年後轉入美國安納波利斯海軍官校三年級就讀。
1859 年以第二名優異成績畢業於美國海軍軍官學校，兩年後美國南北戰爭爆發，嗣後隨艦參加美國內戰。最初馬漢和美國一般海軍軍官一樣，爾後20餘年歷練不同的海陸職務。曾遠航南非、印度洋與日本，當他擔任艦務官時，認識了艦長魯斯代將(Stephen B.Luce1827-1917)，此人對馬漢一生的事業影響，有如沙倫和斯特之對克勞塞維茲。
1862年在海軍學院任教。
1863－1867年任塞米諾爾號艦長。
1867－1869年在易洛魁號上赴遠東巡航。
1872－1874年任黃烽號艦長。
1877－1883年任安納波利斯海軍軍校軍械部與射擊部主任。
1883 －1885年任漢諸塞號艦長。馬漢的船艦經常駐泊在南美，在讀到一本《羅馬史》(Mommsens,History of Rome)，探討漢尼拔當年經由陸路進入意大利的理由；馬漢由此做了個擴及於海洋的推論，獲致一個結論：“海洋的控制，是一個從來不曾有過，有系統認識和解釋的歷史因素”；於是開始進一步對17、18兩個世紀的海、陸軍戰史《伯羅奔尼撤戰爭史、續編》、《遠征記》、《羅馬史》、《羅馬帝國史》、《法國海軍史》，馬漢尤其攻讀了約米尼的著作《1792~1801年革命時期的軍事和批評史》和《戰爭藝術概論》，作有系統的研究對比。
1885年馬漢發表《墨西哥灣與內海》一書，深受當時海軍戰爭學院創辦人魯斯的賞識，受聘前往紐波特海軍學院任教，專任海權史學與戰略學的講述。
1886－1888年又繼任魯斯為海軍大學校長，專心於海權理論的研究和宣揚，並成為日後海權理論的權威。
1888年就任西北海軍船塢基地主席。
1890年出版《海權對歷史的影響1660－1783》(The Influence of Sea Power opon History)。
1892 年出版《海權對法國革命及帝國的影響》(The Influence of Sea Power opon the French Revolution and Empire)相繼出版，使其廣受好評，尤其受到英國學界的讚賞與敬仰，“牛津”和“劍橋”大學相繼贈與榮譽學位。
1892－1893再度出任海軍大學校長。
1893-1895年任芝加哥號艦長。
1896年服務軍旅40年後退休，仍然繼續研究寫作相關海權論著。
1898年擔任美西戰爭的指揮官。
1899年第一次海牙和平會議，以美國代表團顧問身份及美國海軍作戰委員會委員出席，堅決反對裁軍。
1902－1903年馬漢被選為美國歷史學會的會長。
1906年美國國會通過法案，把所有曾在內戰時服役的海軍上校皆昇為備役少將，馬漢雖接受了這份榮譽，但在著作上，仍保留其“上校”階級。
1908年出任美國海軍事務委員會主席。
1911年發表《海軍戰略論》(Nanal Strategy，Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Militray Operaction on Land)
1914年12月1日因心臟病發作，逝世於華盛頓海軍醫院，享年74歲。
馬漢著作甚多，總計寫了20本書和137篇論文。有關海權的理論散見於其著作中，並未有專書。其中以《海權對歷史之影響1660-1783》、《海權對法國大革命和帝國的影響(1793-1812)》及《海軍戰略論》較著名。是世界公認的海權先知者，也是世界上最具權威的海軍史學家和戰略家，這三部著作的歷史影響足以動搖當代每個人的生活方式與思維習慣。
海權論與海軍戰略簡史
海軍戰略是隨著海戰史的發展而發展的。古代海軍的海上作戰行動，多為陸上作戰的從屬，尚未形成“海軍戰略”這一概念。隨著海上戰爭和海軍的發展，海上作戰行動逐漸伸向遠洋，從而脫離了對陸上戰場的從屬地位。
15世紀末16世紀初起，西班牙、葡萄牙、荷蘭、英國、法國等殖民主義國家為了掠奪海外殖民地，保護殖民權益，爭奪海上霸權，其海軍遠渡重洋，對殖民地進行武力征服，相互之間也進行了多次戰爭。這是西方海軍戰略理論的基礎。
19 世紀末，美國已發展到市場經濟主義向外擴展階段，其海軍有了較強的實力，開始了向海外的擴張。與此同時，美國海軍理論家馬漢，提出適應美國擴展需要的海權論學說和以海權論為中心的海軍戰略理論。強調要以優勢的海上力量控制海洋，利用公海向海外投送兵力，去確保海上航運的安全海疆，目標自是建立稱霸的海軍。其學說和戰略理論成為美國海軍理論的基礎，並對其他國家的海軍戰略理論產生了重要的影響。
1918年起蘇聯海軍開始建立，到1945年二次大戰結束及以後一段時間，基本上是一支近海防禦力量(要塞艦隊)；自20世紀60年代以後，逐漸發展成為一支具有遠洋進攻能力的海軍(存在艦隊)。
70年代以來，美國和蘇聯競相發展新型核子潛艇，能夠發射遠程戰略導彈，除用於戰略襲擊外，主要作為實行核報復(即第二次打擊)的工具。美國、蘇聯的海軍部署和活動於世界各大洋，還把商船隊、漁船隊和海洋考察船隊作為他們推行其海洋戰略的輔助力量。
中國人民解放軍海軍是以國家的軍事戰略指導下，在陸軍、空軍和沿海廣大人民群眾、海上民兵的協同支援下，實行近海防禦作戰，其任務是抗擊外國海軍從海上入侵，保衛本國的領海和海疆，維護國家的海洋權益。
臺灣-中華民國，島嶼四面環海，對馬漢的海權論與海軍戰略，豈僅陸海空軍將領者應熟習而師法，豈僅海權國家奉之為泰斗而已，甚盼以島國為本之全體國民以至最將領及最高統帥，若皆能虛心涵泳體會，蘄其深造自得，則將更深一層，融為我島國軍戰爭藝術之啟示也！
馬漢的思想背景
馬漢的一生是處於美國極欲向外擴展，成為世界貿易強國之時，需要建設強大的海軍，和指導海權發展的戰略理論依據的時代，其思想背景的形成，可以概括分為以下六點：
一、美國南北戰爭後，美國人眼光內向，以西部開發為焦點，而忽視其外交關係和海外利益。
二、19世紀末，世界是以歐洲為中心，並受歐洲支配，美國被偏處於邊緣地帶的地位。
三、歐洲工業革命第一階段已趨於結束，新的階段正要開始，蒸氣和電力正在使陸海交通轉型。
四、自然科學與社會科學都大有進步，尤其達爾文主義成為國際競爭的基礎。
五、歐洲列強都採取擴張政策，紛紛向海外建立殖民地，殖民主義、帝國主義已成當時主流。
六、馬漢接受美國海軍戰爭學院創辦人魯斯的指導，將約米尼(Antoine Henri Jomini 1779-1869)《戰爭藝術》中的陸戰規律應用到艦隊作戰，以之向學員講授，並於1911年以《海軍戰略：與陸軍上事行動原則及實踐的比較和對比》，中譯本《海軍戰略論》之書名出版。
七、馬漢兩部主要的著作，基本是以英法兩國戰史為論點：
(一)1688－1815年拿破崙失敗，在英法長期戰爭中的每一階段，都是制海權的得失決定勝負。馬漢說：並未企圖在陸上採取大規模軍事行動，而僅憑控制海洋和歐洲以外的世界，英國政治家即能確保其國家的利益。
(二)影響海權發展的先天因素(說明不列顛的海洋優勢)：馬漢印象最深的是英國人如何經由海權的獲致，而促使其財富及國力的增長，另一方面他又嚴厲地攻訐法國人，由於背向海洋而重視大陸，終於一蹶不振。
(三)地理位置(不列顛為橫越海路的島嶼，在戰略上具極大的利益)最理想的位置是居中央位置的島嶼，靠近主要的貿易通道上，有良好的港口的海軍基地。
馬漢學說對世界的影響
馬漢的海權論，是在美國南北戰爭後產生的，適應了美國為確保海運對自由市場經濟半殖民主義政策的需要，成為當時美國政府制定“海洋政策”和“海軍發展政策”的理論依據，並對其他強國海軍的“海洋戰略”發生重大影響。
馬漢的《海權對歷史的影響》出版之後，美國及許多國家的政策和思想都受影響，尤其當時英國的海洋優勢，正受到法、俄兩國所構成的聯合威脅，馬漢的著作使英國政府獲得一種現成的工具，以來代替其政策辯護，得以獲得重整軍備的成本；德皇威廉二世著手擴建海軍，馬漢的著作亦成其手中最佳的宣傳武器；日本正走向帝國主義和海軍主義的道路，馬漢的著作恰好可以對它提供政治性和戰略性的理由。
馬漢的思想不僅刺激了歐洲諸國與日本走向海軍造艦競賽，也鼓勵了海外殖民地的擴張，英國史學家韋布斯特(Charles Webster)就認為馬漢是引起第一次世界大戰的原因之一。總之，馬漢的海權思想和海軍戰略理論，一直支配著西方世界國家的海洋政策和戰略，對近代史影響即深且鉅，至今歷久不衰。
一、美國：馬漢的書固然是以英國歷史為實質肉容，其理想卻是以美國的前途為建言的目標，呼籲美國政府重視海洋，能採取積極的海洋政策，使美國迅速走向世界權利的大道；在美國，馬漢於揚名海外之後才受到尊重，但美國的海洋政策受其思想的影響，也最深遠。就實務而言，不僅1898年的美西戰爭及巴拿馬運河的開通受其鼓吹，美國的遠東政策更經常受其影響。1901年老羅斯福當選美國總統後，極受馬漢海權思想之影響，致力發展海權；包括美國艦隊的擴建及積極奪取太平洋各戰略島嶼外，積極海洋的政策、遠東政策(對華門戶開放)及巴拿馬運河之開通及加勒比海之戰略海上基地，馬漢的鼓吹和聲援，均居重要地位，一直到第二次世界大戰，所有美國海軍軍官在討論或準備戰爭時，均仍遵守馬漢的理念，並採取他的方法。美國今日實力能獨步全球，美國海軍成長為今天遏制全球17個重要海峽，足以為世界任何地點的戰爭提供海上支援的世界海上霸主，而且他的思想還深刻地改變了幾代人頭腦中固有的大陸主義的觀念，使世界戰爭的樣式與格局發生了一場海上革命。
二、英國：馬漢發表其《海權對歷史的影響》後，不久就被譯成德、日、俄、義、瑞典、法文，其第一個受到影響的是英國，當時英國海洋優勢飽受俄、法兩國聯合威脅，在1889年英國政府提出海軍擴充計畫時，馬漢著作的理論，立即成為英國政府政策最強力的辯護理由。英國人說：英國之所以能有一支堅強的海軍，毋須感謝保守黨或自由黨，而應感謝馬漢上校！
三、法國：法國很重視馬漢對於法國海軍政策的批評，並且稱讚其思想具有真正的創造性。
四、德國：德皇威廉二世及海軍部長鐵畢茲(Von Tripitz)亦深受馬漢影響亦不下於英國，雖然德國在馬漢發表其鉅著前就已著手擴建海軍；而馬漢著作，卻成為德國政府的最佳宣傳利器。但德國卻忽略了馬氏的一項重要訓條：“一個國家無法同時發展陸權與海權”，導致德國陸軍反而受經費影響而減低其戰力。
五、日本：當時日本正走向帝國主義和海軍主義的道路，馬漢的著作被譯成日文，為日本政府提供政治性和戰略性的理論根據，日本海軍學校把馬漢的著作當作教科書，各級學校圖書館也均收藏。
海權思想
馬漢用《海權對歷史的影響》及《海權對法國革命及帝國的影響》兩本鉅著，來探討他的海權哲學(Philosophy of sea power)，他根據英法兩國歷史，發現海權是民族(國家)偉大性不可或缺的因素，當運用適切時，海權可增長財富國力，運用不當時，則帶來國運衰頹。
主張擁有並運用具有優勢的海軍和其他海上力量，去控制海洋，以實現己方戰略目的的軍事理論。也有人譯作海上實力論。分析研究了英國同荷蘭、西班牙、法國等海軍強國為爭奪海洋霸權而進行的多次海戰以及美國獨立戰爭中的海戰，闡明瞭海權對這些戰爭的勝負，對有關國家、殖民地和海上貿易所具有的重大影響及作用。至1911年，馬漢又寫成《海軍戰略》一書，形成了他的海軍理論體系。
馬漢的海權論認為，以貿易(指商品輸出)立國的國家，必須控制海洋。奪取並保持制海權，特別是與國家利益和海外貿易有關的主要交通線上的制海權，是國家強盛和繁榮的主要因素。要奪取和保持制海權，必須具有佔優勢的海上實力，即強大的艦隊和商船隊以及發達的基地網。他從戰略角度分析了一國的地理位置、自然環境、領土範圍、人口數量、民族性格和政府政策(包括發展海上實力的政策)等因素對海權的影響，提出海軍戰略就是在平時和戰時建立並加強海上實力，以實現國家的戰略目標。他認為，奪取制海權的方法是艦隊決戰和海上封鎖，而要完全奪得制海權，只有通過艦隊決戰。他強調集中兵力，把集中兵力視為基本的作戰原則和貫徹海軍戰略的主要手段。他主張美國應建立強大的遠洋艦隊，首先控制加勒比海地區和中美洲地峽，爾後進一步控制其他海洋。還主張美國在太平洋同其他列強實行“合作”，以獲取利益，並爭奪中國市場。
NO:278_2
U235 於 2002/06/25 20:52
Re:哲學研究-軍事思想-馬漢.海權思想
海權論思想要義
馬漢歸納出影響海權發展的一般因素有六項，即：“地理位置”、“自然地理形態”、“領土大小”、“人口數量”、“民族性”、“政府的性質和政策”。
海權的六項基本要素
一、地理位置：最理想的位置是居中央位置的島嶼；靠近主要的貿易通道上，有良好的港口和海軍基地。不列顛群島與歐洲大陸的距離不遠不近，既足以使英國獲得對抗外敵入侵的相當安全保障，又便於打擊敵人，換言之，進可攻退可守。例如：英國以英吉利海峽和歐陸相隔大，不僅有水為屏障，且距歐陸近，因此英國不須維持大陸軍，而可集中國力發展海權，以優勢的海軍來封鎖歐陸港口，並控制出入歐洲北部的航線。與英國成強烈對比的是法國，他不僅要維持大陸軍，而其海軍也必須分駛大西洋與地中海，因此在海權競爭中，法國對英國自然居於劣勢。
二、自然地理形態：具綿長之海岸線，及擁有良好可用的港埠；海岸線可決定向海洋發展的難易程度，良好港灣則代表向海發展的先天潛力，而土地的肥沃與否，則影響人民討海為生的意願和需求。一國的海岸線是其邊界的一部份，凡是一個國家其疆界易於與外界接觸者，其人民便較容易向外發展，與外面世界相交往。地形平坦、土地肥沃可能使人民安土重遷，不願投身海洋，如法國；反之，則逼使人民不得不討海維生，如荷蘭、葡萄牙。島國及半島國家受限於地形上的因素，若欲發奮圖強，則必須重視海權的發展。
三、國家領土大小範圍：供應必要物資，但地形未經河川嚴重分割，大到難於防守；馬氏認為國土的大小必須與人口、資源及其他權力因素相配合。一個國家人口的總數與海岸線總長度的比例，具極大重要性。否則廣大的領土可能反而成為弱點。如面積太大，而人口與資源不成比例的國家，防守密度低，國家的危險性增高，假使又被河川或港口所割裂，則更是一大弱點。以美國內戰時的南方為例，以人口和資源的比例而言，其面積是太大了，尤其是有了太長的海岸線和太多的內陸水道，兵力易被分割而導致失敗。領土幅員應和人口、資源等因素相配合，地廣人稀、過度綿長的海岸線及內陸水道眾多等，有時反而成為弱點，如美國南北戰爭時之南方領土即是。
四、人口數量：提供從事海洋事業的人口培育，儲備海軍後備力量；人口數量和素質對海權均為重要基楚，海權國家不僅應有相當數量的從事航業人口，而其中直接參加海洋生活的人數更應站相當高度的比例。國家的平時航海事業(包括航運和貿易)足以決定其海軍在戰爭中的持久力。英國即為典型例證，他不僅是航海國家，而且也是造船和貿易國家，擁有發展海權的必要人力與技術資源。想向海洋發展的國家，不僅應有相當數量的人口，而且其直接或間接參加海洋活動的人數，也應占相當的比例。
五、民族性：面向海洋，具冒險犯難的性格，促進商機及航運發展；國民對海上貿易的意願及航海生產能力的心理因素亦極重要。人人以向海洋尋求財富為榮，航海事業自然蓬勃。海商與海軍的結合，再加上殖民地的開拓，終使英國成為海權霸主。主要為貿易願望(重商主義)和生產能力；有此心理基礎，人民才會走向海洋尋求財富。海洋商業與海軍的結合，再加上殖民地和海外市場的開拓，遂使英國成就有史以來的最大海洋強國。
我們正倡導全民正當休閒活動，惟受限於台灣地狹人稠，無法闢建足夠的休閒場所。台灣連綿的海岸適於規劃海上遊憩活動，例如遊艇、潛水、海釣、滑翔翼、拖曳傘、水上摩托車、賽船、泛舟、帆船、衝浪、滑水等活動，可增加全民休閒運動空間，同時提供青少年育樂的大自然天地，以紓解青少年問題，這些多元的海上活動，亦可透過海事教育逐步規劃實施。
六、政府的性質和政策：政府的戰咯主張，影響海軍武力的運用；政府必須明智而堅毅，始能對海權作長期發展。英國的成功主因即在此。自詹姆士一世開始，英國的國家政策即一直以追求海外殖民地、海上貿易和海軍優勢為目的。政府若明智而堅毅，培養其人民對海洋的興趣，則海權的發展也自然比較容易成功。英國自詹姆士一世時代開始，其國家政策就一直以追求殖民地、商業和海軍優勢為目的，故能奠定海洋強權基礎。馬漢認為英國之成就為空前海洋強權，除了具備上述基本條件的優勢外，其政府海權運作的適切，實居關鍵。在海權運作方面，馬漢認為英國若無海運貿易能力，無廣大殖民地(資源、基地和市場)，以及訓練有素的海員和船艦，則英國雖有先天優越條件，亦將無能為力，尤其在戰爭工具運用上，即制海權爭取上，英國通常均以在海上擊滅敵國艦隊或對敵港口建立封鎖為一貫指導，更是重要因素，相反的，法國卻熱衷於領土的征服而未著眼於擊滅英國艦隊，於是結果便完全不同。
當前海事教育問題之探討
馬漢海權論之中心思想
一、馬漢引證英國在拿破崙時代的戰爭中獲得海上霸權的事實，來證明欲發展海權必須以強大的海軍控制海洋，以掌握制海權：拿破崙幾次企圖渡過海峽征英皆告失敗後，於1798年征埃時，其海軍在尼羅河海戰時遭英國納爾遜將軍所率領的艦隊重創，地中海制海權盡失，本國與埃及遠征軍的交通線被切斷而告失敗。1801 年，拿破崙為了削弱英國的商業，號召各國武裝中立，俄國、丹麥、瑞典及普魯士皆參加，一致反對在波羅的海行使交戰國權利。英國必須仰賴波羅的海各國輸入橡木、繩索和帆布，所以無法容忍上述諸國參加武裝中立，乃派遣波羅的海艦隊，以武力來打破拿破崙的武裝中立政策。在哥本哈根海戰中擊敗丹麥海軍艦隊取得進出波羅的海的自由後並進入芬蘭灣，打破武裝中立的政策。1805年在特拉法加海戰中，英國艦隊擊敗法西聯合艦隊，建立英國海軍的無敵霸權。
二、 海權的發展屬外線作戰，以攻擊為主要任務，陸權對海則以防禦為主。
陸海權的合作，是走向合和平繁榮與發展，如：英國的殖民制度轉向邦聯制、美洲、東協、歐洲共同市場；陸海權發展的任一方走向錯誤的方向，就是走向戰爭，如：一次大戰的歐陸、二次大戰“德國”與“日本”，企圖統治全世界。純陸權的防禦發展如：蒙古之四大汗國、清帝國初期之禁海。
三、有優勢之海軍，優良的海外基地、海港，才能與敵人抗衡，發揮海權之力量。
(一)海軍的目的在於會戰，而最終的目的則為取得制海權以控制海洋，因此艦隊所需要的不是速度，而是強力的攻擊火力，擁有優勢的海軍，才能控制海洋。
(二) 擁有廣大又富饒的海外殖民地及優良海港，有利於艦隊補給、維修，對延伸海軍戰鬥能力有很大助益。海權必須能確保自己的交通線安全，並同時能切斷敵人的交通線。交通線愈長，則海權所能賜與的利益也就愈大。而交通線的建立，就依賴線上的各個海外基地(殖民地)與海港了。英國在18世紀在地中海南岸擁有眾多海外基地，因此方能封鎖法國海岸，擁有地中海制海權；法國拿破崙遠征埃及，其目的即欲切斷英國經地中海到印度之交通線。
三、 丹麥的日德蘭半島與西蘭島控制北海與波羅的海的航道咽喉；直布羅陀海峽緊扼大西洋與地中海的交通；蘇彝士運河為地中海與印度洋的海運衢道，若能掌握這些戰略要地，就可發揮以海制陸的優勢。
海權控制陸權的地帶
一、海峽：海峽是交通樞紐地帶，掌握海峽即可控制敵人之海上運輸，阻止其海權之發展。如獨立國協從波羅的海出大西洋之交通線受制於松德海峽；從黑海出地中海又受制於達達尼爾海峽及博斯普魯斯海峽，致使其海權發展自帝俄迄今仍無法獨霸於世。
二、半島：半島伸入海中可享海上交通、運補之利，亦可發揮陸海協同作戰之效果。如19世紀拿破崙時代的西班牙半島戰爭，英藉海上運補遠優於法軍藉陸路運補，致法軍在半島戰爭中失敗。
三、島嶼：島嶼如獲有優勢的空權與海權，則可發揮其控制陸權之戰略據點價值。如日本、台灣、菲律賓各自擁有堅強的空權與海權，才使中共勢力無法向太平洋及印度洋伸展，其戰略位置舉足輕重。地中海北岸的一系列島嶼亦是以海制陸的戰略據點，為世界霸權爭奪的對象。
海權國之基本條件
一、海軍條件：要有海軍、海上基地、海運路線(交通線)且不受他國控制。美國在20世紀雖擁有強大海軍艦隊，但被分隔於兩洋，無法達到“集中”、“節約”之原則，因此馬漢力主美國應開鑿並控制巴拿馬運河及控制加勒比海諸島以保障太平洋與大西洋航運路線之安全。美奉行馬氏之觀點而成今日海上之霸權。
二、海運條件：必須擁有龐大之商船、港口及順暢之海上航路，並有海外商業及經濟關係。從海權的意義來看，海權乃為控制海洋及利用海洋，以達成國家目標之能力，而拓展海權之主要工具為海軍武力及商漁船隊，武力用以制海以保障海上商漁船隊與交通線(海上航路)之安全，而商漁船隊可開發海外商業及經濟利益，厚植國力，平時商業船隊可賺取大量經濟利益，戰時可支援海軍艦隊作戰，如福島戰爭，英國即徵調很多油輪、貨輪、客輪、協助運補兵力及戰略物資。
三、海外商業條件：國民大量移民於國外殖民地，並建立雄厚的經濟實力，對國力之擴張具有極大優勢。17、18世紀，英國在其海軍武力配合其商業船隊在世界四處拓展其殖民地，獲致豐厚的經濟利益，而成為海上霸權，有日不落國之稱。台灣為一海島，四周環海，海岸線連綿1,000公里，是道地的海洋國家。為確保國家生存與安全，除維護海權(Sea Power)外，另為解決島上資源貧乏問題，改善國計民生，必須利用航運（海運）進口各種大宗貨品與原料，更要對外拓展貿易、賺取外匯。
構成海權的後天條件
一、工業生產：一個國家欲發揮和維持巨大的生產力，作為海權的背景，就必須從世界各地獲取大量不同的原料，經過加工轉變為各種戰咯物質，厚植國力；「工業生產」可說是建立海權的工具。
二、航運能力：商、漁業航隊精巧發達，除可促進國家的繁榮，其航運能力的發展亦是工業生產能力及海軍發揮海權力量的支撐。
三、基地：海軍若沒有良好的後方基地、中繼基地、前進基地，就難於發揮制海戰力，況且海外基地(殖民地)更是外貿的市場依據。
四、海軍武力：為控制主要海上交通線、海上戰略要點、重要港口及海岸、鄰近之陸上要域、航運及基地護衛的基本力量。
上述四項因素構成海權條件，並非是機械式的合成，而是在其合成的過程中，同時又產生彼此激發的作用。
工業生產、航運能力、基地、海軍武力四者息息相關。因為有雄厚的工業生產，才能造船造艦；有強大的航運能力，才能由世界各地輸入戰略物質與原料，才能拓展外貿，增加國家財富；有了基地，才能擁有海外市場，航運才有運輸目標，海軍武力才有發揮戰力的據點；具備海軍武力，才能確保制海，維護航運與基地的安全，四者相互支持，缺一不可，這也就是海權的本質。對資源不足而依賴外貿甚殷的國家來說，海上交通無異是生命線所寄，要想贏得台海防衛戰爭勝利，精實海權實力勢在必行，面對海洋世紀來臨，現代軍人，對海權思想與海軍戰略，實在不可不知。
NO:278_3
U235 於 2002/06/25 20:53
Re:哲學研究-軍事思想-馬漢.海權思想
海軍戰略內容
海軍戰略是由國家最高軍事領導機關根據本國的政治、經濟、軍事戰略、領土範圍、海洋地理環境、科學技術、國際形勢以及可能的作戰對象等條件制定。其內容主要包括海軍的建設、作戰、訓練和科學技術研究等方面。諸如海軍的建設方針，海軍內各兵種的構成、比重，領導和指揮體制及部隊的組織編制，武器裝備和軍需物資的規劃、生產和儲備，海軍基地、港口的分佈和建設，海上戰場的選定和準備，海軍後備力量的建設和戰時動員計畫；海軍的作戰方針，海上戰爭的目的、任務，海上戰區的劃分，海軍作戰部隊和勤務支援部隊的部署，控制海上戰略要點，奪取和掌握海洋戰區制海權和制空權的行動計畫，指揮和後勤系統的組織；海軍教育訓練的方針、原則、體制，以及海軍知識結構的確定等；海軍軍事科學研究的體制和規劃，海軍軍史、戰史、作戰理論和戰略、戰術的研究，各種訓令、教令、準則、操作的制定，艦艇、飛機和各種武器、裝備的發展方向、設計論證，研究海洋環境對海軍的影響，海軍的遙測學、海軍科學研究方法學等海軍邊緣科學理論的建設，等等，都屬於海軍戰略的範疇。現代海軍，已經發展成為一個具有很高的機動性和很強的突擊威力，並具有戰略襲擊能力的軍種。世界許多國家正競相開發海洋，有的海軍強國企圖稱霸海洋，在海洋權益上的鬥爭日趨激化，海軍的戰略地位越來越為人們所重視。
一、海軍戰略類型
在不同的歷史時期，不同國家的海軍實行不同的海軍戰略。其基本戰略類型有兩種：即“守勢作戰”和“攻勢作戰”。在戰略指導上，實行“守勢作戰”時，通常進行海上戰術、戰鬥的“攻擊作戰”；實行“攻勢作戰”時，於戰術、戰鬥攻擊的同時，在必要的一方，輔以必要的海上戰術、戰鬥的“防禦作戰”。
二、制海權
交戰一方的海軍，在一定時間對一定海區的。目的是確保己方兵力海上行動的自由，剝奪敵方兵力海上行動的自由；保護己方海上交通運輸的安全，阻止敵方的海上交通運輸，亦即使該海洋區域為己所用而不為敵所用。根據控制海洋區域的目的、範圍和持續時間，可分為“戰區制海權”、“戰略制海權”、“戰術制海權”。制海權不是絕對的，在優勢一方取得總制海權的情況下，劣勢一方也可能在一定的時間內，對局部海區取得局部制海權，一如空軍之局部空優與突襲(入)。
奪取制海權的戰爭在西元前5世紀的希波戰爭(492－449B.C.)就出現過。而馬漢為首創把制海權問題，綜合為軍事理論；隨著海軍武器裝備的不斷發展，海軍奪取制海權的手段也不斷變化。19世紀以前，主要使用水面艦艇，以後除水面艦艇外，還有潛艇和空軍，20世紀50年代起，又增加了核戰略導彈。在現代條件下，奪取和保持制海權，還包括奪取該海域上空的制空權，並需綜合使用海軍各種作戰兵力、兵器和多軍種聯合作戰方式才能達到。
三、海上封鎖
用武力切斷敵方海岸或某一海區與外界海上聯繫的進攻性作戰行動。分為“全面封鎖”和“局部封鎖”、“水上封鎖”、“水下封鎖”。目的是限制敵方艦船機動，孤立敵方島嶼或海岸區的兵力集團，掌握制海權，切斷敵方海上交通運輸。海上封鎖主要由海軍水面艦艇、潛艇和空軍配合實施，封鎖的方式有兵力封鎖、水雷封鎖，或兵力封鎖與水雷封鎖相結合。海上封鎖的地點，通常選在敵方的海軍基地、港口或主要航道以及海峽附近海區。
早在希波戰爭中，波斯艦隊就運用過海上封鎖。在以後的戰爭中，海上封鎖不斷得到發展。第一次世界大戰，英國艦隊就封鎖了德國的出海口，使德國艦船一度失去行動自由，海上運輸幾乎陷於停頓；隨後，德國海軍使用潛艇對英國實施海上(水下)封鎖。第二次世界大戰後期，美軍使用空軍實施大規模佈設水雷，對日本進行海上封鎖，斷絕了日本的原料和糧食等的輸入，切斷了日本本土與其所佔太平洋島嶼之間的海上聯繫。美軍在越南戰爭和英軍在馬爾維納斯群島之戰中，也實施過海上封鎖。在未來戰爭中，海上封鎖仍將是一種有效的作戰型式。
按國際條約和公約的規定，進行海上封鎖必須正式宣佈，指明封鎖的開始時間和地理界限，以及中立國艦船離開封鎖區域的期限。吾人非常懷疑，如果中-臺之間發生戰爭，中共是否會事先提出聲明，後才實施行動！
馬漢海軍戰略論精華
是指導海軍建設和作戰的方略。屬於國家軍事戰略，是國家軍事戰略在海軍中的運用。海軍之有馬漢正像陸軍之有克勞塞維茲，對於闡明海權在歷史中所扮演的角色及其重要意義，為馬漢最傑出的成就，能以全部歷史為背景來寫海軍史，並同時注意到政治及經濟因素者，馬漢實為第一人。
“集中”、 “中央位置”、“內線”、“海上交通線”、“絕對攻勢”等為馬漢海軍戰略論精華，其基本的理論架構，受約米尼《戰爭藝術》的影響頗深；“集中”與“中央位置”能迫敵分散兵力，“內線”能使兵力迅速到達某一點，海軍戰爭中唯一決定因素還是戰鬥艦隊，其真正的目的不是盡量增強某一艘船的威力，而是要使整個艦隊發揮最大的攻擊能力；因此，馬漢有一句常為人引述的名言：“絕勿分散艦隊！”。他說：交通是一個概括性的名詞，不是地理線，如陸軍所採取的道路，而是軍艦的必需補給，一個軍事實體與國家權力之間經常保持連絡的運動線。
一、集中原則：
集中乃獲致戰果的根本，集中的涵義有三：其一是“目標集中”。馬漢引用拿破崙的名言說：目標專一就是成功的祕訣，強調：切勿在同一時間內，作兩種意圖 (追逐兩個目標)；艦隊兵力部署，應能相互支援，密切聯繫，不得各自為戰。其二是：“優勢與牽制”；在決戰線上保持優勢兵力，以優勢主力攻擊敵之一點，另在其他點牽制敵軍，以便主力攻擊能獲致戰果。其三是：“火力集中”，當遭遇敵兩艘戰艦時，要集中火力合力攻擊其一艘，千萬不要各戰一艘。馬漢用：“永遠不要分散艦隊”一語強調集中原則的重要性。
二、中央位置：
馬漢認為位置是一種形勢，中央位置能提供一個提早到達目的的捷徑，但日俄戰爭之俄軍，雖據有旅順，卻因海戰失敗而未蒙其利，故中央位置須加上力量，才會形成真正有利的結果。換言之，擁有位置適中、形勢強固、資源豐富的海軍基地，海戰時就可居於先天有利地位，但並不保証絕對勝利。
三、內線：
內線就是從中央位置，向一個或數個據點延伸，用以取得阻止敵軍會合的中心位置，以便用劣勢兵力牽制一面之敵，另以主力集中攻擊他面之敵。換句話說：內線的定義，是作戰的一方能迅速調動兵力，集中對任何一面之敵，加以有效的運用。要言之，內線是較敵人運用的路線為短的一條路線。這又是一個作戰方便的手段，並非絕對勝利的保証。
四、海上交通線：
係陸上部隊與海上艦隊自由運動以維持戰力的空間，為補給線和連絡線的總稱，對軍事供應和勝負具有密切關係，是大軍作戰命脈，能支配戰爭，故有生命線之稱，必要時，又可使軍隊自由撤退，故又有逃命線之稱。不過，馬漢所說的交通線，並非指軍隊必經之途的地理線，而是船艦載量有限所無法攜行的必要補給品。他明確地指出所謂補給品：第一是燃料、第二是彈藥、最後才是糧食，而海軍艦隊的補給來源就是靠海軍基地。故馬漢真正的意思是，來自海軍基地的後勤補給與修，是成就海軍戰略持續的必要因素。
五、絕對攻勢：
海上作戰要保持絕對機動與攻勢，反對把海軍充當四通八達而漫無疆界的海洋防禦工具。他說：“在一切海戰中只有一項基本原則，即：唯有攻擊才能確保防禦的安全”、“海軍放棄了攻擊性能，等於放棄其最有效的基本功能”、 “在海上採取守勢，是絕對不利的，除了為形勢所迫採守勢之外，千萬別自動採取守勢，擁有優勢兵力者固應主動邀敵決戰，即使因兵力劣勢先行避戰，也當使敵不明我之動向，迫敵轉移兵力，再相機誘敵而擊滅之”。馬漢對劣勢海軍的運用，其實和柯白所說的“存在艦隊(Fleet in being)”有些類似。
近代戰略學者羅辛斯基(Herbert Rosinski)論制海權時，認為馬漢對海軍的運用，並不以“在其防衛區域的近前方建立防線為滿足”，而是要“獲得完整的制海權為理想”。羅辛斯基歸納馬漢言論的意義說：“因為海是一個整體，其中沒有任何部分可以劃分和設防，所以要對我方在海上或經過海上的利益提供有效保護，則唯一的方法就是把敵人逐出整個海洋之外......而在海上，僅只為了本身安全之故，我們也仍將被迫必須徹底擊滅敵軍，並將其逐出海洋之外”。
結論
古希臘學者修昔底德(Thucydides，西元前 460-406)指出：海權(Sea Power)是海的權力(Power of the sea)不屬於任何人，而僅當人們知道如何利用此種權力時，海才會把此種權力賜與他。歷史的軌跡告訴我們，過去忽視海洋的人，平時必難以發展，戰時必遭受重大挫敗。中共曾對“世界海戰史”、“鴉片戰爭”、“中、日甲午戰爭” 海戰歷史進行大量研究，得到的結論是：“守土型的國防觀念，是海權意識淡薄的突出表現，在海洋時代必然貽誤大局......要保證國土安全，首先要保證國家的海疆安全”，而致力於擴建海軍，以爭取海權。但後世史學家對其仍不免有所批評，如：
一、在歷史中還有若干非海洋帝國的興起，他都未曾考慮。
二、海權因素故然重要，但導致拿玻崙失敗又遂有其他因素的存在。
四、 英國在17和18世紀中的成功，海權雖為重要理由，但並非唯一的理由。
發展海權的第一步，就是研究海權思想和海軍戰略理論，馬漢的思想，正可以給海軍一個有力的指引；雖然馬漢的思想並非十全十美，而且有些已嫌不合時宜，但吾人若能師其意而不泥其古，兼採其他海洋戰略學者卓見以資互補，致力實踐於國防建設實務，必然裨益無窮。
第二次世界大戰結束時，美國國務卿海約翰曾言：地中海是昨日之洋，大西洋是今日之洋，太平洋是明日之洋。時值邁入21世紀，位居西太平洋“中央位置”、東南亞戰略要衝的中華民國台灣，對馬漢的海權論應有更深一層的詮釋與認識。
台灣中華民國，在四面環海資源有限，本島戰略縱深不足，戰時當以臺海週圍之海域為決戰戰略縱深，自然平時海、空交通運輸安全之確保，即是我國的生命線。
台灣諸島群位於中國大陸海岸線之中央位置，是控制中共向海洋發展必經要衝，為中國大陸權成就強海權之際，對於台灣問題，不願放棄訴諸武力，美國海權之對於南北韓及越南問題，也都是大陸權與世界第一大海權對抗的因素之一。
不論是為了維護中華民國的永續生存發展，或是抵制中國的威脅，以維護海、空航道安全，臺灣均不得不致力於發展制陸空海權實力。既已處於西太平洋中央位置和空海內線有利位置，加上“質精、適量、戰力強”的空海島上防衛力量，陸軍依島群制海制空、護衛支援海空作戰，海軍依海護島(群)護空、實施制海空陸作戰，空軍依島護島護海護空、實施制海空陸作戰，以及結合諸友邦支援，未來的臺海防衛戰爭，才能立於不敗之海上。
亦在此呼籲中國：
◎不要忘了馬漢的重要訓示“一個國家無法同時發展陸權與海權”，歷史的宿命如果真是“陸權與海權的對抗”，拿下這個“臺灣島群”，將是真正陸海權對抗的開始，中國的生存發展真的需要與太平洋諸海權對抗嗎？
◎中國現在之發展有需要，如同美國南北戰爭後之向海發展嗎？中國之發展海權能取代美國成為世界級海上霸權嗎？
◎從中國研究《地緣政治》見“森”之後，怎可往牛角尖裏鑽，不見“林”“木”反以往東南向挑起《陸海權對抗》的“不放棄以武力解決臺灣問題”只見“草(島)”的閉著眼放火燒嗎？
◎如果中國之陸權，真沒有能力向西北陸地繁榮經濟，反而向最能幫助中國繁榮的最大一部海權，臺、日、美採取對抗的心態，才是消耗與不智！
參考資料：
海權論(馬漢)
1.所謂“存在艦隊”的觀念，就是：“只要海軍艦隊仍然存在，則對兵力較強的一方，就永遠構成潛在威脅”。“存在艦隊”用以阻止優勢敵軍獲得制海權的手段為：採取守勢，拒絕納爾遜式的正規海戰(Regular battle)，並抓住一切機會來進行攻擊。
2.制海權乃是為一種特定目的而控制海洋交通，其意義即為使我海上行動不受阻礙或反對的能力，以及阻止對方如此行動的能力。這個定義是英國海洋戰略學家柯白(Sir Julian Corbert，1854~1922)所界定的。
3.海軍思想的發展，國防部史編局譯印。
4.中華戰略學刊民83年春季刊，劉達材《海權論》。
5.中共海權意識崛起初探，黃埔雙月刊541期。
6.陸軍軍官團因進修書籍《馬漢海軍戰略》中譯版序文。
7.戰略家思想與著作，鈕先鍾，麥田出版社。
8.西方戰略思想史，鈕先鍾，麥田出版社。
9. 21世紀的戰略前瞻，鈕先鍾，麥田出版社。
10.http://www2.fjtc.edu.tw/mio/Strategic/%E8%A5%BF%E6%96%B9%E5%85%B5%E5%AD%B8/Mahan.htm
11.馬漢的海權思想與海軍戰略
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